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REFLECTING ON MORALS

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IN order to do anything intelligently a certain degree of reflection is necessary. This is particularly obvious with regard to any practical activity or occupation. Take, for example, the case of a naïve bricklayer. Let us assume that this man never reflects upon the nature of his occupation, but simply looks upon it as a more or less mechanical procedure of laying one brick upon another for a certain period of time during the day. He does not relate his occupation with the occupations of his fellow-workmen, or even with the purpose of erecting buildings. If such a man were left to his own devices on a desert island with a plentiful supply of bricks and mortar, we could imagine him erecting a gigantic pinnacle of bricks, without purpose or meaning, where a more intelligent man would have endeavoured to construct a shelter against the rigours of the climate.

Naïveté such as this is rare at the practical level, and no doubt the naïve bricklayer would qualify as being mentally deficient. Yet such naïveté is by no means uncommon at the theoretical level. But regardless whether an occupation be practical or theoretical, in order that we really know what we are about we must reflect upon that occupation and upon the relationship in which we stand to it. The fact that theoretical occupations are themselves already reflective in no way absolves the theoretician from carrying out this further reflection—in his case, the reflection upon himself as reflecting.

All of this is no doubt very obvious. It seems almost a platitude to assert that in order to do anything intelligently we must reflect upon what we are doing. But particularly in the theoretical as opposed to the practical domain, the temptation is to assent to this obvious truth and, having assented to it, proceed to ignore it. It will always seem to a certain type of theoretical intelligence that

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whatever is obvious is trivial, and hence to be dismissed. Thus, it is not sufficient that a philosopher (for example) should simply *agree* that he is engaged in a reflective activity. If all we were concerned with were the fact that philosophy is a reflective activity, why then there is no escaping from that fact. Neither, if we are honest, is there any escaping from the recognition of that fact—once it has been pointed out to us. The trouble is, however, that our attention is apt to wander. What we must do, therefore, if we are to check this wandering attention is to keep the fact that we are reflecting upon experience constantly in mind. In other words, we must grant the recognition of this fact the status of a methodological principle.

The question now arises as to the justification for adopting such a principle. At the practical level the failure to reflect has obvious consequences. At the theoretical level the consequences are perhaps less obvious, but no less grave. In the interests of clarity I shall offer an exceedingly crude example of the kinds of confusion arising out of the failure to reflect at the theoretical level.

Sigmund Freud and his successors have, in the course of their researches in the field of psychoanalysis, laid great emphasis upon what they refer to as "infantile sexuality." It is maintained that all normal children pass through three main stages in their development, these stages being first, an incestuous stage, secondly, a homosexual stage, and finally reaching the heterosexual stage. In other words, a child in its early infancy is sexually attracted towards the parent of the opposite sex, and in late childhood is sexually attracted towards children of the same sex. But what justification is there to offer for this description of childhood in terms of sexual deviation? There is, in fact, none. The description is a result of a failure on the part of the psychologist to reflect upon his own function. Admittedly if the psychologist were to act towards his mother in the manner of a child at the breast we should be inclined to regard his conduct as somewhat sinister, and if he were to behave towards his fellows in the manner of a child of ten we might also feel rather dubious. But a psychologist is not a child, nor is a child an adult. What is appropriate behaviour for the one is not necessarily appropriate for the other. If the psychologist were simply to take the trouble of reflecting upon the fact that he is an adult reflecting upon the behaviour of children this naïve confusion need not arise. Certainly the psychologists who subscribe to the notion of "infantile sexuality" are primarily interested in abnormal psychology and in the treatment of neurosis; and no doubt there is something to be said for the view that the behaviour of neurotics is childish. There is nothing to be said in favour of the view that the behaviour of children is neurotic.

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The error of "false identification" exemplified in the speculations of the Freudian psychologist is also to be found in the writings of moral philosophers. Indeed, the main error of naïve theoreticians in general is the confusion of references in the first person with references in the third. It is always possible for the theoretician to think of the person involved in the situation he is considering either as himself or as someone else. Or, to put the point more accurately, it is always possible for a man whose job it is to assess in some respects or other a human situation to think of the person involved in the situation either as "I" or as "he." I say this is the more accurate way of putting the matter, because it is possible for me to refer to myself in the third person as well as in the first, and so it is not sufficient in order that we distinguish between the first and third party reference that we distinguish simply between the idea we have of ourselves and the idea we have of others. If we are to avoid confusing the two types of reference we must distinguish between the references themselves, and the distinction between myself as "I" and myself as "he" must be made just as clearly as the distinction between myself as "I" and another person as "he." So far as the actual reference is concerned, there is no distinction at all between myself and another as "he." In either case the reference is third party. There is, of course, nothing in itself wrong about making these diverse references. The assessor has a perfect right to refer to the person involved in the situation either in the first or in the third person, *provided* he clearly distinguishes between the two alternative references. Should he fail to make this distinction he will almost invariably be led into spurious identification of these references, together with the subsequent application of categories which belong to himself as assessor with categories which belong to himself, or another, as agent. For it is not the case that the categories which apply to references in the first person need apply to those in the third. It is for this reason that the psychologist, if he is to furnish us with accurate information regarding the experiences of childhood, must bear in mind that he is not a child and that the categories which apply to him do not necessarily apply to children. Similarly, if the moral philosopher is to furnish us with accurate information regarding moral experience, he must bear in mind that he is not the moral agent. The fact that he has been a moral agent himself is no more (and, of course, no less) significant than that the psychoanalyst was once a child himself. Either is at liberty to draw upon his own experiences should it suit his purpose to do so. But the distinction between himself as assessor and the subject (whether the subject be himself or another) must be clearly and consistently maintained if his report is to be of any significance. Otherwise the tendency will be to confuse the references, so that the

assessor will develop the ambiguous attitude involving identification and non-identification with the agent, which in turn gives rise to a variety of confusions as regards the nature of the action itself.

By way both of explaining and of exemplifying what is here maintained, I shall offer some examples of this confusion as it figures in the writings of certain reputable philosophers.

The problem of "subjective" and "objective" rightness was of great concern to philosophers of the "deontologist" school, such as E. F. Carritt and W. D. Ross.¹ Ought a man to do what is right, or what he thinks is right? It would not be to our purpose here to examine in detail the many subtle distinctions and careful arguments which were advanced by these philosophers in their treatment of this question. We need only concern ourselves with the broad outlines of the question at issue. According to the objective view, a man's duty consists in doing what is right: according to the subjective view, a man's duty consists in doing what he thinks is right. Neither view seems adequate as a description of moral experience, since from the subjective point of view it can be the case that a man ought to do what is wrong, while from the objective point of view it can be the case that a man ought to do what he thinks is wrong. It should be noted that both the subjective and the objective view imply ethical objectivity, for both distinguish between what is right and what is thought right—the subjective view being that although something is right a man ought to do what he thinks is right, and the objective view being that regardless what a man thinks is right he ought to do what is right. To subscribe to this distinction at all is to subscribe to the notion that something is right, regardless whether we are of the opinion that a man ought to do what is right or what he merely thinks is right. Both sides assume that there is such a thing as objective rightness, and differ only in their estimate as regards what a man ought to do in the light of this assumption.

Even if we grant that there is such a thing as an objectively right action, the question arises as to whether the knowledge of such an action is in fact accessible, and, if so, to whom. Apparently not to the agent. The objectively right action, for the moral agent, can only be the action he ought to do if only he could discover what it was. Yet if the action is completely unknown how can it be regarded as an action which ought to be done? Obviously, the action cannot be completely unknown, and we do not have far to seek in order to discover the implied possessor of this knowledge: namely, the philosopher who is considering the problem. From both the subjective and objective points of view, the agent is ignorant of

¹ See the books *Ethical and Political Thinking* and *The Foundations of Ethics* of these respective authors.

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what is right whereas the assessor knows what is right. Where, then, is the connection between the objectively right action and obligation? Nowhere, it would seem. But if there is no connection between the objectively right action and obligation, there seems little point in asking whether or not an agent ought to do what is objectively right. On the other hand, if there is to be a connection between obligation and the objectively right action, this requires that the agent knows what is right. But in that case the whole question becomes ludicrous. No moral agent has ever concerned himself with the problem as to whether he ought to do what he thinks is right or what he knows is right. Thus, not only is the agent excluded from the knowledge of what is right, but he *must* be so excluded if the question regarding whether he ought to do what is right or what he thinks is right is to be raised at all.

Admittedly the agent never knows what is right in the sense that he can never be absolutely sure of the consequences of his actions. Success may not be a sufficient condition of an objectively right action, but it is a necessary condition. The action I ought to do, or think I ought to do, is an action which has not yet been done; and just because of this I can never know that *any* action I ought to do is "right" in the sense of fulfilling its purpose. But neither can the philosopher know this. Alternatively, once an action is accomplished I may see that it was right, in the sense that it has succeeded; and, other things being equal, I can see this just as plainly as the philosopher or anyone else. The fact that I can look back upon my moral experience and say that I ought to have done something other than what I did, even although I thought what I did was right at the time, is apparently taken by the deontologist as evidence that in any moral situation there is some specific action I categorically ought to do. But when I say that I ought to have done something other than I did, what I mean is that assuming, for example, I was under an obligation to help this man, the obligation would have been fulfilled (as in fact it was not) by doing this other action. I do not mean that I ought to have done something else in the general sense—i.e. that instead of helping the man I ought to have hindered him. It is because (let us say) that I *have* hindered him that I say I ought to have done something else: assuming I was under such obligation then, I now wish I had done something else. But this is not to say that the action was categorically binding—even in the sense that it would have been so, had I been aware of it. For, if the action were so regarded, it would no longer be a question of wishing I had done it but of wishing that I ought to have done it: and that no one can wish.

So far as our present inquiry is concerned, however, what is of interest to us is less the presence of contradictions within the notion

of the "objectively right action," than the manner in which such a contradictory notion should have arisen at all. As has been previously indicated, the main error to be encountered in the writings of naïve theoreticians is that of failing to distinguish between first and third party reference. When the subject under consideration is human action a further confusion—in the present case closely allied to this last—is liable to arise with regard to the *time* of the action. Just as it is possible to envisage a situation either in the first or in the third person, so also is it possible to posit an action either as accomplished or as unaccomplished. The language employed by the philosopher is not a reliable guide as regards these distinctions. It is possible to employ language which implies that one is thinking in the first person when one is actually thinking in third, and vice versa. Similarly with the language employed in reference to accomplished and unaccomplished action. Unless care is exercised, this state of affairs may lead to considerable confusion. Only where an action is posited as accomplished can I regard it as objectively right. Only where an action is posited as unaccomplished can I regard myself as being under an obligation to perform it. I cannot think of myself as being under an obligation to perform an action and also think of the action as accomplished, since if it is accomplished I am no longer under an obligation. This is obvious enough. But if we adopt a naïvely theoretical position we may make the mistake of supposing that *someone else* can be under an obligation to perform an action which is posited by us as accomplished. We think of ourselves simply as *knowing* something that the agent does not know—namely the right action—and there is nothing in itself contradictory in the notion that we know something which another man does not know. Where the contradiction arises is in positing an action as accomplished and unaccomplished simultaneously. Moral agency requires that an action has not been done, while moral assessment requires that an action has been done; and it is impossible to regard oneself as agent and assessor at one and the same time in respect of one and the same action. In order to assess the rightness of an action it is necessary that we think of the agent in the third person, since the action is posited as accomplished. But it is only where we think of the agent in the first person that we can regard him as a moral agent. Action and agent are, however, necessary and reciprocal poles in the moral situation, and their mutual isolation can only lead to distortion. Such isolation is inherent both in the "subjective" and in the "objective" theory of rightness, and the result is a confusion of the future with the past, the unaccomplished with the accomplished action.

The elusiveness of this temporal confusion is due to the ease with which the person of the agent may be altered while employing

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language which does not indicate any such inconsistency. Although the "subjectivist" identifies himself with the agent, it remains possible for him to refer to the agent in the third person, and, despite the fact that he himself would be prepared to admit that he cannot be under an obligation to perform an action which has already been done, this third party reference may lead him to regard the action in question as known to be right. Thus, he identifies himself with the agent in that he regards the action as obligatory, and does not identify himself with the agent in that the agent does not know the action is right. Although the "objectivist," on the other hand, does not identify himself with the agent, it remains possible for him to refer to the agent in the first person, and this is liable to mislead him into regarding the action which is known to be right as also obligatory. But if the action is to be regarded as the action which the agent ought to do, it must be posited as unaccomplished, and therefore not known to be right. These contradictions in the "subjective" and "objective" views are by no means incidental. The "subjectivist" is bound to regard himself at one point as the assessor, and the "objectivist" is bound to regard himself at one point as the moral agent. Otherwise neither will be considering whether a man ought to do what is right or what he thinks is right at all, since for the "subjectivist" nothing will be right and for the "objectivist" nothing will be obligatory. But once these contradictions have been explicated it becomes difficult to assign much significance to the notion of "objective rightness" as it figures both in the "subjective" and in the "objective" views. The objectively right action is an essentially contradictory notion—an action at once accomplished and unaccomplished, an action which is not an action; in short, a thought which no one can think.

Confusion of person is not restricted to the philosophers of the deontological school. Modern "philosophy of language" shares the naïveté of more traditional philosophy in this respect. It will be remembered that according to the emotive theory of ethics which logical-positivism endorses, when I make a moral judgment I am only expressing my attitude towards the action or situation in question, and exhorting my audience to adopt a similar attitude towards it. "The question for moral philosophy," says Ayer, "is not whether a certain action is right or wrong, but what is implied by saying it is right, or saying it is wrong." The description of a man's activities is in no way amplified by saying that he acted rightly or wrongly, and if two observers differ in their evaluations, and are each equally well informed as regards the facts, it does not follow that either of them is contradicting himself—as would be the case if there were a logical connection between the facts and their evaluation of them. But if there is no logical, neither is there any

scientific connection, for we can only point to the facts and say "that is good," "that is bad," etc. The facts cannot provide us with evidence for our moral judgments since the facts are precisely what we judge morally. "Moral judgments are reasons only in the sense that they determine attitudes. One attempts to influence another person morally by calling his attention to certain natural features of the situation which are likely to evoke from him the desired response. Or again, one may give reasons to oneself as a means of settling on an attitude or, more importantly, as a means of coming to some practical decision." Where moral judgments are passed upon historical or fictitious persons, what we are doing is to evaluate a certain *kind* of person or action and so encourage or discourage in ourselves or in others propensities to act likewise. A moral judgment "may be regarded as expressing the attitude which the reasons given for it are calculated to evoke." It is an element in the patterns of behaviour which make up our moral attitudes. In so far as moral judgment contributes towards defining such attitudes, it may be said to express them. The objection may be raised that on this view there cannot be such a thing as ethical disagreement, but this point need not prove embarrassing. It is indeed true that we indulge in ethical disputation. One man will say that X is good, another will say that not X is good, but such disagreement is of a personal nature, and no actual contradiction is involved. There is nothing in the argument to imply that X is good *and* bad. Each of the disputants is merely expressing his own attitude towards X. To offer as an argument against this an example in which X "really" is good, is impossible; such an example would in turn merely express the attitude of the person giving the example. "Moral judgments are emotive rather than descriptive . . . they are persuasive expressions of attitudes."

The foregoing account of the emotive theory is taken from Ayer's article in the magazine *Horizon*, but differs little from the general view expressed in *Language, Truth and Logic*. Ayer is now prepared to concede that "to say . . . that these moral judgments are merely expressive of certain feelings of approval or disapproval is an oversimplification." But apart from his rather vague references to "patterns of behaviour," nothing is done to make good this deficiency. He also incorporates in this later account the notion of the persuasive element in ethical evaluations, and hence the possibility of significant disagreement over questions of value. This point was briefly referred to in the second edition of *Language, Truth and Logic*: "a consideration of any dispute about a matter of taste will show that there can be disagreement without formal contradiction, and that in order to alter another man's opinions, in the sense of getting him to change his attitude, it is not necessary to contradict anything

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he asserts. A great deal of what passes for ethical dispute is disagreement regarding facts: "it is, however, also possible to influence other people by a suitable choice of emotive language." It is perhaps misleading of Ayer to say that there can be disagreement about a question of value according to his theory, since what is really meant is a disagreement in attitude. But whereas his earlier contention in *Language, Truth and Logic* (that "one really never does dispute about questions of value, for such dispute is not really about a question of value, but about a question of fact") might have been taken to imply that if both disputants were sufficiently well-informed agreement would be reached, his later contention bears no such implication. This is important, because the earlier account left room for a more orthodox sense of "value." If in order that ethical agreement be reached it is only required that the facts of the case be known, this might be taken to imply that quite definite ethical characteristics are attached to this or that action or situation; and since not even Ayer has ever maintained that agreement regarding facts constitutes agreement in moral judgment, this might mean that there really were ethical values in the traditional sense—for otherwise, what would we be agreeing about? In short, this would imply some sort of ethical objectivity, which is a notion very foreign to Ayer's way of thinking. Nevertheless, it is an empirical fact that we do disagree, and since ethical values are scouted by the logical-positivist, something must be found to disagree about. This is supplied in the form of affective attitudes of persons indulging in ethical disputation, and the examination of these attitudes is the province of the psychologist rather than the philosopher.

The emotive theory of ethics has received its most extensive presentation in C. L. Stevenson's *Ethics and Language*. Stevenson gives a detailed account of the operation of ethical terms in ordinary discourse. He realizes that any bald statement which relegates ethics to the psychiatric ward will be objected to on empirical grounds. If "X is good" is equivalent to "most people like X," ethics is a matter to be decided by ballot; if it is equivalent to "I like X," we are left to the vagaries of introspection. Stevenson believes that where the traditional public-interest and self-interest theories fail is in concentrating exclusively upon the descriptive connotation of the word "good." To be at all convincing "interest" theories must attend more carefully to the emotive disposition of ethical terms; for the function of ethical statements is not to convey information, but to influence people. If I make an ethical observation to my neighbour, I am not merely acquiescing that I, or most men, approve or disapprove of the action or situation in question. What I am trying to do is to get him to adopt a similar attitude, and the

possibility of my being able to do so is dependent upon the emotive meanings of ethical terms. Many, perhaps most, words carry an emotive as well as a descriptive meaning. This may be brought out by considering words like "negro" and "nigger," "sensuous" and "sensual," "free-love" and "adultery," etc., where the difference in meaning is emotive (expressing the attitude of the person employing the preferred word, and also tending to arouse similar attitudes in the person addressed), while the descriptive meaning remains constant. Words may thus be used descriptively to express the beliefs of the speaker, or emotively to express his attitudes in a persuasive or prescriptive manner. In this sense, ethical propositions are imperatives. But the imperative element is not crudely obvious. If it were, the propositions would lose their effectiveness; no man can approve or like anything to order. (An obvious criticism of the theory at this point is that if Stevenson's work is successful it should render the imperative element obvious, and thus rob the ethical terms of their effectiveness.) If I am arguing the rights and wrongs of a case with an opponent, I may offer him factual information, but once he has accepted the facts in question there is nothing more to be done, assuming he still disagrees with me, except to resort to persuasion. But it is just at this point that the dispute becomes ethical. The manner in which language operates on such occasions is often by means of definitions. A change in meaning may cause a change in interest, and this is effected by means of "persuasive definitions." It is characteristic of persuasive definitions that their emotive function remains constant while their conceptual content is changed. For example, the question as to whether Pope is a poet, may be regarded as linguistic in so far as it can be resolved into the question as to whether we are prepared to extend the conceptual meaning of the word "poet" in order to bestow that honorific title upon Pope. Ethical terms proper, however, have no conceptual content, possess no descriptive meaning, but are purely emotive in their function. Nevertheless the meanings of ethical terms are constant to at least this extent: that such expressions as "X is good" are equivalent to "I approve of X; do so likewise!"

According to the emotive theory the function of the philosopher is an extremely limited one. Yet despite the severity of the limitations it imposes, the method remains exceedingly naïve. Let us consider the procedure more closely. The philosopher sets out to analyse the proposition "X is good." This proposition is considered in the light of its employment in ordinary conversations: it is analysed, in other words, as a *statement*. But it is important to notice that although "X is good" is to be analysed as a statement, the person making the statement is excluded from the parentheses. In spite of this fact, however, the analysis offered is of the type, "I like X; do so likewise."

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What this amounts to is that the speaker, who was excluded from the proposition, is suddenly introduced in the analysis. But this is not a legitimate procedure. The resultant analysis (i.e. "I like X; do so likewise") is not an analysis of "X is good" at all, but an analysis of "I say X is good." Obviously, however, the analyst wishes to obtain an analysis of "X is good" which will apply to *anyone* who enunciates this proposition, and not simply to himself. Yet the analysis which is offered is not third party, but first: "I like X; do so likewise." And the reason for this is not hard to find: it would be too obvious a reduction of ethics to conventionalism if it were maintained that whenever I said "X is good" I meant that other people liked X, and wanted me to like it too. Nevertheless, if the analyst is to obtain an analysis which will apply to persons other than himself, the analysis should be in the form: "A likes X, and wants me to like it too." But this third-party analysis can only be obtained by analysing a third-party proposition. "A likes X, and wants me to like it too," is neither an analysis of the proposition "X is good" nor of the proposition "I say X is good," but an analysis of the proposition "A says X is good." (If to this it is objected that the proper form of this proposition is in turn, "P says A says X is good," then this is admittedly the case where we refuse to break the charmed circle of third party reference. No regress of this kind follows where the "P" in question is the analyst himself. The alternative is linguistic solipsism.) What the linguistic analyst does, is to apply the analysis of "I say X is good" to propositions of the form "A says X is good"; and indeed it is from this confusion of propositional reference that the analysis offered derives much of its apparent force. For if the analyst were simply maintaining that whenever *he* said "X is good," what he meant was that he liked X and wanted us to like it too, then this confession might arouse little interest. True, if we were discussing the rights and wrongs of a case with him, we should have to bear in mind the fact that he was employing the expression "X is good" in this particular way. But taken in itself, the fact that the expression means this when he employs it is of little consequence except, perhaps, to himself. What makes it seem a matter of some consequence to us, is the extension of this analysis to *our* propositions. But this is only effected by means of the referential confusion already cited, i.e. the application to the proposer's proposition of an analysis which is only applicable to that of the analyst. This identification of what other people mean by "X is good" with what the analyst means by that expression is an instance of arbitrariness, not of analytical acumen.

Admittedly it may sometimes be the case that the proper analysis of "A says X is good" is, as a matter of fact, "A likes X, and wants me to like it too." For my own part, I am perfectly willing to grant

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that there are many occasions upon which this analysis is sound. When people say conventionally that something is good, all this amounts to is that they like something and want me to like it too: this is all their statement signifies, so far as I am concerned. Yet this is not necessarily what people have in mind when they issue moral injunctions. Such people often imagine themselves to be in a position of authority as regards the behaviour of others: sometimes on supposedly religious grounds, but more frequently upon no grounds other than their own self-importance. What they mean is absurd, but by a process of "double-think" they mean it none the less. Thus, ethical terms are employed to emphasize personal prejudice and generally "lay down the law." We often hear people telling one another that they "ought" to do something as though they were in a position to put one another under moral obligation by mere force of words. If we could do this we could also say "let there be light"—and light there would be. People who talk in this vein are suffering from delusions of grandeur, and it is important that they should realize the basic worthlessness of those god-like pronouncements. But the linguistic analysis of ethical statements will never effect this realization, for that analysis remains constant no matter how ethical terms are employed, and therefore cannot be invoked in order to explicate their abuse.

The propositional confusion here outlined parallels the confusion already described in the writings of the deontologists, and stems from a similar lack of reflection. We cannot regard ourselves at one and the same time as assessor and agent in respect of one and the same action. The reflection which is required in order to distinguish between assessor and agent must also be invoked if we are to distinguish between analyst and proposer. Only thus are we enabled to keep our references clear and consistent—be they propositional or factual. In one way the linguistic method offers stronger temptations than most to overlook first and third party references, since from one point of view all the references are third party. That the first person singular is employed in "I say X is good," for example, does not alter the fact that the reference is third party in so far as it is treated by the analyst qua analyst. Linguistic analysis is in this sense an objective method. But this makes no difference so far as our reflective discipline is concerned. Although from one point of view "I say X is good" is third party, it is propositionally first. Linguistic method dispenses with the distinction between first and third party reference in that it is indifferent as to who enunciates the proposition "I say X is good"—whether it be myself or another. But the distinction re-emerges at the new (i.e. propositional) level. We have now to distinguish between "I say X is good" and "A says X is good"—these being the propositional forms of first and third

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party reference respectively. We may remain indifferent as to who enunciates these propositions only so long as we distinguish between the propositions themselves. They are not identical. The tendency to identify them, as instanced by the application of the analysis of "I say X is good" to "A says X is good," arises out of the naïve identification of the analyst with the proposer. "X is good" stands in a similar relation to the proposer as the act to the agent, and stands in a similar relation to the analyst as the act to the assessor. The reference to proposition for the linguistic analyst parallels the reference to action of the deontologist, and to analyse a proposition is no more to propose it than to assess an action is to perform it.

The naiveté which leads to the exclusion of the analyst from the parentheses of the proposition as enunciated by him, results in the application of identical analyses to his own propositions and those of others. But may not this confusion be avoided where the analyst directs his attention exclusively upon his *own* propositions? This certainly has the appearance of a less arbitrary procedure. Providing the analyst does not meddle with propositions as enunciated by others, it should be impossible to confuse the analyses appropriate to the latter with analyses appropriate to his own propositions. The difficulty is to see much importance in such analyses except for the analyst himself and, perhaps, for those standing in a personal relationship to him. On the face of it such analyses may be of psychological interest, but they can hardly be of interest to philosophers. If, however, the propositions in question are considered from the standpoint of the facts to which they are related, then the application of such relations might fairly claim to be of philosophical interest as offering a basis for the classifying of propositions in accordance with those facts. For example, it might be the case that certain propositions which are usually thought to refer to the same sort of fact really refer to totally distinct facts, and the establishing of such a distinction would be a genuine philosophical undertaking. Even although the philosopher who attempts this undertaking concerns himself exclusively with propositions as enunciated by him, thus avoiding confusion of *propositional* reference, yet the *factual* references may readily be confused if the facts in question happen to be, on the one hand, an experience of the analyst and, on the other, an experience of someone else. For the mere fact that the proposition refers to the experiences of different *persons* may lead to the notion that the experiences themselves are essentially different, which by no means follows.

An attempt to distinguish between having an obligation and having a feeling of obligation is made in Chapter Eleven of R. M. Hare's *The Language of Morals*, where he writes: "It is important to point out a fact which has been singularly ignored by some

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moralists, that to say of someone that he has a feeling of obligation is not the same as to say that he has an obligation. To say the former is to make a statement of psychological fact, to say the latter is to make a value judgment." It should be noted that this reference is made in the third person, i.e. it states what the assessor (or moralist) has to say regarding the moral agent. But, as so often happens in moral philosophy, there is an implicit reference in the first person, i.e. to the assessor, with which the reference in the third person is confused. Under cover of this confusion, what is merely a difference in personal reference between identical statements emerges as a seeming difference in the nature of the two statements themselves. The fact of the matter is that considerations of this kind not only have not, but never could have, any bearing upon the distinctions they are supposed to establish. The dice are loaded, as it were, at the very outset of the game, inasmuch as the convention of referring via the assessor to what *really* ought to be done, and referring via the agent to what *he* merely *feels* ought to be done, is assumed. The only reason why such subterfuge as this passes unnoticed, is that when we read such passages we naturally identify ourselves with the assessor, since to read a book on moral philosophy is not to be an agent in a moral situation. It is only by begging the question in this way that any relevance to the supposed distinction between having an obligation and having a feeling of obligation is maintained. In "third-person" examples of the type we are now considering, it is always I who make the value-judgment and the other fellow who merely has a feeling. But there is no reason why, if his feeling he ought to do X be a psychological fact, my feeling he ought to do Y should not also be a psychological fact. Alternatively, there is no reason why, if what I say he ought to do be a value-judgment, what he says he ought to do should not be a value-judgment. And this will always be the case where the examples under consideration contain references to more than one consciousness.

The propositions invoked by Hare in support of the supposed distinction may be stated as follows: "X ought to do Y" (value judgment), and "X feels X ought to do Y" (statement of psychological fact). It is obvious that just as all mention of the proposer was omitted from the proposition "X is good," when considered by the analyst, so here all mention of the person having the feeling, or making the judgment, is omitted from the proposition "X ought to do Y." But upon reflection this last proposition, if it is a value judgment, should be "A judges X ought to do Y" (where the "A" stands for the analyst making the judgment). If the fact of feeling is to be included in the one proposition, the fact of judging is to be included in the other. But what justification is there for assigning

to the analyst's proposition the status of "judgment"? Why not "A feels X ought to do Y"? Admittedly, the fact referred to by "A judges X ought to do Y" differs from the fact referred to by "X feels X ought to do Y"—just as it differs from the fact referred to by "A feels X ought to do Y"—but it does not differ in respect of factual reference from "X judges X ought to do Y." There is no difference at all between these respective propositions, except for the difference in personal reference. To appropriate the word "judges" for inclusion only in the proposition expressing the analyst's opinion as regards what X ought to do, is yet another instance of philosophical arbitrariness. The lack of reflection which leads the analyst to exclude himself from the parentheses also leads to the mistaken notion that an essential difference in status can be extended towards the two propositions in question. For once the reference to the analyst is included in the proposition, it becomes evident that there is no reason whatever for interpreting "X ought to do Y" as "A judges X ought to do Y" rather than as "A feels X ought to do Y." Hence, there is no justification for classifying "X ought to do Y" as a value judgment.

It might seem to follow from this that it is impossible even to give an appearance of drawing the supposed distinction between value judgment and statement of psychological fact in respect of propositions which refer to the experiences of one person, and which bear no reference whatever, either explicitly or implicitly, to anyone else. Yet this is not the case. Even where the possibility of confusing personal reference is eliminated, it remains possible, for example, to give the appearance of distinguishing between "I ought to do X" and "I feel I ought to do X," and of classifying these propositions as "value judgment" and "statement of psychological fact" respectively. That this is possible is entirely due to the ambiguity of the word "feels," which may be employed either in the sense of "having a feeling" (which would be its meaning in a statement of psychological fact) or in the sense of "feeling *that*" something or other is the case.¹ Thus, Hare maintains that "I have a feeling that I ought to do X" is a statement of psychological fact, whereas "I ought to do X" is a value judgment. By value judgment he appears to mean the decision a man makes with regard to the "conflicting obligations" (as the deontologists used to call them) with which he is confronted. Hare gives the following example: "A man who has been brought up in an army family, but has become affected by pacificism, may well say 'I have a strong feeling that I ought to fight for my country, but I wonder whether I really ought.' " But surely when a man talks of having a "strong feeling" in such a context, he is using the word

¹ On this distinction, see G. Ryle's article on "Feeling": *Philosophical Quarterly*, April 1951.

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"feeling" in the sense of "rather thinking," or of "feeling that" he ought to do so and so? The natural way to speak about such matters is indicative of this fact, in that it is "feeling that," etc., and not just "feeling." What it expresses is doubt regarding the rectitude of a certain action or principle, not introspection regarding one's sensations. If the man were convinced he ought to fight for his country, nothing further would remain for him to decide. It is not a question of having a "strong feeling" that I ought to fight for my country and another "strong feeling" that I ought to renounce the brutality of war, and discovering by introspection which feeling is the strongest, so that a value judgment is the outcome of conflict between my various feelings. This would amount to the crudest kind of psychological determinism, to which the notion of "value judgment" or indeed judgment of any kind would be singularly inappropriate. When we recognize that "feeling" in this context is "feeling that," these difficulties disappear, and with them the notion of "conflicting obligations" and the absurdity of a situation in which one wonders which of the actions one ought to do, one ought to do. For in saying that "I feel I ought, etc.," I am not asserting, but denying, that the action in question is obligatory. Even where I say: "I feel *strongly* that I ought to fight for my country," this, at the very most, can only mean that I am almost convinced that I ought to do so. The distance between "I feel I ought to be a pacifist" and "I ought to be a pacifist" is traversed gradually, not by a qualitative leap; and the difference between them is a matter of degree, it is not a difference in kind. Furthermore, when we deny that "I have a feeling I ought, etc.," is a statement of psychological fact, this is not necessarily to deny that *obligation* might not be a psychological fact, but only to deny that the statement in question is a statement to that effect. It might be argued that, although it is only in the "feeling that" sense of "feeling" that I can say "I have a feeling that I ought," that nevertheless obligation itself *is* a feeling in the psychological sense of the word "feeling." But even if obligation were in fact a "feeling" in the psychological sense, this would make no difference so far as drawing a distinction between having an obligation and having a "feeling" of obligation is concerned, for in that case "I have a feeling I ought to do X" and "I ought to do X" would be identical statements: "I ought to do X" would be a shorthand way of expressing that I have a certain feeling. Only where "feeling" is employed in the sense of "feeling that" are the two statements distinguishable.

Hare believes that the question: "Wouldn't it be possible for you to feel just like that, although you really oughtn't to do X?" indicates that "I ought to do X" and "I have the feeling I ought to do X" have different meanings. From what has been said, it should be

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apparent that the difference is merely in degree. We can just as readily ask a man who says "I ought to do X" whether he may not be mistaken. No one, I hope, is suggesting the infallibility of mankind in such matters. Even the question itself indicates that the statement is not regarded as referring to the psychological feelings or emotions of the person making the statement. We are not asking the man to introspect regarding his feelings, for then the natural question would be: "Do you really have the feeling you ought to do X?" On the other hand, neither are we directing the man's attention to some special sphere of "value judgment" into which he has not yet entered. When we put the question to him as to whether he really ought to do what he has in mind, we are not pulling him away from his psychological preoccupations and getting him to do something else. In short, we are neither asking the man to indulge in introspection nor asking him to do anything different from what he is doing already. What we are doing is to ask him to do a little better, or a little more carefully, what he is already doing.

We are not suggesting here that the ambiguity of the word "feel" could ever of itself give rise to the erroneous classification of "I ought to do X" and "I have a feeling I ought to do X" as referring to different facts. What this ambiguity does, however, is to permit the apparent application to propositions in the first person of the distinction between "value judgment" and "statement of psychological fact." The distinction itself arises out of the failure to reflect. There seems to be no contradiction in my saying that a man feels he ought to do X, and my also saying that he ought not to do X; and this being the case it may seem natural to assume that there is some difference between "feeling" and "having" an obligation. It is from considerations of this order that there arises the notion that there is a qualitative difference between those propositions which include the word "feel" and those which do not. But we have seen that the omission of any mention of feeling with regard to what the analyst thinks someone else ought to do, is the outcome of a failure to reflect, whereas its inclusion with regard to what the analyst thinks he himself ought to do simply indicates a lack of conviction on his part. Once we dispense with the factitious ambiguity of "feeling," and reflect upon these propositions as enunciated by us in connection with our own experience, it becomes obvious that the propositions refer to the same fact. For although such propositions as "X feels he ought to do Y, but he really ought not," "X ought to do Y, but he feels he ought not," etc., do not appear contradictory, this is only because the experiences of two different persons (agent and analyst) are being referred to—the reference to the agent's experience being explicit, that to the analyst's experience, implicit. But, upon

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reflection, such propositions as "I feel I ought not to do X, but I really ought," "I really ought to do X, but I feel I ought not," etc., are contradictory, which would not be the case if "I feel I ought to do X" and "I ought to do X" referred to different kinds of fact.

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MOTIVES AND MOTIVATION¹

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Introductory

To probe people's motives is almost an occupational malaise amongst psychologists. And it is not one that can be nursed in private. It intrudes constantly into discussion of acquaintances, into moral assessments of people's actions and their responsibility for them, and into pronouncements on the proper operation of law. On this account psychologists are treated with suspicion, often with derision and resentment, by their academic colleagues. Of course, like Jehovah's witnesses, they come to expect, even to relish, the reception they receive. For has it not been written that we all have a strong resistance to such revelations, our real motives being often those which we are ashamed to admit? But there may be good grounds for this resistance as well as psychological explanations of it. My hope in this paper is to set out the sorts of grounds that there may be for our resistance to this scrutiny of our motives and to the theories of motivation which lend some kind of scientific respectability to it.

I. *The term "motive" in ordinary language*

One of the contributions of modern analytic philosophy has been to point out the troubles that can be generated if a term which has a well-established use in ordinary language acquires also a technical use and the technical meaning insinuates itself into everyday contexts. Yet no one, to my knowledge, has brought out the shock to ordinary language occasioned by the psychologist's search for motives. Of course, what we call "ordinary language" is the repository of crude and often outworn theories; and it is because the language used by psychologists has led so many of us to look at our actions in a new way and even to consider revising some of our most resolute common-sense convictions, that it is worth while dwelling on what may seem to be at first only a matter of terminology.

There are, so it seems, three main conditions which limit the use of the term "motive" in ordinary language. Firstly I would suggest that those uncorrupted by much contact with psychologists only speak of people's motives in contexts where there is some question of *assessing* their conduct.² Secondly, when the motive is asked for

¹ This paper was read to the Alexander Society at Manchester in March 1955 and to post-graduate seminars at Birkbeck College and the London School of Economics. The author wishes to acknowledge such criticisms or comments as have led to alteration of the original paper.

² I made this point in a previous paper but did not develop it. See R. Peters, *Motives and Causes*, Proc. Arist. Soc. Supp. Vol. XXVI, 1952, p. 145.

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in such a context, it states the *reason* which the agent had for *departing from an established expectation*. Thirdly the motive is not merely a reason but the *conclusive reason* which actually "moved" him to act. I now propose to examine these three conditions and their relevance to the psychologist's use of the term "motive."

The first two conditions can be treated together, as questions of assessment usually arise when some breach of an established expectation has occurred. The term "motive" is surely used widely in moral and legal discourse which are concerned entirely with assessment. We "ascribe" or "impute" motives to others and "avow" or "confess" them in ourselves. But we only do this when a breach with an established expectation has occurred and there is a need to *justify* an action. Motives are then unearthed as reasons which the agent had for the action. The reason states the objective of the action, the state of affairs aimed at. But not all reasons are motives, in spite of the philosophical fashion of equating them. I have heard a philosopher say, for instance, "What was his motive for saying that everything was made of water?" This sounds quaint, almost indecent, simply because it carries with it the suggestion that Thales was somehow to *blame* for his metaphysical tour-de-force.

This restriction of the term "motive" to situations where a justification is required for a breach with established expectation explains our sense of outrage when a psychologist gets busy on our motives. We do not mind if he asks our motives for stealing his silver or burning his book, but we wince when he asks about our motives for getting married, playing chess, and giving people Christmas presents. In his own mind he may well be searching for the springs of our conduct which may be hidden to us; but in our minds he is sowing the suggestion that what we are doing is not normally done and that we may be up to no good. This is particularly apparent in relation to psycho-analytic theory. For when Freud suggested that *all* actions have motives, he was in effect casting aspersions on everything that we do. The use of the term "ulterior motive," when used indiscriminately about all our actions, has the effect of *blaming* equally smoking a pipe and stealing silver. Of course we know that psycho-analysts are only too concerned to withhold blame; they wish merely to understand and to cure. But by indiscriminate use of the term "motive" they have either suggested that we are to blame for everything that we do or, in the minds of the very sophisticated, that we are to blame for nothing. Is not the ordinary man, then, on solid ground in resisting such verbal impropriety?

Could it not be the case, too, that we dislike suggestions about our *unconscious* motives not simply because of our resistance to the revelation of wishes which our shame has prompted us to repress, but also because the coupling of the term "motive" with "uncon-

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scious" suggests that we are up to no good and don't know it. This is an unnerving aspersion on our conduct. It makes us feel insecure, at the mercy of unknown forces; and our feeling of insecurity reinforces the resistance to the psychologist's probings which is explained by his theory. It has also, amongst those who have dabbled in Freud, a somewhat comical consequence of multiplying the occasions for blame. A wife might previously have been irritated and slightly hurt by her husband's forgetfulness of the anniversary of their wedding. But now that she has read some Freud she gives vent to her indignation as well as to her irritation; for his conduct reveals that he *really* wishes that they had never married. Fits of forgetfulness come to seem like intentional insults. And, of course, in some respects they may be. But in other respects they quite obviously are not, and the indiscriminate use of the term "motive" has had the unfortunate effect of blurring distinctions which are essential for practical life.

The third condition for the use of the term "motive" explains its connexion with hidden springs, unrelieved tensions, and all the other psychological box of tricks which I shall shortly open up when I consider the use of the term "motivation." For when we produce the motive for an action we are not just suggesting a reason which the agent had for it; we are claiming that the reason adduced in fact states the objective actually aimed at, the one that "moves" the agent to act. Further probing about the action is *ipso facto* rendered pointless once we have committed ourselves to a statement of its motive. What counts as a motive, therefore, depends upon the assumptions of the group with which the prober identifies himself, on what are regarded as convincing reasons for departing from established expectations. In our culture hunger, sex, and desire for profit are typical motives; for objectives are indicated that everyone is presumed to have.

This third condition delimiting the use of the term "motive" is quite consistent with the use of the rather sinister phrase "But what was his *real* motive?" For it is notorious that we give different justifications of actions to different people. The opportunities for this in a complex and highly differentiated society are enormous. To his sophisticated colleagues a solicitor may justify his strange behaviour in taking up tennis when he is 40 by confessing that his motive is to get clients from the Club; to his wife he may plead that he is doing it in order to get exercise; but only to his bosom friend in his cups will he admit that his "real" motive is amorous adventure. Is the "real" motive anything more than the reason that seems to him conclusive in a cool hour or which he would confess to a friend in a less cool one? Our personalities are like concentric rings of loyalties. "Real" motives are those which we are prepared to admit

to people on the inner circle. Psycho-analysts specialize in "real" motives; for, as the well-known jibe puts it, they have the professional monopoly of being the last people that we speak with on terms of intimacy and sincerity before we speak only with ourselves. And they have very definite views about the reasons which alone are sufficient to account for people's actions. They spread their convictions on these matters to those who admit them to their inner sanctum. This they call offering "interpretations," which is a process of offering reasons which seem to them conclusive for people's actions in the place of reasons which seem conclusive to their patients—and, incidentally, to the majority of their fellow mortals. Things are not always what they seem. What they *really* are depends on the assumptions which we take for granted.

But, it might be said, what is it about these objectives or reasons which make them conclusive? I have suggested only that the *logical force* of the term "motive" is to state a *conclusive* reason. Is it sufficient to leave it at that? Etymologically the term "motive" suggests "moving" to action. Is not the motive our actual objective because of a causal connexion between picturing the objective and some inner springs of conduct? If "motive" means the reason which the agent has for the action which states the actual objective aimed at, whatever the appearances, has it not this concrete status because the agent is pushed or moved towards this objective by some inner mechanism?

Whether or not, in ordinary language, there is this necessary connexion between the motive for an action and its inner springs, I would not like to say. I am inclined to say that people who have become familiar with psychological theories are inclined to regard such a connexion as necessary but that, in ordinary language, there is no such definite commitment. It is tempting to suggest that the logical force of the term in ordinary language has been given a psychological interpretation in terms of current theories. Some of these theories have found their way into common-sense assumptions; so it is now impossible to dogmatize on whether or not such a necessary connexion is assumed. But certainly psychologists have given a causal interpretation of the logical force of the term "motive." And, unfortunately, many of them have relied on the old mechanistic model of the efficient cause, with rather unfruitful results for their theories as well as with unhelpful effects on common-sense assumptions. And this is what I now wish to show.

2. *The psychologist's motives*

A few examples of psychological theory will illustrate my point. Bentham, for instance, held that a motive was "a pleasure, pain, or other event, that prompts to action."¹ It must be previous to the

¹ J. Bentham, *Principles of Morals and Legislation* (Blackwell, 1948), p. 216.

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action but must also look to the consequences of the action before the pleasure or pain which gives birth to it can be felt. The motive of a man who rushes out to put out his neighbour's fire is the pain felt at the thought of being burnt. The pain and the expectation are so intimately connected as to be, for practicable purposes, indistinguishable. Bentham then goes on to catalogue the different motives which correspond to different pleasures and pains. Mill, too, in his famous attempt to distinguish motives from intentions,¹ claimed that a motive involves an antecedent feeling which initiates an action. This became a very common notion amongst psychologists. Freud, for instance, regarded the "wish" as an emotively charged idea, which acted as a kind of irritant, initiating action. It was easy for his wishes, whether conscious or unconscious, to become equated with motives. McDougall, too, used the term "motive" in a similar sense. A man's intention in putting his hand in his pocket may be obvious enough. He intends to give a coin to a beggar. But what is his motive? Did he do it because he was afraid, moved to pity, or because he liked to feel superior to others? McDougall equated motives with emotions like pride, fear, and pity.² Thus amongst those psychologists who did not frown on introspection, motives came to be regarded as emotively charged reasons which a person has for doing some things rather than others. The directedness of the behaviour comes about because there is an emotive charge which fires one reason rather than another, and thus directs behaviour towards its goal. It thus becomes legitimate for a psychologist to ask for the motives for any action. For a motive is no longer, as in ordinary language, just a reason that seems conclusive for departing from established expectations. It is an emotively charged reason for doing anything whatever—getting up in the morning, reading the paper, or attending a seminar. No wonder the ordinary academic is shocked by his psychological colleagues. For the term is now used indiscriminately in any context and the logical force of the term has been given a highly speculative psychological rendering.

But, it will be said, feelings are no longer fashionable in psychology. Did not Tolman say that "raw feels" do not get across? The instinct theory, too, which was associated amongst other things with the postulation of distinct emotions for each instinct, has been superseded by less metaphysical theories of motivation. Perhaps so; but most theories of motivation, which ousted the motives of the old psychologists, in fact preserved the model of the initiating push but gave it a more palpable and tough-minded interpretation. The notion of "drive" was foisted on to psychology and linked indis-

¹ See J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism* (Longman, Green and Co., London, 1888), p. 27.

² W. McDougall, *Outline of Psychology* (Methuen, 1928), p. 122.

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solubly with the concept of "motivation." Initiating conditions of "drive" came to take the place of initiating states of emotion. P. T. Young, after distinguishing at least five ways in which the term "drive" was used, recommended that it should be reserved for a persistent stimulus which liberates energy, like that of a contracting stomach or of a physico-chemical state which changes the excitability of the nerve cells.¹ Some theories of motivation actually use the term "motive." To quote one example: "Motive, like the non-technical terms 'want' and 'desire,' is a word which points both inward and outward. Such terms refer both to an inner state of dissatisfaction (or unrest, or tension, or disequilibrium) and to something in the environment (like food, mother's presence, or the solution to a puzzle) which serves to remove the state of dissatisfaction. . . . Motive, as here used, refers to a state of the organism in which bodily energy is mobilized and selectively directed towards parts of the environment."² Two factors are incorporated in this definition, firstly the drives or bodily states felt as restlessness, which initiate tendencies towards activity and which function "like motors here and there within the body, each delivering energy to appropriate muscles and glands." These may or may not be felt as discomfort but they *impel* the organism to activity. Secondly, there is the *directedness* of behaviour towards a goal. An organism is motivated, says Newcomb, "when—and only when—it is characterized both by a state of drive and by a direction of behaviour towards some goal which is selected in preference to all other possible goals. Motive, then, is a concept which joins together drive and goal."³ This linking of the concept of motivation with that of "drive" is so widespread that the recent Nebraska symposium on "Current Theory and Research in Motivation" is almost entirely concerned with the nature and operation of "drives." Often the terms "motive" and "drive" are used interchangeably. "An examination of contemporary discussions of motivation," says J. S. Brown "suggests that one of the major sources of misunderstanding is the failure of most writers to distinguish clearly between drives or motives, on the one hand, and habits or reaction tendencies on the other."⁴ This typifies the extent of the shift in the use of the term "motive."

In modern theories of "motivation," then, the goal-directedness of behaviour is linked with initiating conditions of drive. This is the modern rendering of the conception of "motive" which we found in

¹ P. T. Young, *Emotion in Man and Animals*, (New York, 1943), p. 151.

² T. H. Newcomb, *Social Psychology* (Dryden Press, New York, 1950), pp. 80, 81.

³ Op. cit., p. 82.

⁴ J. S. Brown, *Problems presented by the Concept of Acquired Drive*, Current Theory and Research in Motivation, A Symposium (University of Nebraska Press, 1953), p. 2.

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the earlier psychologists, where persistence towards a goal was linked with antecedent feelings which were thought to initiate the movements. Nowadays, palpable goings on like contractions of the stomach have replaced the indeterminate hankerings of the old theories. But the shock to common-sense beliefs is, if anything, even more severe. For the term "drive" suggests an even more violent thrust as an efficient cause of the action than was suggested in the old notion of ideas with an emotive charge. Of course, scientists can use any terms they like provided that they define them. But surely they should avoid using terms which have such misleading associations. For the suggestion of the term "drive" is that the initiating conditions of action *impel* us to act and render the action *unavoidable*. It is doubtful whether there is this compulsiveness about actions initiated by the basic biological "drives." How much more doubtful is it that there is any such compulsiveness at all about actions initiated by the so-called "acquired drives." It is plausible to say that a man who has been starved for a long period is "driven" towards a beef-steak; but what a word to use for the pursuit of money, praise, prestige, and so on.¹

There might, indeed, be more excuse for the use of such a suggestive term as "drive" if the facts suggested by it were better authenticated. But in the case of the so-called "acquired drives" it is notorious that the facts are far from clear. For where are the palpable initiating conditions for most of our goal-directed activities? To quote J. S. Brown: "Perhaps the greatest hindrance to progress lies in assuming the existence of drives where no such assumption need be made. We might advance more rapidly if we were to start afresh and deny at the outset that each and every object or situation for which an organism has learnt to strive must be accompanied by a characteristic acquired drive for that object."² Or, as Newcomb rather charmingly puts it: "We do not have the means, for example, of distinguishing between the drive states of a given individual when he is motivated to win at poker and when he is motivated to win at tennis. The goals can easily be distinguished, but the drives can not."³ Why, then, should it be assumed that they exist? And why use such a suggestive word as "drive" to refer to them?

Indeed the concept of the "acquired drive" has all those characteristics of an *ad hoc* hypothesis, for which the old instinct theory was castigated by its tough-minded opponents. It is firstly an untested and improbable hypothesis that all goal-directed behaviour is preceded by such states of drive. Secondly, the suggestion looks suspiciously like a rehash of the old faculty psychology in pseudo-

¹ See Symposium, p. 11.

² Symposium, p. 12.

³ T. H. Newcomb, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

scientific trappings, a specific initiating state of tension being postulated for each specific type of goal-directed behaviour. Thirdly, as a hypothesis, it is theoretically trivial; for it amounts to little more than using a mechanical model to *classify* the various types of goal-directed behaviour.

The merit of the notion of "drive" when it was used in its early days (e.g. by Tolman in his conception of "first-order drives")¹ was that it did attempt to single out those of the old instincts which could plausibly be said to involve some definite initiating physiological conditions—e.g. hunger, thirst elimination—which were altered or reduced to "quiescence" by the goal-directed behaviour. This physiological interpretation of "need-reduction" is particularly obvious in Hull's theory where special internal stimuli connected with "needs" are brought in to supplement the stimulus-response theory. When the organism persists towards some goals, these needs are reduced and the internal stimulation abates. Thus, some S-R connexions rather than others are strengthened and behaviour becomes organized towards goals. In other words, the postulation of specific initiating conditions for goal-directed behaviour was tied to a definite physiological theory of homeostasis, developed by Cannon and others. It may well be that the theory was wrong; for it has been shown that goal-directed behaviour in both eating and drinking, and in sexual and maternal behaviour, can proceed without the occurrence of the antecedent extra-neural irritants postulated by drive theorists.² There are also many difficulties about the postulation of end-states of physiological quiescence.³ But, at any rate, the conception of drives in its early days was linked with a definite and testable physiological theory. The derivative suggestion, however, of "acquired drives" has not even the merit of being refutable by physiological evidence.

It is perfectly true that the term "drive" has been used by some psychologists (e.g. Tolman and Hull) as an intervening variable rather than as a term describing definite initiating states or irritants. It functions as a hypothetical construct in these theories by means of which variations in persistence towards a goal can be described as functionally dependent on antecedent conditions like changes in food schedules, chemical changes, and so on, rather than on variations in incentives—e.g. size or nearness of goal objects. And certainly some such concept is necessary. But the trouble with the term "drive" as a generic concept is that it obscures the important

¹ E. Tolman, *Purposive Behaviour in Animals and Men* (New York, 1932), pp. 276–81.

² See D. O. Hebb, *The Organization of Behaviour* (New York, 1949), p. 172.

³ See C. T. Morgan and E. Stellar, *Physiological Psychology*, New York, 1950, p. 387.

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differences between these antecedent conditions by lumping them together under the umbrella of a misleading model. For it suggests that all antecedently energized activity approximates to one pattern; whereas the vital point to stress is the difference in persistence towards a goal brought about by different antecedent conditions. H. W. Nissen exposes the "very old and still prevalent superstition, inherent in the very word 'drive,' that the organism is driven and guided to certain external goals, such as money or murder, by a mysterious force or homunculus who sits somewhere inside, preferably in the heart or brain." The drive, he says, ". . . is merely the collective sensitization of a constellation of acts which are related in so far as they tend to produce a certain alternation in the organism or in one of its relationships to the environment."¹ Why, then, in view of misunderstandings which are admitted to be still current, even amongst psychologists, should the term "drive" be retained? Why not speak simply of "sensitization?" Nissen, it is true, pours scorn on the story of "acquired drives."² But even if we are dealing only with biogenic drives which are "an inferred influence of bodily states on response thresholds . . . which are related, through consummatory acts or their consequences, to those bodily states,"³ is the sensitivity to certain stimuli brought about by hormones circulating in the blood-stream sufficiently similar to that brought about by variations in past experience to warrant the description of "drive" for both conditions?⁴ Could it not be that the omnibus term "drive" conceals many very important differences as well as perpetuating an age old superstition?

Many, like Hebb, see the difficulties in drive theories and prefer not to link the concept of "motivation" indissolubly with that of "drive." Hebb suggests that goal-directed behaviour is preceded by some central "motive-state," an organized phase sequence in the cells of the brain. But so, according to his theory, are *all* voluntary activities, a voluntary act being "one that is determined by a phase sequence or conceptual series with some duration in time, to which both sensory and central facilitations contribute constantly."⁵ What is distinctive about *motivated* behaviour is the direction and persistence in a given direction of the activity so initiated.⁶ In other words, whatever the merits of the physiological speculation, it is the *directedness* and *persistence* of motivated behaviour which is its crucial characteristic, not its presumed initiation by highly speculative drives. And, as has been suggested, the ordinary use of the term "motive" brings out the directedness

¹ H. W. Nissen, *The Nature of the Drive as Innate Determinant of Behavioral Organization*, Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1954, pp. 308-9.

² See 1954 Symposium, p. 309 seq. ³ Op. cit., p. 317. ⁴ Op. cit., p. 286.

⁵ D. O. Hebb, op. cit., p. 144.

⁶ Op. cit., p. 181.

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of behaviour towards a goal; it leaves open the nature of its initiating conditions.

Surely, too, it is the directedness of behaviour which is stressed in the theory of "unconscious motives" rather than its initiating conditions. Freud's great contribution lay in suggesting that behaviour often persists towards goals of which the patient is unaware, which he does not envisage as conscious objectives. The causal part of his theory is concerned with the *antecedent* conditions in childhood which, through the mechanism of repression, set up such blind directedness. It is not much concerned with the initiating conditions of drive which set off behaviour in the present, though there may well be such conditions of generalized restlessness and tension.

There are thus good theoretical grounds for insisting that the directedness of behaviour, rather than its initiating conditions, is the crucial aspect of it which is referred to when we assign a motive. Ordinary language is here on the side of the angels. It is also supported by certain practical considerations which show how irrelevant psychological theories of initiating conditions are to most of our practical transactions and judgments. This must now be briefly brought out.

3. *Motivation and social science*

Most of us, who are not professional psychologists, have a practical purpose in wishing to understand and explain human action. And it is interesting to consider why it is that the social sciences like anthropology, sociology, and economics usually seem so much more illuminating to us than current theories of motivation. These sciences take goal-directed actions as their basic units and construct their classifications and generalizations without enquiring into the motives of men in the psychologist's sense. Social scientists often refer to such explanations as implying the category of "rationality." To quote an example:

"The concept of rationality, much used in sociological and anthropological literature, requires some comment. It is here taken to mean purposiveness plus something else, namely, the fact that the steps taken to achieve the purposive appear by their nature appropriate and empirically sound. We ascribe rationality to sequences of behaviour if they are analyzable in terms of means and ends, more precisely in terms of an intrinsic appropriateness of means to ends of which the actors are aware and which the observer, drawing on his empirical knowledge, can discern and verify. Pareto speaks in the same sense—with a somewhat unhappy choice of terms—of 'logical' actions, that is, actions 'logically' united towards an end from the point of view of the actor as well as the observer and his wider knowledge."¹

Thus explanations in social science consist largely in giving the reasons for actions by showing the end towards which they are

¹ S. Nadel, *The Foundations of Social Anthropology* (London, 1951), pp. 266–7.

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consciously directed. This can be done at varying levels of generality. For instance, a man could be taking certain steps in order to obtain another wife and in order to promote certain more general ends like increasing the population or the cultivation of the land.

The social scientist is also particularly concerned with making generalizations about the unintended consequences of such rational actions¹—e.g. if people aim at raising the level of education in a community, the suicide rate also goes up. An economist, similarly, may show us that we cannot have both full employment and the absence of inflation as compatible objectives, or a sociologist may reveal how changes in the techniques of production bring about characteristic changes in social structure. These generalizations assume conscious objectives and show us the *unintended consequences* of their pursuit. Similarly the comparative studies of the anthropologist help us to understand more about the compatibility of the pursuit of various possible goals. And, from a practical point of view, if we are thinking about social policy, it is immensely important for us to know what the unintended consequences of certain policies are likely to be—e.g. equality of status for women, efficient medical services, and so on. Indeed, many like Popper² urge that the laws of social science should be stated in the form of generalizations about the sorts of things that can't be done without something else happening.

Where, then, is the need for theories of motivation? For, from a practical point of view, it does not much matter what states of mind or body initiate or "drive" actions like putting a house up for sale or introducing atomic energy into industry. The objective, the means which can lead up to it, and the information available to the agent, are what matter—what Popper calls "the logic of the situation."³ Theories of motivation are relevant only if, like the old theory of instincts or the Freudian theory of infantile sexuality, they tell us that our physiology or social training is of such a kind that, whatever our cultural environment, we *must* seek certain objectives, however much we may disguise them. But in such cases the psychologist offers causal laws deducible from a theory. He says little, if anything, of "drives" in the sense of initiating states, which, like the old efficient cause, push behaviour towards its goal.

This theory of "drives" is singularly unhelpful, too, in the other sort of case where the social scientist is ready to admit the need of a psychological theory of motivation—the case of irrational action. For it is usually held that we need only ask for the causes of an action

¹ See, e.g. F. Hayek, *Individualism and Economic Order* (London, 1949), Ch. I.

² K. R. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism*, *Economica*, Vol. II, p. 121.

³ K. R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (London, 1947), Vol. II, p. 90.

when it seems to have no reasons, or when a person does something quite contrary to or inconsistent with his intentions. Max Weber held a view of this sort. To quote him:

"... the rational deliberation of an actor as to whether the results of a given proposed course of action will or will not promote certain specific interests, and the corresponding decision, do not become one bit more understandable by taking 'psychological' considerations into account. But it is precisely on the basis of such rational assumptions that most of the laws of sociology, including those of economics, are built up. On the other hand, in explaining the irrationalities of action sociologically, that form of psychology which employs the method of subjective understanding undoubtedly can make decisively important contributions."¹

Ryle voices similar convictions of common sense when he says:

"We know quite well why John Doe scowled and slammed the door. He had been insulted. We know quite well why the heroine took one of her morning letters to read in solitude, for the novelist gives us the required causal explanation. The heroine recognized her lover's handwriting on the envelope. The schoolboy knows quite well what made him write down the answer '225' when asked for the square of 15. . . . On the other hand there are plenty of kinds of behaviour of which we can give no such explanations. I do not know why I was so tongue-tied in the presence of a certain acquaintance; why I dreamed a certain dream last night; why I suddenly saw in my mind's eye an uninteresting street corner of a town that I hardly knew; why I chatter more rapidly after the air-raid siren is heard; or how I came to address a friend by the wrong Christian name. We recognize that questions of these kinds are genuine psychological questions."²

Psychological explanations, like the gods in Homer, have to be summoned to account for odd states of mind which seem to be almost thrust upon us. Ryle gives no explicit criterion for what makes a question genuinely psychological. But the examples he gives suggest that he has in mind actions which are hardly actions at all in the sense that they are acts without any point or reason. They therefore seem to need a special causal theory, such as that provided by psychologists, to explain them. For common-sense explanation in terms of conscious objectives or the logic of the situation cannot deal with such cases. There are other cases, too, where actions are carried out contrary to our intentions (like being rude to someone whom we want to please) or where we are unable to take the means necessary to attain our objectives (like beginning to feel faint when presented with an opportunity of taking our opponent's queen at chess). For all such cases the causal explanations of the psychologist in terms of unconscious motives seem peculiarly relevant and convincing. Rational behaviour is, as it were, taken as the norm, and deviations from the norm are explained as a function of a variety of social or physiological conditions.

¹ M. Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (Ed. Parsons, London, 1947), p. 99.

² G. Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London, 1949), pp. 325-6.

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But it is not the "drive" theory that helps us here. For even in such cases of irrational behaviour, where it might be appropriate to describe people as "driven" to act, it is not usually the *initiating* conditions of drive which it is important to know about, but the *antecedent* conditions—perhaps in early childhood—which set up such irrational behaviour. For knowledge of such antecedent conditions enables us to take steps to avoid recurrences of irrationality. A psycho-analyst is bound, for therapeutic purposes, to be very much interested in the unconscious motives and fantasies which the patient now has, which are revealed partly, perhaps, in the tension experienced before the pursuit of certain goals of which the patient is not conscious. For therapeutic purposes he may not worry much whether a patient's report of a childhood experience is a fantasy or a reliable record. But the social scientist, who may wish to intervene to avoid the later need of a psycho-analyst, is vitally interested in whether there is in fact a correlation between actual childhood experiences and the later development of certain adult traits. For his practical purposes, therefore, rigorous attempts to establish causal connexions between, for example, the ways in which a child reacts to the frustrations of weaning and potting and later traits like hoarding, petulance, sadism, and so on, would be most welcome. The practical man, who is just as much interested in prevention as in cure, is much more willing to take seriously such fascinating speculations about antecedent conditions than stories of acquired motives, involving highly speculating initiating conditions of "drive."

4. *Motivation and morality.*

Similar conclusions emerge, too, if we consider another practical sphere—that of moral or legal judgment. Here again, what we have to discover is the objective of the agent, the goal at which he consciously aims. This is usually called the motive in ordinary language if we are suggesting a convincing objective which accounts for the departure from a norm or established expectation. But it is quite irrelevant for practical purposes of assessment to unearth the motive in the psychologist's sense which involves not just the objective but also the initiating conditions of the action. A man may jump into a river to save someone from drowning because of a need for social approval. But unless he acts *in order to* obtain social approval, the psychologist's story is irrelevant. We do not give people moral marks for their unconscious needs. The psychologist's explanations are only relevant in such contexts if he can show us, for instance, the conditions which render impulses *irresistible*—assuming that we know what "irresistible" means! For under such conditions the degree of responsibility for the action is decreased. An example would be the

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suggestion by Bowlby that "lack of opportunity for forming an attachment to a mother-figure during the first three years," or "deprivation for a limited period—at least six months and probably more than six—during the first three or four years" (of maternal care) not only causes traits like "unfriendliness," "distractability" and "lack of self-inhibition"¹ but also acts as an *irremediable* determinant, in that there seems to be no further social training that will remedy the effect of this early deprivation. I have no idea whether Bowlby's claims are true; but if they are true, they would be theoretically as well as practically very important. For he would have discovered not merely the causes of certain types of action, but causes of such a sort as to render these types of action *unavoidable* within a given range of circumstances. Apart from the theoretical relevance of such discoveries to the issue of free-will, further knowledge about the categories of antecedent conditions which bring about such examples of unavoidable behaviour would be most welcome for practical purposes, as it is very relevant to our estimates of responsibility.

But here again it is the antecedent conditions rather than the initiating conditions of "drive" which it is important to unearth. Indeed theories of "drives" only mislead us in that they suggest that all motivated behaviour falls into this unusual pattern. *What is needed instead is a better knowledge of those conditions under which a person can properly be said to be "driven" to act.* And these are only a small selection from those conditions under which his behaviour can be said to be "motivated." The trouble, however, has been that the widespread interest created by psychologists in motives, in their sense, has led people not only to concentrate more on the causes of action than on what reasons are good reasons for acting in some ways rather than others; but it has also led people to suppose quite erroneously that whenever the causes of an action can be unearthed, then people are not responsible for what they do. Many nice people begin to doubt the value of their efforts once they become wise to the causes suggested for them. They also come to think that they are not responsible either for their achievements or for their back-slidings. This belief in "psychic determinism" rests, it is true, simply on confusing finding causes for an action with finding causes of such a sort as to render the action unavoidable. But my suggestion is that this muddle can only be perpetuated by theories of "drives," the terminology of which suggests that in all cases where we have a motive to act, we are somehow impelled or driven to act.

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¹ J. Bowlby, *Maternal Care and Mental Health* (Geneva, 1951), p. 47.

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MAUD BODKIN

"WE have but faith: we cannot know; For knowledge is of things we see." So Tennyson wrote in the nineteenth century, using the same distinction that in the first of our era Paul the Apostle used, writing to his converts of the walking by faith that looks not to the things seen and temporal, but to the things eternal and unseen. (2 Cor. iv. 18, v. 7.)

If we consider the contexts of these two passages we find, I think, an implicit contrast of faith with two differing concepts of knowledge. When St. Paul writes triumphantly of the inward man renewed through faith in the eternal things, careless of the sufferings of the outward man through the vicissitudes of things temporal, he barely glances, with a kind of contempt, at that knowledge "of the things we see" that has become chief object of the contrast with faith in the thought of Tennyson. When, continuing his discourse, St. Paul speaks again of faith, there is, as in Tennyson's thought, a note of privation in the word. While "at home in the body" and "absent from the Lord," Paul, like Tennyson, recognizes "we have but faith": in his own words, "we know in part," "see in a glass darkly," waiting for release into participation with the true Divine knowledge: "then shall we know even as we are known" (1 Cor. xiii. 12).

In the centuries that lie between St. Paul's contrast of faith and knowledge and that which finds expression in Tennyson's *In Memoriam*, the work of scientists, directed upon the things we see, had conferred upon knowledge of these a status in men's thoughts very different from that St. Paul would assume in communication with his converts. The vicissitudes of the body and tyranny of the senses that Paul could despise must indeed have had powerful hold upon many of his converts, but there was then no such strongly organized knowledge of things seen and temporal as in Tennyson's time could daunt those who would gladly have affirmed as knowledge their intimations of things unseen.

Not that the new power of the scientific concept of knowledge had banished entirely from Tennyson's thought concerning faith that other concept of knowledge that had meant so much to St. Paul and to those who fed on his thought in the earlier ages of our era. The ideal of a Divine knowledge that looks "through and through" the self in its inner active being, its striving and failing, is present in Tennyson's thought as he recalls the unrivalled joys of communication, in mutual love, with the mind he recognized as enlightening his own, and strained to follow that mind in its conceived further growth toward God-likeness, beyond death.

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Yet it is not chiefly as an expression of faith, and of faith's ideal of knowledge, that we value *In Memoriam*. This poem, T. S. Eliot has said, is "religious" not through its faith, but "because of the quality of its doubt."¹ If our concern with the poem is for its expression of a certain attitude characteristic of its time, that attitude can, I think, be recognized especially in the passages that speak of the incongruity between "nature" as the scientist views it, and human faith in a loving Creator-God. Tennyson wrote of man,

"Who trusted God was love indeed,
And love Creation's final law—
Tho' nature, red in tooth and claw
With ravine, shriek'd against his creed—"

The doubt the poem expresses, Eliot writes, "is a very intense experience." Its intensity suggests, I think, the shock of a new awareness, as if the thinkers who used the idea of design in nature as an argument for a loving Creator had never looked steadily at the interactions going on in nature, till Darwin and others began to formulate these with comprehensive accuracy.²

(2) The philosopher who today maintains faith in a God of love, and attempts some reflective justification of his faith, finds his task no easier for all that has happened in the worlds of thought and action since Tennyson's time. In the world of public action the kinship of man with the beast of prey has become more than ever apparent. We have seen how the instincts of the beast can grow to demonic exorbitance when penetrated by human intelligence divorced from human tenderness. In the world of public thought, the extension to every province of the impersonal, objective methods of science has exercised on some minds a kind of intimidation. A philosophic thinker so affected may feel, as Karl Jaspers has said, that communication has been broken off with those who in other ages within the philosophic tradition could believe strongly in things unseen, and venture their lives upon their faith.³

In this predicament one line of reflection that seems worth following is the attempt to understand more deeply—and so perhaps to justify—faith and faith's ideal of knowledge, through the study of these, in their contrast with the ideal of knowledge that inspires the scientist.

Making such an attempt, Professor Jaspers has offered a character-

¹ *Essays Ancient and Modern* (Faber, 1936), p. 187.

² St. Paul had perhaps looked with sympathy at these interactions when he wrote of the whole creation that groans and travails waiting for redemption, so also the earlier writer who dreamed of a holy condition when lambs would no longer suffer, mangled by lions; but in later centuries men seemed almost to lose the power of looking upon nature directly with sympathy for the inner lives of the creatures.

³ *The Perennial Scope of Philosophy*, by Karl Jaspers, trans. Ralph Manheim (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950), pp. 9-10.

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ization of the faith of those saints of philosophy, Socrates, Boethuis, Bruno, who vindicated their faith "after the manner of martyrs." The faith of these men, he says, was in a truth with which they were so personally identified as to be ready to die for its sake. He contrasts that scientific truth for which Galileo, threatened like Bruno by the Inquisition, rightly would not die. Galileo's retraction was of a truth objectively valid, verifiable in time by all men, needing no witness of a dedicated and surrendered life. The truth for which these philosophic martyrs died was not thus objective, verifiable, but for them, each in his historic situation, it was a truth commanding, absolute.¹

"I will obey heaven rather than you," Socrates is reported by Plato to have said, standing before his judges. "I have no other business than to go about persuading you all to care less for your bodies and your wealth than for the perfection of your souls. . . . I shall not change my ways though I were to die a thousand deaths."

The content of this commanding faith of Socrates in the perfecting of the soul we can gather only approximately from a study of his whole life and thought as we have it presented, chiefly, by Plato. Professor Cornford has summed up "the Socratic philosophy" as "a reaction from the materialistic drift of physical science" as studied by the Ionian philosophers. Socrates was inviting men to cease from pursuit either of material gain or of knowledge of the material world, and to turn their eyes "inwards to the nature of the human soul." This exhortation, Professor Cornford has noted, would appear strange to the ordinary Athenian who seems to have thought of his soul "as an airy unsubstantial wraith or double of his body" that would flit at death to a realm equally negative. To care supremely for such a soul, he might well think, would be to cherish a mere shadow of himself.²

(3) If, for a moment, we dwell on this thought of Socrates preaching a new concept of the soul to men whose inherited outlook on the world made nonsense of his message, we recognize a controversy that continues into the present hour. How are we to think and speak of the soul in relation to the bodies we see and touch? We speak of looking inwards to find it; we speak of the soul "inhabiting" the body—in St. Paul's speech, its "earthly tabernacle." If these phrases seem as nonsensical to some thinkers of our time as Socrates' valuation of the soul may have seemed to many of his hearers, can we reinterpret our metaphors, to avoid the confusion, the "category mistake," to which it seems our speech invites us? The primitive Greek image described by Cornford as a wraith or double of the body can certainly be understood as such a mistake. It presented the soul as another

¹ Op. cit., p. 210.

² *Before and After Socrates* by F. M. Cornford (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1932), pp. 27-8, 50.

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material thing added to things seen and handled, though in some puzzling way lacking their sensible character. But for this unreal image Socrates, and after him Plato, sought to substitute a conception more significant; and today the question is still with us whether we can give an account of the soul, and of unseen spiritual reality to which the soul is akin, that shall be clear of such confusion and shall make the speech both of Socrates and of St. Paul intelligible to us, establishing true communication between us and them.

Let us consider this metaphor of inner and outer that recurs so persistently when we today, or writers far back in the religious and philosophic tradition, speak of the mind or soul. "Though our outward man is decaying," St. Paul wrote, after telling of bodily sufferings willingly endured in his ministry, "yet our inward man is renewed day by day"—renewed through communion with the Divine, the Eternal. St. Paul and Socrates, living each within the world of thought and imagery that enshrined his faith, might have found it hard to understand one another; yet for Socrates and for Plato, as for Paul, privation and extremity of the outward, sensuous, life was as nothing in comparison with the relation of the soul to things eternal. This, I take it, is the central content of that faith which we find and respond to within our heritage both of religion and of philosophy. The relation this faith affirms is between each of us—each human being as a soul or spirit capable of reaching out toward a power or agency of good in the universe—and that power in some sense aware, responding, able to sustain and illumine.

Those who become aware of such a relation have distinctive experience of what may be termed an inner history—inner in the sense that it is known in the first instance to the individual person himself and to no other; though, so far as the individual is able to find images, terms, to express his experience, it can be communicated to others who have had experience partially similar, and through such communication and response modification may result of the individual's first rendering of his truth.

A history "inner" in this sense must, it would seem, pertain to every human individual:¹ a history distinguishable from that pub-

¹ To certain of our sub-human fellow-beings also we tend to attribute an inner history. Where, observing behaviour, we recognize "acquirement of meaning" in the biological sense, we incline—in the case of animals with whom we live in sympathy—to interpret this behaviour in terms of such meaning and memory as we experience, though where communication through speech is absent we can have no assurance of any such memory as can create for the individual a continuous inner history.

Such an inner history for the human individual begins—in contrast to the public history beginning at birth—with some remembered moment, perhaps of dawning self-consciousness: in my own case a memory of lying in my nurse's arms, aware of my body moved by hers as she breathed, and somehow, dimly

licly observable, verifiable history constituted by events such as dated birth and death, and bodily interactions with various social institutions. But it is those individuals who become conscious of a relation to God—to some power or value, however imagined, that is for them more significant than their own ego-centred impulses and enjoyments—who experience most fully an inner history, one of spiritual growth, or transformation, or adventure.

"We know that we have passed from death to life," "Old things are passed away: all things are become new:" so St. John and St. Paul communicate their experience of inward revolution, conversion. More tentatively a conversion is expressed by Plato in his image of the prisoners in the cave: "Let us suppose that one of them has been released and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and walk with open eyes toward the light."¹ Of that "good which every soul pursues, divining its existence but perplexed" Plato—declaring distrust of his own power to speak—presents light, the sun, as an image, telling the story of the inward adventure of the philosopher in terms of the released prisoner straining unaccustomed eyes at first in pain and bewilderment, becoming at length assured and joyful in the new vision.

We might think also of a history more detailed and nearer our own time, such as the *Apologia* of J. H. Newman, writing, as he says, about his own "most private thoughts and feelings"—"about that living intelligence by which I write and argue and act . . . my mind and its beliefs and sentiments." In this personal record, looking back from the standpoint of his matured faith, he recognizes that before he "fell under the influence of a definite creed," there was relevance to that faith in his childish sense of "unknown influences . . . I thought life might be a dream, or I an Angel and all the world a deception, my fellow angels by a playful device concealing themselves from me and deceiving me with the semblance of a material world;" and again, recalling the time of his "inward conversion" at the age of fifteen—a conversion "of which I still am more certain than that I have hands and feet"—and of his conviction at this time that he was "elected to eternal glory," he speaks of its influence "in confirming me in my mistrust of the reality of material phenomena, and making me rest in the thought of two and two only absolute and luminously self-existent beings, myself and my Creator."²

Such a record seems to illustrate well the character of that inner history upon which only the subject of it can look back directly,

wordlessly, wondering at the contact. That moment I recognize as having continuity of meaning, through all change and development, with my later awareness of myself as a being in contact with others.

¹ I use the Golden Treasury translation of *The Republic*.

² *Apologia pro vita sua* (Longmans, 1878), pp. 2, 4.

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discerning stages in the development of an individual faith and outlook on the world.

(4) With the thought thus illustrated of an individual inner history we may compare the account given by Professor Ryle of a concept of two histories, a public and a private, that is part of the myth, or dogma, of "the ghost in the machine." According to this dogma, he says, a person "lives through two collateral histories, one consisting of what happens in and to his body, the other consisting of what happens in and to his mind. The first is public, the second private." He goes on to say that according to "the official doctrine" the individual has "unchallengeable cognizance" of some at least of the episodes of the private history. Of these events his introspection "is commonly supposed to be immune from illusion," while to everyone else those inner happenings are "inevitably occult."¹

It is not clear to whom in recent times this "official theory" is attributed. Those of us who, years ago, were lecturing to students reading such textbooks as those of Professors Stout and James, spoke, no doubt, in the textbook terms of introspection as a taking note of one's individual thoughts, feelings and conative tendencies, but never asserted immunity from error in such self-observation—insisted, rather, as Stout's *Groundwork* puts it, that any self-knowledge thus gained must develop in "closest interdependance with interpretation of manifestations of mind in others." Yet whatever doubts we may entertain as to the application of Professor Ryle's mockery, the force of his whole exposition, its relation to the present "climate of thought" may well drive us to examine more closely the imagery that in our religious and philosophic tradition presents an inner history, often of conflict between soul and body.

"I keep under my body and bring it into subjection." St. Paul tells his Corinthian converts. The body, says, Socrates in the *Phaedo*, "fills us with longing, desires, fears, all kinds of fancies and multitudes of absurdities," and the purification of the soul by the philosopher consists in "accustoming it to gather and collect itself apart from the body."

This imagery of the ghost myth,² as used by Paul and by Plato in describing an inner history, does not, like the object of Ryle's mockery keep separate "what happens in the body" from the story of the mind. The relation of soul and body is an essential part of the soul's history, but that history is not told in the same terms that science, or materialistic "common sense," would use.

The body, the flesh, was conceived by St. Paul, scholars tell us, not

¹ *The Concept of Mind* by Gilbert Ryle (London, 1949), pp. 11-14.

² I use the term "myth" here in the sense of an imaginative rendering of what appears to the thinker a truth which cannot be expressed in terms of the intellect.

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as evil in itself, but as weak in resistance to evil; as it were, a natural medium for invading and indwelling sin. "To an extent we can hardly realize," says Dr. H. W. Robinson, the human soul was conceived as an arena of opposing spiritual forces; responsive, as spirit, to the Divine Spirit, responsive through the flesh to the almost personified force of evil, Sin.¹ So Plato conceived the soul encumbered, contaminated with evil through the body, and in the *Phaedrus* vividly portrayed the struggle of the spirit with the body's lust, in imagery of the charioteer and his rebellious steed. When a present-day psychologist speaks—if he still does—of the will controlling animal appetites he is using language which, for many ages, men, both learned and simple, have felt they could verify within their own immediate experience.

In view of the long history and wide varied use of this imagery of inner conflict, I find surprising Professor Ryle's statement that the concept of volition, or of the will, is an "artificial" one, that we do not use in daily life—that novelists do not use.² A novelist may not use the term "volition," nor separate the will from the spirit, the active personality, but the inner history with its conflicts, the struggle of the will with bodily appetite, is surely one main theme of novelists. As an instance: in Julia Strachey's *Man on the Pier* (John Lehman 1951) an image occurs that, in its slighter fashion, might compare with the unruly horse of the *Phaedrus*. A man's lust for the wife of a friend is described as a phoenix "weaving its fire nest with his nerves," lying "low on its bed of suffocating sulphurous ember" or beating heavy wings within him, growing daily more vociferous, until by what seemed an "act of violence," with a sense of throwing half of himself away, the man, realizing as intolerable the act toward which he was inly urged, ended the conflict—though not the pain—as altered behaviour followed.

Such instances suggest how essential is the concept of the will, however metaphorically expressed, in truth or fiction, to the story of the inner life; but it is not with the story of the inner life that the scientist is concerned. Desiring so to fashion his conclusions that they may be verified in sense, or in an intellectual, impersonal form of experience, the scientist must ignore the individual history that can be communicated only through symbolic imagery to those whose personal experience is adequately similar. He must speak in terms of sensible objects and of the measuring calculating intellect.

(5) It is the existence of these different languages, or different uses of language, that gives force to Ryle's contention concerning "category mistakes" and different "teams of ideas" whose inter-

¹ Article on the Soul (Christian) *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (edited James Hastings, 2nd impression 1934).

² Op. cit., pp. 62, 64.

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relations may be readily misunderstood. The thinker who sets out to describe human behaviour in terms publicly verifiable may be said to make a category mistake if, unaware and without warning, he includes reference to experience of which only the subject can be directly aware. Of all the descriptive terms commonly applied to human beings there is none, as Ryle argues, that cannot be understood as referring to behaviour publicly perceptible. For instance, the terms, chaste, temperate, self-controlled, may be used by the social scientist in his examination of publicly perceptible actions and relations, but the spiritual conflicts that a lover may experience in the achievement of chastity, temperance, self-control,—such inwardly felt violence of the will as Plato, or the novelist, attempts through imagery to communicate—cannot be described in terms belonging to the scientist's vocabulary.

The resources of the speech we employ in the intercourse of daily life are of wider range than those by which scientific knowledge, in the stricter sense, is built up. The scientist, with his verifiability test, the literary artist or other writer concerned to communicate the inner life, may each develop his own usage of language toward a distinctive perfection: but in our common thought and speech the different uses intermingle and interpenetrate in a manner that, though it may generate misunderstandings, can often serve well enough our complex purposes. Recalling episodes in our individual history we commonly realize something of how at the time they felt, and have glimpses also of how our action could have appeared to an observer. Similarly our perception and memory of another's action involves usually an element of sympathetic awareness of how it feels to act thus; and the descriptive terms we use carry for us and our hearers something of both aspects of meaning. It is according to our habits of mind and main direction of interest that we either view others mainly in terms of what Martin Buber has called the *I-It* relation, as objects observably behaving in various ways, or on the other hand, maintain in speech and thought awareness of each confronted being as a *Thou*; equally with myself a centre of intimate personal experience.

(6) I have spoken at some length here of the individual history that is immediately experienced in its passage and looked back on as continuous with the experienced present; also of the speech that attempts some partial communication of such a history. I have done so because the realization of this speech and history as different from the speech of science, and the objects of which science gives account, seems to me essential for the understanding of religious and philosophic faith.

The faith with which—as Jaspers says—I am identified, and of which I seek to make my life a witness, is directed indeed toward

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truth and knowledge, but a truth and knowledge different from that of the scientist.

Let us refer again to the passages quoted earlier—statements by St. Paul and by Tennyson concerning faith. St. Paul looked beyond this life to the perfecting of faith's partial knowledge in participation with the knowledge of God: knowledge within which—as his religious tradition had taught—he and those he addressed were known intimately, perfectly, in all the depth and secrecy of their individual being. It was with such knowledge united with love—faintly, partially shared under limitation of human infirmity—that St. Paul sought to know and love his converts and prayed that they might learn to know and love one another.

Tennyson, writing *In Memoriam*, contrasted that faith which he trusted came as "a beam in darkness" from God with the knowledge, coming to us more readily, concerned with things we see and touch; but his poem recurs again and again to thoughts of that other form of knowledge, with mutual love, that he once experienced in communication with his friend, and for which he still longed, striving to pass beyond compelling images of "the darkened heart's" last journey and resting place, to conceive his friend as still aware, in communion now with the penetrating, compassionate insight of God.

The form of knowledge thus illustrated from the writings of poet and religious thinker is regarded by those philosophers who have recognised it as not to be characterized in terms of the bifurcation of subject and object.¹ It may rather be said to exist between, and inclusive of, the *I* and *Thou*; that which is characterized as objective, or merely subjective, being abstracted from the reality of our immediate experience. Attempting to communicate this experience, we fall back inevitably into speech that can appear as referring merely to objects. I speak of the human spirit I have known in community of awareness as *Thou*, and may seem to be speaking of an *It*, a fleshy creature with observable characteristics. I attempt to speak of the supreme spirit toward whom mine reaches out as its ultimate meaning and fulfilment, and again, I am compelled to speak in terms applicable to objects within the material universe—even within my own small range of sense knowledge.

¹ As well as to the writings of Karl Jaspers, I would refer here particularly to the articles of Professor Hallett, where he speaks of the "fatal error" of "radical objectivism"—the "identification of the real with the objective"—(*Philosophy* XIV. 54) and of the "possession" of the self and of "other minds in mutuality" as distinct from knowledge of them as objects (*Ibid.*, 172): also of knowledge of the self, "too immediate easily to fall under the *prima facie* interpretation of knowledge as a relation of a subject to an object." (*Philosophy* XX. 77, p. 241) and of knowledge of other minds as agents that—unlike bodies—"do not appear as intrinsic objects of qualified spatio-temporal contents" (*Ibid.*, 242).

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This helplessness of our speech to convey adequately even so much as our immediate experience implies is one source, I think, of the apparent conflict between the expressed faiths of men sincerely religious. Each of us must express our faith in accordance with that inner history within which we have communed with others who have "spoken to our condition": our contemporaries, or those who in the past contributed to that tradition with which we have contact. Must we then say of our faith, so individually determined, that however it may sustain and illumine our lives, it has no content meriting the name of knowledge?

If, as thinkers, we cannot recognize any knowledge but the objective, any speech other than that dealing with objects, or the subjective, "emotive," we must agree, I think, with the writer on "theories of religious knowledge" who argues that our existence as part of ultimate reality does not give knowledge of that reality.¹ If, however, we recognize a form of speech that refers to objects as symbols only, while its intention is to communicate an experience transcending the dichotomy of subject and object, we may find in such symbolic consciousness and intention, "a springboard toward transcendence."²

Recognizing, through our own immediate experience, in the records our religious and philosophic heritage preserves, intention to communicate encounter with a Being transcending sensuous and conceptual knowledge, we receive some assurance—not proof of the existence of God, but witness to that transcendent Being: and, with it, a fellowship in faith that helps us "to break through the prison"³ of our own subjectivity. Reading, and recognizing as authentic, say, the words of St. Paul, or those the Gospel writers record as spoken by Jesus, we encounter—though only through words and images a historic situation has fashioned—a mind, a *Thou*, of wisdom and spiritual range beyond our own. In such encounter we experience our own conscious being, illumined and enlarged, and enjoy, under human limitation, a form of knowledge we can conceive as again enlarged, perfected, when our spirits shall have been released by death.

Such faith and knowledge is too distinct in its essential nature and scope for its enjoyment to be inhibited through respect for the achievement of science, and for the scientific criteria of verifiability. We do not expect adequate verification either in sense or intellect of the images and intellectual constructions that carry the intention of our faith. We can find no solace in any intellectual solution we can formulate of the problem of evil. The conflict that shook the faith

¹ *Theories of Religious Knowledge from Kant to Jasper* by Bella K. Milmed. *Philosophy* XXIX, 110, pp. 112-13.

² *The Perennial Scope of Philosophy*, p. 30.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

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of Tennyson between "nature red in tooth and claw" and God realized as love, still brings distress. Yet even this conflict is more endurable if—with Gabriel Marcel—we hold that faith is ultimately concerned not with intellectual solution of problems, but with participation in mystery. Through faith such feeble efforts as we can make to ease a little suffering can become conscious participation in the mystery of that divine redemption for which the whole suffering creation waits.¹

Thus scepticism concerning the adequacy of religious images and constructions can be so integrated into faith that we are not cut off either from those who in past time have found their faith's expression in imagery different from ours, nor from that Reality intended both by our symbols and by theirs.

¹ *Romans* viii. 22-3.

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Professor STEPHEN TOULMIN

WHEN we first begin to reflect about conduct in a philosophical way, whether as philosophers or not, we look for general truths, fundamental principles. Our acceptances and rejections, preferences, commendations and disgusts, seem at the start chaotic and unsystematic, and we hope to reduce them to order—to show that there are general principles by reference to which all our varied acts, admirations and decisions can be understood and justified. The number of such principles should for choice be small. Ideally, we think, it should be possible to present our progress through life not as a thing of fits and starts, of zig-zags, gestures and recoils, but as aimed in a single uniform direction. If we esteem some things above others, praise some men, commend some deeds, admire some paintings this should be (according to the ideal) because in each case the Supreme Value or Ultimate Good finds expression in the esteemed, praised, commended or admired thing, man, deed or picture. We hope to find a single standard by coming up to or falling short of which things of all sorts will earn the prizes or rebukes they deserve.

This particular ambition is the most grandiose a philosopher can conceive, and most of us do not keep it for long. Merit (we come to see) springs from no one source: its forms are Protean. It is no good trying to find a standard by which things of *all* sorts can be judged. If we praise some men, commend some deeds, admire some pictures above others, it is not because the winners each come up to the same general standard: it is because each comes up to its own appropriate standard in a way in which the rejected men, deeds or pictures do not. The things which make an occupation a worthwhile one, the things which (morally speaking) do a man credit, the things which mark off the good Pekingese, vacuum-cleaner or Van Gogh—these are, and must in the nature of things be different. The ideal of *the* Supreme Good, *the* Ultimate Value ceases to hypnotize us, and we are prepared to embark on the more modest enterprise of seeing just what different sorts of judgement there can be, and what criteria are appropriate to the assessment of things in each class.

Yet even when we have given up the search for a single, unique criterion of value applicable in all fields alike, our desire for simplicity may remain. One thing we may grant: that the criteria for the moral judgement of an action are entirely independent (say) of those for the aesthetic appraisal of a picture. Nevertheless we may still feel

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that within any particular field—the field of morality, say, or that of self-interest—there should be a single fundamental principle, and we look to the philosophers to tell us what it is. Nor are we wholly disappointed. Plenty of them seemingly oblige us by producing formulae which they offer to us as “the fundamental principle of morality.” Unfortunately about the correct way of expressing the principle they are far from agreed. Mill, for instance, produces one formula, put in terms of utility, Kant produces another, in terms of universalizability; and it is clear that neither is going to be happy to accept the other’s account.

How then are we to decide between them? That is what I want to ask in this paper. And I shall approach the question, not by considering the different answers philosophers have produced each on its own merits, but by a more roundabout course—asking first, what kind of thing such a fundamental principle of morality could be; and then going on to discuss, how far (if at all) any one philosopher can hope to establish his chosen fundamental principle of morality to the exclusion of its rivals.

I

When a philosopher puts forward some formula as “the fundamental principle of morality,” how, then, are we to understand him? Appeals to everyday moral rules, everyday moral principles, we are familiar with; but what is added by saying that a principle is “the fundamental one”? Clearly one thing we shall expect to find is that this fundamental principle is more general than most of our everyday rules and principles: if it is to tell us the essence of morality, it must be wide enough, general enough, to embrace the everyday rules within its scope. This observation leads us to the first natural hypothesis: perhaps the *sole* difference between everyday moral principles and philosophers’ fundamental principles is this degree of generality—perhaps, that is to say, the relation between principles of morality and everyday principles is just one of width, the fundamental principle embracing all everyday principles within its scope in the way the principle that a man ought to do what he has promised might be held to embrace, as narrower rules, injunctions to keep verbal promises and written promises, explicit promises and implied promises.

We must examine this suggestion for a moment. I want to put forward two arguments against it: first, that in calling our everyday rules “principles” at all, we *imply* that there is no such more general rule of which they are all alike specifications; second, that the principles actually offered to us by philosophers as “fundamental principles of morality” lose their plausibility if interpreted in the way suggested.

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As to the first point: let me compare the question, what makes a moral rule a "principle," with the question, "What makes one part of a tree its 'trunk'?" The answer to this latter question is easily given: the trunk of a tree is that part to which all the limbs, branches, twigs and leaves are directly or indirectly connected, and from which all alike draw their sap. A limb of one tree might resemble the trunk of another in every internal respect, so that if they were both severed from their attachments they might be indistinguishable; yet the limb will not for this reason be a trunk, nor the trunk a limb—since the one is rooted directly into the ground and the other is attached to an intermediate sap-bearer off which grow also further limbs. In calling a trunk a trunk we imply that there is no larger unit to which it is organically connected. We do say, it is true, not only that a tree is *made up of* limbs, trunk, etc., but also that a wood is *made up of* trees; but it is a different sort of "being made up of" in each case. For a number of trees to constitute a wood it is not necessary that they should share an organic connection. We do not require that the trees going to make up a wood should all join on to some subterranean super-trunk, and so make of the wood a single, vast, spreading tree: all that is required is that the trees should be neighbours, rooted in the same stretch of ground, and that they should form a fairly compact and recognizable group having a reasonably defined boundary.

A somewhat similar pattern emerges, I suggest, if we consider what are the things that make a moral rule a "principle." The claims arising for a man in any particular situation are like leaves in this respect, that one can always ask from where they derive their force. If this question is asked, a sequence of considerations can usually be put forward of increasing generality: at each step, we relate the claim under discussion to a more general rule, and so join this claim up with a wider class of other particular claims—the claim is shown to derive its force from the same general rule as these other claims. But there is only a finite number of junctions between a leaf and its trunk, and only a limited number of steps in backing a particular claim before we reach a rule so general that there is no going behind it—no going on from it, that is, to a still wider, more general rule of the same type. This stage normally comes when we say such a thing as "Well, it was a promise, and promises ought to be kept": if a man demands a more general rule at this point, we do not normally know what sort of thing he is looking for. Indeed, to say that one makes it (or regards it as) a principle to keep promises implies just that—that when one comes to the rule concerned one will treat it as a trunk, not as a limb, i.e. one will refuse to entertain the question, from what wider rule still the principle draws its moral sap in turn. The chain of reasons ends here. As with trees, of course,

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so with moral arguments: though a number of principles are not connected alike to a single, more general super-principle, they may nevertheless form a well-defined group of neighbours, all (so to speak) rooted in the same stretch of ground. In this sense, they may go to make up a larger whole. But to this last point I shall return later.

The force of the term "principle" as applied to moral rules being what it is, there seems therefore to be no room for a fundamental principle of morality—if the job of that fundamental principle is to be, to embrace promise-keeping, abstention from cruelty and all the rest, in just the way the rule about promise-keeping embraces verbal and written, explicit and implied promises. But that, it may be said, shows only that our use of the term "principle" in this connection rests upon unexamined assumptions: common sense may not recognize the underlying principle of moral judgement, but it is the business of the philosopher to lay it bare, and show us the common source from which all our everyday rules draw their morality—if found, this source would indeed be properly called "the fundamental principle of morality." —

Against this view, I must advance my second argument. If this is really what philosophers have been trying to do when they put forward and argued on behalf of "fundamental principles of morality" then they have been singularly unsuccessful. Reading Kant or Mill on this subject, one usually feels that they have established something, even if it is not always clear what. But whatever it is they prove, whatever point they succeed in making when they offer us a "principle of morality," we have only to interpret the principle as an everyday moral rule for the point to evaporate completely.

This is easily shown. When either a general moral rule or a narrower specification of it is equally relevant to a moral problem, it does not make any difference to the soundness of our appeal which we cite as backing: I can show someone why there is a claim on him in a particular case, either by pointing out "You did write saying 'I shall be there,' " or by saying "It was a promise." If the more specific consideration has the force we claim it to have, then the more general one must have the same force: for the more specific one derives its force from the general rule—the fact of the man's writing as he did is morally relevant just because to write so was, or was as good as, to promise. Apply this criterion in the case of philosophers' "principles of morality": if they are simply entirely general rules of an everyday kind, we can appeal to them equally well on all occasions where moral considerations arise. In the present case, I can say "you ought to go, because you wrote saying you would," or I can say "you ought to go, because you promised"; or I can make the same point in even more general terms by saying "you ought to go, because

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it would be utility-maximizing (or because it would be treating all rational agents as members of the kingdom of ends)". . . But can I? Can I, that is, make the *same* point by this further step? Surely not; and surely the philosophers who put forward such principles never intended us to try.

Mr. Carritt, it is true, interprets the Utilitarians as meaning just this, but he does only so as to be able to ridicule them; and he does so in the face of Mill's explicit warning against this interpretation of his views. The principle of utility, as Mill explains in the opening paragraphs of *Utilitarianism*, is presented as a test, not for single deeds but for general practices, not as a moral rule itself but as a tribunal before which legal and moral rules have to answer. Nor are Kant's principles any more happy when treated as moral rules: the force of his claim that rational beings must be treated as ends not as means, obscure though it may be, is more than that of the injunction "Don't be beastly to other people"; and this itself could hardly be suggested as *the* moral rule, enshrining on all occasions the peculiar moral point of whatever less general rule we invoke. "Why not?" you may ask—to which for my present purpose it is enough to reply that, though we might respect the kind heart of a man who chose to make "Don't be beastly" his only rule of conduct, this was certainly not what Kant was exhorting us to do.

I conclude provisionally, therefore, that in moral arguments there is room for a number of principles of greatest generality, and that their individual point is lost if we try to merge them all into a single, completely general principle. Those philosophers who have seriously tried to run our different rules of conduct together have, in fact, rarely been able to cut the number of independent matters of principle down below two or three. Butler, you recall, cuts it down to three—benevolence, fidelity and veracity—and even if we were to treat veracity as a species of fidelity, we can still find no convincing way of interpreting benevolence as a sort of fidelity (or, to use Sir David Ross's jargon, optimificity as contract), nor vice versa. The copse of morality contains, at the very least, *two* trees.

II

So much for the critical part of my paper, in which I have suggested what "principles of morality" are not. Before I go on to ask again what they *are*, I want to make a bit of a detour. For the points I have been labouring in the first part of the paper have sometimes been misleadingly put, and I should like to say something about this. "In backing a particular moral claim," I said earlier, "there is only a limited number of steps we can take before we reach a rule so general that there is no going behind it—no going on from it," I hastened to qualify myself, "to a still wider, more general rule of the

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same type." This qualification, I now want to show, was absolutely vital; since without it what I said would have been a half-truth with unacceptable implications. For notice how one can argue. After a limited number of steps in a moral argument we reach principles of a sort there is no going behind: if at this point a man continues to ask for reasons, then (some have said) there is no further talking to him. The chain of reasons has an end. When we get to that end, to the principles, that is, we reach something which a man must just accept—or take the consequences. If at this point he goes on asking questions, he cannot expect us to treat his request seriously. Provided a man has a rational faculty, the principles of morals will commend themselves to him in the same way as do the principles of geometry and arithmetic, or (say) the proposition that a whole is equal to its parts. Suppose a man deny the most obvious propositions of lines or numbers, and perversely contend that the whole is not equal to its parts, there is no reasoning with him: he puts himself outside the pale of reason. And 'tis as absurd and blameworthy to mistake negligently plain right and wrong as it would be absurd and ridiculous for a man in arithmetical matters ignorantly to believe that twice two is not equal to four, or wilfully and obstinately to contend, *against his own clear knowledge*, that the whole is not equal to all its parts. But there, I have dropped into the very language of the passage Patrick Nowell-Smith quotes from Samuel Clarke in his Pelican *Ethics*; a passage in which, as Mr. Nowell-Smith comments, "the theory underlying persecution is admirably explained."

How did we get here? By seeing that there are principles of greatest generality in morals, and drawing the wrong conclusions from this observation. We may say that at this point the search for wider and wider principles reaches its natural termination—and this is the true interpretation of the motto that "the chain of reasons has an end." But to say this is not the same as to say that at this point talk must stop. Still less is it the same as to say that at this point talk must be replaced by other means of persuasion, as Clarke implies and others have hastened to conclude. Why then should philosophers have been so ready to take this further step? I think there is a reason for this, which throws light on the nature of the philosopher's calling, and on its limitations.

"The chain of reasons has an end" does not mean "a point is reached at which talk stops"; but it does mean that a point is reached at which, if talk continues, it takes a radically new turn. What I suspect is that this turn is not only new but essentially non-philosophical. For consider what we should really do if we reached this point in a practical case. We are thrashing out some moral issue with a man, and we find after a time that one thing alone divides us. One of us accepts, the other is sincerely doubtful about a wife's

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duty to her husband. "If a man is a dull old stick," says Jolly to Straight, "Why shouldn't his wife have a little fun on the side? I don't see any wrong in it: in my opinion you are just sticking to out-dated tabu with no genuine foundation to it, the relic of times when a woman was a man's chattel." How is Straight to answer this challenge? They are certainly at a point where little good would be done by invoking yet more general principles. What is at issue is not the question, whether the wife's conduct is covered by some principle to which Jolly and Straight both subscribe: it is the principle itself which is in question. The road to greater generality is therefore closed: what alternative is open?

I can think of one move Straight might make which, to my mind, though not the only possible one, would be a good one. He might go to the bookshelf, take down a copy of Tolstoy's novel *Anna Karenin*, and say to Jolly, "Read this." And a fortnight later they could meet again and carry on the dispute from this point.

Why do I say this is a good move? To explain why, let me return to my earlier image of the pattern of reasons in a moral argument as the branches of a tree, whose trunk corresponds to a moral principle: I want to add one thing to this image which will perhaps not bear very close examination, but which is near enough for my present point. The claims arising for a man, I said, are like leaves: they draw their virtue by channels which lead us back through branches and limbs to the trunk. The trunk in Jolly and Straight's case is a wife's duty of fidelity. Where, asks Jolly in effect, does the trunk draw *its* virtue from? Nowhere, he argues, for it is just a piece of dead wood. To this an intuitionist like Clarke will have to reply: "Trunks do not draw their goodness from anywhere: they are themselves the final source. And a man who professes not to recognize some principle as a sound one, who does not acknowledge the living tree when it is placed before him, is either defective or a liar: if he is not denying the plain testimony of his rational faculty, this can only be because his rational equipment is sub-normal." How does Straight's reaction, of handing over the novel, improve on the intuitionist's? To begin with, it allows for the possibility of a genuine dispute: and it does this by recognizing that a trunk does draw its goodness from somewhere, even though not from a super-trunk. And is not this correct? To see that a principle is still a living one, a green one, that it is not dead wood, is surely to see that there is something in life from which it draws its virtue. Whatever sort of thing this is, it is far more complex than can be put in a yet-more-general principle: it is something which can be grasped only by seeing in extreme particular detail how in action the principle bears upon our lives, what hangs on accepting or ignoring it. It means (to adapt my

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image) recognizing in what part of our lives the principle is rooted, and over what regions its roots extend.

This sort of move need not, of course, be a conclusive one. It is open to Jolly to argue that, in important respects, life is not as Tolstoy represented it, so that the scales are unfairly weighted against Anna; and he may seek to turn the force of Straight's appeal by counter-appealing to reports of the wretched lives actually led by the more downtrodden late-nineteenth-century wives and mothers. And of course facts, if one can quote them, are more relevant than fictions, and first-hand experiences more relevant than hearsay . . . "Experience," as they say, "is the Best School." However, as the saying goes on, the Fees *are* very high: and the reconstruction of life by a first-class novelist, if vivid and imaginative, provides one with as good a source of vicarious experience as most.

Furthermore, the move may be misunderstood. "Really," Jolly may reply, "Anna was too impulsive and indiscreet. The risks she ran were quite excessive: there's no reason why, with a little contrivance, a wife shouldn't avoid rousing her husband's stupid jealousy." The issue may get shifted, that is to say, away from the area of morality to that—so to speak—of technique. So the question of the moral relevance of the picture Tolstoy gives us can be raised. Still, pitfalls apart, this move of Straight's does have the merit of getting the argument going again, and of doing so by shifting it away from the consideration of moral principles in the abstract to the actual impact of these principles on the detailed working-out of our lives.

It is this task, of mapping the root systems of our moral principles, which in my view is not one for the philosopher. For the natural direction of the philosopher's work is towards generality, and we must now go into reverse. Philosophers have not, of course, been at a loss for a word to indicate in what region the roots are put down—J. S. Mill's "happiness," my own late-lamented "satisfaction," Dr. Baier's phrase "natural human goods" are all, I suspect, sign-posts in this direction. But to show convincingly how far-reaching the roots of a moral principle can be, and just where we are led if we follow them out—this is a task for which a philosopher is professionally unfitted, if not positively disabled. It is one which a great novelist can certainly do much more adequately.

Once again, Mill's *Utilitarianism* deserves good marks. In his first chapter, he himself uses the image of the roots of a tree to indicate the relation of the truths really underlying a science to the science: they "may perform their office equally well, though they be never dug down to and exposed to light." And he goes on to make a famous distinction between formal proof and what he calls "considerations capable of determining the intellect," which seems to me entirely

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to the point. Once we reach the turning-point in moral argument, the real matters of principle or the really fundamental ends, the time for formal proof is past. From now on what we need is considerations capable of determining the intellect either to give or withhold its assent. This indeed is something the Tolstoys of the world can provide for us; and do in a way that we philosophers cannot hope either to improve on or, I suspect, to formalize.

III

I must now bring this detour to an end, and return to the main topic of the paper—though the considerations brought to light in the course of the detour are not without value for this topic. I had got as far as deciding what philosophers' principles of morality are not—that is, utterly general moral rules of an everyday kind. I left until now the question, If they are not that, what then are they?

Now I remarked earlier that one thing can be made up of others in all sorts of ways: the limbs of a tree have an organic connection to the branches and to the trunk, but the trees making up a wood need have no organic connection—all we require of them is proximity, compactness and a reasonably well-defined boundary. The model can help us again now. For though we may give up thinking that what makes all moral rules alike moral is as-it-were an organic connection—and that what is required of the philosopher is that he should uncover the subterranean super-trunk from which all moral rules derive such morality as they possess—though we may give up this idea, there are still plenty of questions left to us to ask. Suppose, for instance, it is as-it-were the wood in which they stand that makes these principles alike moral, the fact of their being rooted in a particular part of our life in a way which it takes a Tolstoy to discover and present to us faithfully and in all its detail; then it is still open to us to ask what the boundaries of this wood are. If we believe that the copse of morality has a well-defined boundary, then it is a fair thing to ask philosophers that they should trace it out.

This, I shall argue, is one thing philosophers have in fact been doing when they put forward their fundamental "principles of morality"—defining morality in the sense of delimiting its boundaries, showing how it abuts on to, but is distinct from, law, tabu, etiquette, technique, enlightened self-interest and so on. Certainly Kant's distinction between moral maxims, counsels of prudence and imperatives of skill is a necessary part of any such boundary-drawing. But one thing needs saying about the way in which they have tried to perform their task. Too often they have been Ptolemaic in their methods. They have approached their task expecting to delimit morality accurately by producing a simple formula; and when the formula of their choice failed to do the whole job have resorted to

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philosophical epicycles. But there is no more reason to suppose that a single criterion will serve to mark off morality and its principles from all those things which they are not than there is to take for granted that the orbits of the planets are perfect circles. What the form of the boundary is must be found out, not assumed beforehand.

Still, even though no single formula may do the whole job of delimiting morality, there is one thing it can hope to do: it can indicate the way in which some *sector* of the boundary runs. It can serve, that is, to represent the shape of the boundary *in a given direction*. And this I am sure philosophers' super-principles have been used to do—to mark the bounds of the area of morality along a certain stretch, and so to repel attempts to take over the all or part of the area by annexing it to some neighbouring one.

Let me give an historical illustration of this. Throughout the eighteenth century philosophers felt the need to show that, properly looked at, morality and self-interest must coincide. So we find even Butler arguing that, if we sit down in a cool hour and consider what our own truest interest is, we shall always find ourselves drawn towards the moral or altruistic act—the implication being that, if in a particular case we fail to find this happy coincidence, then we couldn't have sat down for long enough, or the hour couldn't have been cool enough. Against this whole trend of eighteenth-century moral philosophizing, we find Kant—ever re-asserting the distinction between considerations of morality and those of self-interest in a situation in which philosophers had come to forget how the line between them runs. As a way of re-emphasizing the location of this line, the categorical imperative principle will do very well. Of course, the criterion it spotlights will not serve to mark off all the other sectors of the boundary, those dividing morality from tabu, from law, from etiquette and so on. But if Kant appears to overlook this fact, that is perhaps understandable; seeing that his eyes were fixed—and with some reason—in the direction of the sector at that time under attack.

The situation as I see it is similar to that Mr. L. N. B. Thomas found when he examined the function of definitions of poetry.¹ Whenever people have said "poetry is . . ." or "the essence of poetry is . . ." in a way which carried conviction, there was always (he found) some implied contrast. Matthew Arnold says that poetry is a criticism of life, and people quote this remark in isolation, as though he had been identifying poetry and propaganda: but look at the context in which he made it, and you will see that he says this

¹ Mr. Thomas is at present Director of the National Gallery of Western Australia. His unpublished thesis on this subject is full of illuminating suggestions of this sort, but it had the ill-fortune to be adjudicated on by teachers of English, not by philosophers.

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precisely in order to contrast poetry with *belles-lettres*. Wordsworth says poetry is emotion recollected in tranquillity; and again his assertion needs its complementary denial—poetry is not (as some say) the spontaneous overflowing of a brimming heart, it is not *gush*. To define poetry, to say “poetry is . . .” or “the essence of poetry is . . .” can therefore be a real help to our understanding, provided it is clear *from the context* what contrast is implied—*belles-lettres*, *gush*, oratory, music or whatever. The formula offered, “emotion recollected in tranquillity” or “a criticism of life,” then serves to emphasize the special sector in the boundary of poetry which divides it from the *belles-lettres* or *gush*. It says in effect: “the essential thing about poetry, as opposed to *gush* (say), is . . .”, or “the essential thing to mention when marking off poetry from *gush* is . . .”

Definitions of morality, distillations of its essence, formulae presented as its “fundamental principle”; these I am inclined to think of along with definitions of poetry. They do not map the whole boundary of morality, but they do help to delimit it, by contrasting it with some one other thing. Such a dictum as “the essence of morality is that its imperatives are categorical” no more tells us the only thing worth knowing about morality, than does the motto “poetry is a criticism of life” tell us the only worthwhile truth about poetry: neither gives us a necessary and sufficient criterion for distinguishing morality (or poetry) from all other things. But when any sort of frivolous jingle goes by the name of poetry, or when morality comes to be confused with worldly wisdom, then may be the time to re-assert the old distinctions, and to re-erect the boundary-stones along the sector where they were in danger of being lost to sight.

Two things follow from this analysis. In the first place, if we ask how far any one philosopher can claim to establish his chosen principle or definition to the exclusion of those which other philosophers advocate, then, as a matter of strict logic, the answer is that he cannot. If we pick out some one feature as *the* essence of morality, we can justify our choice only by reference to some implied contrast, with self-interest (say) or tabu or law. And if two philosophers are interested in contrasting morality with different things, then—so far as logic goes—there will be no opposition between the fundamental principles which each will formulate as a result.

But perhaps we must go further than logic takes us. After all, there may well be crucial issues in moral philosophy at any given time. There may, in 1780 say, be some contrast which especially needs emphasizing. Definitions of morality, accordingly, have never been produced by philosophers solely from a desire for logical precision. This is why there is always some plausibility in the view I took the trouble to argue against first, the view that such principles

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are intended to be treated as moral rules. For these definitions or principles have not only a logical but also an authentically moral force. Everyday moral rules they are not, but at another level they remain moral, not just logical, principles. The essence of morality for any philosopher is that which he believes it essential to emphasize—essential because only by emphasizing that can one defend the threatened sector of its boundary. And for those who consider the autonomy of morality worth defending, who are unwilling to see it turned into a dependent province either of desire and self-interest (however coolly sat-down-upon or thoroughly mulled-over) or of tabu or law or politics or etiquette or theology (all of them directions from which it has been and is still at one time or another advanced upon), for them the task of delimiting the threatened sector of the boundary will be more than one of logical analysis. It will have a genuinely moral urgency.

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ON RETRIBUTION

A retributive theory of punishment must at least say that it is a necessary condition for the justification of a punishment that the person punished should be guilty. But "guilty" here may be taken in two different senses, giving two very different kinds of justification. In the first sense, to be guilty is to have wilfully disobeyed a law or order of some authority, and it is the defiance of this authority which justifies punishment. Mr. Mabbott has put up a good case for a view of this kind.¹ It is clear that we regularly do justify the punishment of offenders on the ground that they have broken rules, and therefore deserve to be punished. And there are some moral situations (those of officials charged with the administration of regulations) in which this is the only fact to be considered in deciding whether or not to punish. As to the view that this constitutes the only valid justification of punishment, I wish to make two comments.

Firstly, I can see no reason for saying (as both Mr. Mabbott and Mr. Mundle² do) that punishment can be justified only by a breach of a *law* or *rule*. The law-courts of highly developed political societies may indeed be bound by this principle. But parents (whose punishments are much more numerous than those of magistrates, and surely not less justifiable) and schoolmasters and ships' captains punish for disobedience to specific orders as well as to general rules. Furthermore, in less formalized systems of authority there is always the right to punish evident misdemeanours whether or not they have been explicitly forbidden. I don't suppose there is any school which has a rule forbidding the smearing of the classroom seats with glue; but any boy in any ordinary school who did it would certainly be punished, and with ample justification. Even the most elaborately codified systems of law have vague offences like "committing a nuisance" which can be made to cover plenty of anti-social actions which the legislators didn't think of beforehand.

Secondly, while the fact that a law or order has been disobeyed may provide a justification for punishment, it cannot provide a complete, independent or ultimate justification. The argument "You have broken this rule, therefore you deserve punishment" invites the question "Why should I obey this rule?" Before one can justify a given punishment imposed by a given authority for a given offence, one must first justify the right of this authority to make rules controlling this sphere of action, and to impose punishments of this kind. This may be easy (as with the authority of Her Majesty's Parliament and judges over you and me, or the authority of my neighbour over his children). It may be not so easy (as with the authority of the French government over the Moroccans, or the authority of Legree over Uncle Tom). But until a justification of the authority has been given, the punishment remains unjustified. (Many wise men have held the doctrine of Natural Law, which says that there are some sorts of actions which no authority has the right to prohibit.) Thus a retributive theory of this kind requires to be supplemented by a theory of the way in which the authority of rulers is to be justified; and it is consistent with many different theories on this question. In particular, it is consistent with a utilitarian theory of what justifies the authority of governments. It is also consistent with a utilitarian theory of how punishments should be graded as between different offences and different offenders. For the principle "Those

¹ *Mind*, April 1939 and *Philosophy*, July 1955.

² *Philosophical Quarterly*, July 1954.

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and only those who have disobeyed laws or orders should be punished" neither says nor implies anything about the severity of punishments. It is not, however, consistent with the principle that "the infliction of a particular punishment should be determined by the good *that particular punishment* will do either to the criminal or to society" —this is Mabbott's most valuable point.¹

If the retributive theory is to offer a complete and self-contained justification of punishment, it must be understood in a different sense. In this sense, which is the usual one, "guilt" means moral wickedness; and it is the doing of a moral wrong which deserves and justifies punishment. If ill desert attaches to moral wrong, it does so independently of the rulings of governments. And the law-enforcing activities of governments may themselves be justified on the ground that they give the wicked their deserts. (Locke's theory is rather like this—the authority of governments is justified because they can more effectively and conveniently inflict those punishments which the Law of Nature already authorizes; and Locke's account of the way men surrender to special officers their personal right of taking vengeance on wrongdoers is not so unhistorical as is sometimes maintained.)

On this view, the infliction of suffering² on the wicked is a good thing quite apart from deterrent, reformatory or other useful consequences. This is the feature of the retributive theory at which people are most apt to boggle. It seems to me that the punishment of wrongdoers does constitute a good independent of its deterrent or reformatory effects, though not a very great good, inasmuch as it gives satisfaction to the resentment or indignation against wickedness which is felt by those who care for morality. This resentment, this inclination to make the wrongdoer suffer for the harm he has done, is perhaps the earliest source of the practice of punishing wrongdoers; it is independent of, and exists alongside, the desire to punish in order to prevent wrongdoing. The retributive theory in its normal form takes the satisfaction of this resentment to be the central and primary aim of punishment.

To a large extent the retributive view of punishment works in harmony with utilitarian views. Conflict may arise between them on two sorts of questions. Firstly, there can be conflict as to which actions are to be made punishable. A utilitarian will be unwilling to punish actions which arouse moral repugnance without doing any evident harm (Sunday trading and homosexuality might be examples). He will be unwilling to punish actions which, though they do harm, do less harm than would probably be done in the course of suppressing them. He will be unwilling to punish actions, however wicked and harmful, if there is no prospect that punishment will lessen their incidence. A retributionist (as such) will be prepared to punish in all these cases. Conversely, a retributionist may refuse to punish actions done for reasons of conscience, or actions done or omitted negligently but without evil intent, whereas a utilitarian will ignore these considerations of motive.

Secondly, there will be conflict as to the relative severity of punishments to be inflicted for different sorts of offences, and upon different sorts of offenders. On this issue, a utilitarian will consider the deterrent and the reformatory effects of different punishments upon different types of offenders, and the ratio between the suffering inflicted by the punishment and the suffering prevented by the observance of the law. He will in general affix the severest penalties to those types of offence which do the greatest harm, and which it is therefore most important to prevent. A retributionist will consider the "moral gravity"

¹ *Mind*, April 1939, p. 162.

² Mabbott objects to the word "suffering" here, on the ground that there is a difference between inflicting an evil on an offender and depriving him of a good (e.g. his liberty). Surely this is a quibble. A man imprisoned for several years suffers, and is meant to suffer—probably he suffers more than if he had been severely flogged.

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of the individual offence, and will try to make his punishments proportionate thereto. Mundle¹ has recently offered a defence of this principle. I agree that it is on grounds of "moral gravity," rather than on utilitarian grounds, that we often proceed in determining the severity of punishments. But I shall argue that the principle that the severity of punishment should be proportionate to the moral gravity of the offence is not a clear principle suited to give us systematic guidance on this matter.

The difficulty is that in order to apply the principle we need to be able to measure the degree of moral turpitude which different offences possess. If retributive punishment is, as I have maintained, primarily a matter of satisfying indignation, then the measure of moral guilt would presumably be the amount of indignation aroused by the offence. In fact I think we do habitually use this as our private measure of wickedness; and there are parents who punish according to this measure. But it is obviously unsuited to be a public measure of the amount of punishment deserved, for it varies far too much in relation to similar offences from person to person and from time to time. Anybody who wishes to make "moral gravity" determine the severity of punishment in a penal system must find some more consistent means of measurement than this.

The most obvious objective criterion, which seems to appeal both to small children² and to politically immature adults, is the amount of damage done; the greater the harm caused, the heavier the punishment should be. This works well enough in cases where the punishment is at the same time a restitution, a restoring of a *status quo* which the wrongdoer has disturbed; and the reasonableness of adapting the punishment to the crime in such cases has probably encouraged people to think of all punishment as a sort of repayment for wrongdoing—a view which is, however, applicable to few offences other than those against property (no punishment can cancel the loss of a life, a limb, a girl's virginity). The principle of judging the wickedness of the action by the damage done is bound to be abandoned as soon as we come to assign moral merit and demerit to the will and character of the agent, rather than to the consequences of what he does. Then we cannot allow that the careless motorist who knocks down three pedestrians deserves thrice the punishment of him who knocks down one, or the bank robber who gets away with £10,000 a hundred times the punishment of him who only collects £100. The idea of a material equivalence between crime and punishment lingers only in some particularly emotional corners of our moral consciousness, in the tendency to think that death is the uniquely appropriate punishment for murderers, and flogging for cosh-boys.

How then can we measure the moral quality of the guilty will? I think we set about it rather like this. We try, from the circumstances of the offence, to estimate the strength of the offender's inclination to do wrong, and we reckon as most wicked, and deserving of the heaviest punishment, that offender whose inclination to evil, as against contrary inclinations to do right, is the strongest. Thus it takes a stronger appetite for wrongdoing, or a weaker susceptibility to conscientious scruples, to be a ringleader than a follower, to rob a benefactor than to rob a bank, to strike in cold blood than to strike in the heat of passion, to embezzle for the sake of luxury spending than to embezzle for the sake of averting ruin. The logic of "previous good conduct" is similar: it shows that the offender's inclination to wrongdoing is less strong than it might seem, since hitherto he has managed to resist it. "Extenuating circumstances" are always circumstances in which the inducements to do wrong are particularly strong, or the inducements to do right particularly weak. The heaviest punishments are earned by those who most entirely and consistently flout common

¹ Loc. cit.

² See Piaget, *Moral Judgement of the Child*.

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standards. This sort of measure of "moral gravity" is quite often used by persons in authority.

But further reflection takes us yet another step. If differences in external circumstances may alter the assessment of guilt, may not differences in the internal circumstances do the same—I mean differences in the innate and acquired tendencies of character with which a man has to cope? If A has a constitutional craving for alcohol, and B has been brought up in the society of confirmed drunkards, does not sobriety require from them a greater effort of will than from C, who was raised by teetotallers and dislikes beer? And does not this lessen the moral gravity of their offence if they become drunk and disorderly? If in the last analysis moral value belongs only to the will, that is to the effort a man makes towards right living, then we must admit that similar actions and similar dispositions may have different moral values in different persons, and that neither the man who does most harm, nor the man with the most vicious inclinations, is necessarily most deserving of blame and punishment. I think this is the position to which reflection tends to lead us; in judging our own actions at least, we claim most merit for those good deeds which it cost us the greatest effort to do, we excuse ourselves most readily for those bad deeds which it would have cost the greatest effort to avoid. But if this intensity of moral effort made or omitted is the real bearer of moral merit and demerit, it is a quantity which God might conceivably measure, but we certainly cannot. It is an impossible foundation for a penal system.

When we have got this far, we can hardly avoid having doubts whether there is really any quantity of moral desert to be measured at all. The more carefully we investigate the conditions of human action, the more elusive "moral gravity" becomes. And as we come to think of human actions as the outcome of previous causes, as we find ourselves saying "There, but for the grace of God (or the luck of the draw) go I," we tend to lose the attitude of mind to which the idea of retribution appeals. "Tout comprendre est tout pardonner" is false if it means that understanding of causes and motives necessarily makes us more lenient; we may still think it right to punish an offender, perhaps severely, for the sake of others, or even for his own. What is true is that the growth of understanding normally brings with it a diminution of indignation, which draws much of its power from our horror of the unfamiliar. And when we no longer feel indignation, though we may still wish to punish, we do not wish to punish retributively.

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In fact, only one book on or around Marxism has been received for survey during the year that is past, though there are perhaps few British philosophers who would see anything for surprise or regret in that. Among the books not received, however, are two of very considerable interest and intelligence, which it would be wrong not to mention for the sake of anyone who may be unaware of their existence; Merleau Ponty's *Les aventures de la dialectique* and Raymond Aron's *L'opium des intellectuels*. Both books appeared at roughly the same time as a British critic was rash enough publicly to lament that political philosophy was dead in France. Quite apart from anything else, this seems an odd complaint of a country in which Marxism, be it for better or for worse, is very much a live intellectual influence. Classical Marxism may indeed be what Professor Acton calls "a philosophical farrago," but it would be a bad mistake to treat it as no more than a dead doctrinal body, to be dissected and preserved, if at all, as simply an historical curiosity. What the intellectuals of the world's next generation or two will be saying may be anybody's guess; but that a very large proportion of them will be saying it in Marxist or Marxist-derived terminology seems a safe prediction. When for any reason a certain vocabulary is placed beyond the bounds of critical questioning, all development must take the form of interpretation and application. But to say this is very different from saying that all development is brought to a halt. This is a situation that tends to be peculiarly irritating to the critic; there is an almost overwhelming temptation to regard one's opponent as a fraud, who slips dishonestly from one position to another, even perhaps appropriating some of the critic's own weapons, while yet maintaining that he is still what he said he was at the beginning. An opponent who will stick to one fundamental orthodoxy is so much more satisfactory. Marxism, however, is a doctrine peculiarly likely to go through far-reaching changes within the framework of a superficially unchanging vocabulary. And since there are after all many Marxists who are by no means fools, to follow such developments may be worth while not only for the reason that to do so may be a necessary condition of any real intellectual contact—though this is surely a good enough reason in itself.

As far as the two books just mentioned are concerned, since, as I have said, neither has been received for survey and since anyhow both have already attracted a good deal of attention in this country, there is no need to discuss them here; except perhaps to remark that Aron's methods are far more straightforward than Merleau Ponty's, and to add by the way that the latter produced in the journal *Express*, while it was still a weekly, a most ingenious interpretation of the policies of the East German régime in terms of the dialectic. (I should say too that both books are, of course, anti-Marxist in their respective ways.) The book that *has* been received is *Le Marxisme* by Henri Arvon (Armand Colin), a short and readable, though not simple, introduction to the subject. It might well make an excellent introductory companion to Professor Acton's work on the same subject, different as the two books are. Where Acton tells the reader what the Marxist theses are and what are their pros and cons, Arvon leads him into them. Though he is by no means totally uncritical, he gives a more sympathetic account and catches in a

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way something more of the flavour of Marxism. This is probably partly because he sets out at once from the standpoint of the Hegelian dialectic and the notion of alienation; and in part too the result of a selection and presentation that constantly emphasize the way in which the "human situation" in its various aspects forms the focus of Marxist preoccupations. Arvon's exposition, which does not, needless to say, cover entirely the same ground as Acton's, is doubtless far less analytically lucid and precise; it is anyhow a good deal shorter. On the other hand it expresses something of the nature, and hence the feel of possible future developments, of Marxist thinking that one might be less likely to get from a work in which Marxism is in effect expertly taken to pieces. Both approaches are surely of equal importance.

About *Pouvoir politique et pouvoir spirituel*, by Joseph Ohana (Marcel Rivière, Paris), I found it hard to make up my mind. Its main theme is a plea for the adoption of a creed of spiritual values—as opposed to political values, perfectly proper in their necessary sphere of ways and means—conceived not as objective things-in-themselves, but as ideals of reason, elaborated as a result of reflection on the unifying tendencies inherent in human nature as a whole; although a few devoted men might live as witnesses to these values, they are for the majority like signposts to an ideal that could not possibly be realized in practice. But first is needed a thoroughgoing rejection of all accepted systems. This the author seems to carry through somewhat too thoroughly for his own subsequent purposes. For his refusal to admit any felt certainty of belief can hardly be turned aside merely by asserting that it is obvious that human nature is directed by some intelligent agent. This is a strange book, at times wild, at times cranky, but at times also extremely shrewd and in any and every case clear and to its point. There are some acute and provocative criticisms of Kantian and Intuitionist ethics, of Utilitarianism, Marxism and the Catholic Church; and the whole discussion is invigorated by an active concern with the real life problems and behaviour of ordinary people in this modern age. (It is odd, though, given the general tenor of the book, that no mention at all is made of Hume.) All in all, despite its incoherence, it is in parts so stimulating as to be well worth reading.

Georges Vlachos, on the other hand, has written a whole *Essai sur la politique de Hume* (Institut Français Athènes and Domat-Montchrestien, Paris), an examination of Hume's view on politics throughout the entire range of his works. It is difficult not to feel that despite his obvious intent to be fair, Vlachos is basically out of sympathy with Hume and sometimes goes unnecessarily out of his way to prise open the possible inconsistencies when no greater ingenuity exercised in the opposite direction might have bound them together. On the whole that considerable part of his book which deals with the essays and the history is the more interesting and he brings out well the way in which Hume fluctuates between a view of experience as full of limitless variation and one of political science as founded on a few simple generalizations of more or less a priori psychology. Among other points worthy of note is, too, the discussion of the relations between Hume's political theories and his political sympathies. Again this is a clear and stimulating book and one that by and large is well worth the reading.

Among the works received from Messrs. Gauthier-Villars is a very welcome new edition of *Les fondements logiques des mathématiques* by Professor E. W. Beth. This is in every way an improvement on what was already a very valuable book. The content has been revised and brought up to date, the index enlarged, the format overhauled and the little booklet of errata

and addenda absorbed into the text. In particular, as Professor Beth points out, Book III on formalized axiomatics has been thoroughly recast. In fact, the only drawback is the inevitable increase in price to almost twice what it was. Of J. Barkley Rosser's *Deux esquisses de logique* Mr. G. B. Keene reports as follows: "The first section of this monograph contains a neat presentation of two alternative axiomatizations of combinatory logic (consistency proofs for them have been given by Curry), demonstrates their equivalence to Church's calculus of lambda-conversion and shows how general recursive functions can be defined in the latter. Slight disappointment may, however, be felt over a paragraph headed 'Chapter 5.' Here our interest is chiefly aroused by a final note to the effect that the possibility of setting up a theory of deduction on the basis of lambda-conversion is at present being worked out by Curry and Feys. But nothing further is said, even about the general outline of such a programme. The treatment is detailed and rigorous although at times the author lapses, a little inconsistently, into an almost elementary tone of exposition. In the second section, for instance, we are given an account of the concept of 'model' in formal logic which could safely have been assumed to be unnecessary for readers able to follow the subsequent more technical discussion. Then follow sketches of some important (including some fairly recent) consistency proofs in mathematical logic. Of particular value is a short section relating the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem to a recent theorem of Heyting and Rosser, namely, that every consistent logic has a non-normal model. One would like to have seen a fuller discussion of the implications of this proof with respect to the formal adequacy of all axiom-sets for the natural numbers. The monograph is well up to the standard set by its predecessors in this series."

Traité de la connaissance by Louis Rougier contains, by contrast, some strange lapses from the Gauthier-Villars standard. It is in many ways, a curious book altogether. Its general standpoint might be described as that of the orthodoxy of the American branch of the later Vienna Circle. There is a good deal of reference to recent work in mathematical logic, but none to that of the second Wittgenstein and his followers. Its purpose is an exposition of this particular empiricist theory of knowledge—though the author is distinctly uneasy about the title of empiricist—knowledge being limited, of course, almost entirely to questions of logic, mathematics, language and science. The exposition takes place on a bewildering variety of levels and thus tends at times to take on the air of an anthology. From the point of view of philosophers in this country, the ground covered is nearly always familiar and not infrequently out of date; yet the author is probably not unjustified in describing his thought as "non-conformist" as far as most French audiences are concerned. Certainly it is refreshing to find a French philosopher insisting on the importance of the distinction between synthetic and analytic propositions and that of exposing non-sensical pseudo-propositions about nothingness. These are wholly admirable sentiments. But it is disconcerting at the least to come across a wild inaccuracy and inconsistency scattered throughout the book. To mention four examples only. There are a series of transpositions between such terms as "disjunction," "conjunction," "sum," "product," "addition" and "multiplication." On page 121 the list of the sixteen possible compound propositions based on the truth-table of two propositions "p" and "q" would be accurate enough if the second and third lines of the table on which the list is based had been the other way round; (as they are in fact in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*). As the list stands it can only baffle the uninitiated; for others there

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could anyhow be no need to write out such a list. The term "propositional function" is used in various unusual ways (for example, page 257). And, less important but by no means untypical, Edward Caird, or what I presume to be Edward Caird, turns up in a list of the neo-Hegelians as "des deux Caire"!

"Edmond Barbotin," Mr. Eric Hill reports, "has already edited for posthumous publication a brief history by O. Hamelin of Aristotle's theory of the intellect as interpreted by later commentators and now he has himself undertaken in *La théorie aristotélicienne de l'intellect d'après Théophraste* (Vrin, Paris), a full examination of Theophrastus' views on the matter. Barbotin argues that Theophrastus' witness must be of prime importance since he was Aristotle's intimate disciple and his immediate successor as head of the Lyceum. The thirteen fragments of Theophrastus on the subject are printed in an appendix with critical apparatus, careful textual notes and a translation. Barbotin does not claim that Theophrastus' evidence brings any great flood of light into the obscurity of Aristotle's theory of the active and passive intellects and of the origin and fate of the soul. In fact it mainly confirms the well-known inconclusiveness of Aristotle's own writings upon the subject. Later syncretist commentators like Themistius and Priscian tried to tie up the loose ends by accommodating Aristotle's views to those of Plato and the neo-Platonists, but Theophrastus recognized the "De Anima" for what it was, the unfinished grappling of a great mind with a great problem. This is a scholarly and valuable work. There are excellent indices and a full bibliography.

"*L'être et la forme selon Platon* (Museum Lessianum), by R. Loriaux is a study of the Platonic dialect, about half the book being devoted to the 'ascending' form and half to the 'descending' form. In his exposition, accompanied by lengthy analysis of the relevant dialogues, he goes over much familiar ground without contributing anything particularly new. The book is clearly written, but can hardly be considered important."

Fr. Duyckaerts, in *La notion de Normal en psychologie clinique* (Vrin, Paris), discusses four main candidates for a definition of "normal" before putting forward his own. These are the ideas of "integration," "independence" or "autonomy," "adaptation" and the "average man." The author's own view is that "it seems legitimate to consider as normal the man whose individual and social life is orientated in a creative direction." His activity must be purposeful, but of a positive kind and not simply limited to the "avoidance of frustration." Duyckaerts is anxious to avoid the mistake of defining any particular type of action as normal or abnormal irrespective of circumstances; to judge of an agent's state of mental health one must know not just what he did, but also why he did it. Fair enough, no doubt; but then just what is one saying when one talks of creative activity? To quote Duyckaerts again: "We consider an individual to be creative . . . who is capable of conducting himself according to the physiological, psychic, social and cultural data which form the whole of his phenomenal field." This could mean anything—or nothing. Still, the book as a whole provides an interesting discussion of a most important topic, sharpened by a general awareness of the practical necessity of deciding what conditions are so abnormal as to call for treatment and at what such treatment is to aim. The book, I take it, is primarily directed to anyone concerned with psychology, but there is a good deal in it which may be of interest to philosophers too.

Every year I end by finding myself overcome with remorse at the books that I have neither space nor competence to discuss and this year the

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situation is somewhat worse than usual. The following at any rate must at least be mentioned; their titles will have to speak for themselves. *Marsile Ficin et l'art*, by André Chastel (Droz, Geneva and Giard, Lille); *Erasme et l'Italie*, by Augustin Renaudet (Droz); *La philosophie néerlandaise au siècle d'or*—Tome I, *L'enseignement philosophique dans les universités à l'époque précartesienne (1575-1650)*, by Paul Dibon, (Elsevier); and *Les relations intellectuelles de Locke avec la France*, by Gabriel Bonno (University of California Press), which makes use of the Locke papers at the Bodleian. These are all scholar's books and certainly demand the attention of anyone interested in the relevant special subjects.

ALAN MONTEFIORE.

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Ethics. By A. C. EWING, M.A., D.Phil., F.B.A., Litt.D. (London: English Universities Press. Pp. vii × 183.)

This little book is intended for beginners, and the beginner who reads it can hardly fail to come away with two impressions. The first is that ethics is a much simpler subject than it really is; for Ewing writes with great clarity and the general arrangement is logical. "Ethics is concerned with two main kinds of questions, first, with deciding the general principles on which ethical terms are to be applied to anything, and secondly with deciding precisely what these terms mean." Nothing could be clearer. Various ethical theories, Egoistic Hedonism, Utilitarianism (both hedonistic and ideal), the theories of Kant, Ross and Moore are passed in review and, with greater or less hesitation, condemned. But when we look for positive answers to the two main types of question we find, as readers of Ewing's other books will expect, that there is only one principle on which we apply ethical terms; we apply them to the things to which they obviously apply. The attempt to answer the second question simply peters out when it has been shown that at least some ethical terms are indefinable. This is a pity; since the realization that some ethical terms are indefinable might lead, not to the conclusion that it is obvious what they mean, but to the investigation of methods other than that of definition for elucidating their meaning. Ewing, like Moore, passes from "indefinable" through "simple" to "understood without investigation."

The second impression that the novice cannot fail to get is that "philosophers" (very few are named) must have been quite extraordinarily foolish. Their theories topple like nine-pins before the tritest moral observations. Thus Egoistic Hedonism is refuted by pointing out that if it were true we should have to pass a favourable verdict on a man who wantonly started a civil war in order to gratify a death-bed desire for revenge. Since "we" should obviously not approve of this, egoistic hedonism must be false. Ewing has failed to notice an assumption which underlies this refutation. He starts the chapter, properly enough, as follows: "One of the first questions that presents itself in ethics is—Why ought I to sacrifice myself for the sake of somebody else?" But the question he actually answers is "Do we approve of those who are consistently selfish?" It is not surprising that Ewing should find this latter question easy to answer; what is incredible is that he should think it relevant. Almost every moral philosopher of standing has thought it incumbent on him to come to grips with egoistic hedonism, and many have refuted it with so little success that they have been accused of being egoistic hedonists themselves. They have found the task of refutation difficult partly because they have been deliberately playing a philosophical game in which no moral judgment is allowed to count as "obvious," but mainly because they have refused to make Ewing's assumption, viz.: that if it is obvious to Ewing and me and John Doe that Richard Roe ought not to do a certain thing, Richard Roe himself must be convinced that he ought not to do it as soon as this is pointed out. Philosophical egoism is precisely the rejection of this assumption; which is why Plato, for example, found it so difficult to deal with. But Ewing, like Cephalus, leaves the discussion just where it begins to get difficult.

The attempts to define "good" and "ought" which Ewing mentions and dismisses are likewise travesties of philosophical theories. Did any philosopher ever say that "good" meant what the speaker or what the majority approves

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of? The first is clearly a dig at Hobbes; but there is all the difference in the world between Ewing's version and Hobbes's "whatsoever is the object of a man's desire, that is it which *he for his part calleth good*." Hobbes is talking about first person statements; his theory can only be translated into the impersonal mode if you assume, as Ewing does, that "this is good" is logically analogous to "this is square." And this is exactly what Hobbes denies, as he makes abundantly clear. Of course you can refute a subjectivist "definition" of good, if you assume that "good" is the name of an objective property. The second (majority) definition is usually fathered on Hume; but I am glad to say that Ewing leaves it fatherless. The usual laugh about statistics is a laugh at nobody's expense.

There is something very like an inconsistency between Ewing's rejection of these definitions and his frequent use of an appeal to what the reader finds or "we" find obvious as a criterion for applying moral words. Granted that a criterion is not a definition; yet it would seem that every argument against the proposed definitions can be used against the application of the corresponding criteria. Ewing would surely not admit that the fact that I think it obvious that something is right is a conclusive proof that it is right; nor is the fact that many or most men find it obviously right.

Both sets of arguments seem valid against any of the over-simplified theories that Ewing examines; and both ignore the insights which such theories enshrine. The jejune truth underlying all subjectivist and intuitionist theories is that when I make up my mind that I ought to do something *I* make up *my* mind. It is analytic that when I have considered all the relevant facts and moral principles bearing on the situation that occur to me there is no further criterion that *I* can apply. And the rather less jejune truth underlying objectivist and majority theories is that our moral language, unlike our talk about matters of taste, presupposes a background of general agreement.

Ewing ignores throughout the discoveries (if that is not too question-begging a word) of modern logic. He hardly considers the possibility that we might have many different criteria for applying moral words no one of which is necessary or sufficient; he ignores the multiplicity of uses to which moral words are put, and he ignores the multiplicity of the words themselves. The rich and varied vocabulary of words and locutions which go to make up our actual moral discourse is reduced to "good," "right" and "ought"; and these three can, it seems, be shuffled at will. For example, in dismissing utilitarianism on the usual grounds that it fails to square with the moral judgments that "we" actually make, he uses the phrase "all but the very poor ought to give much more money to charity than on the average they do." But this "ought" covers at least two very different things: (1) "It would be a good thing if all but the very poor, etc. . . ." and (2) "All but the very poor are under an obligation, etc. . . ."

It might be said that the faults that I have noticed are inevitable in a short introductory book. The book is less than two hundred pages long and it is a considerable achievement to have covered so much of the subject so lucidly in so small a space. But if the over-simplification imposed by the purpose of the book necessarily leads to travesty—and I think it does—this is an argument against the writing of any book on ethics within such limitations. It is indeed a problem how students who lack the advantage of Socratic discussion with a tutor can best be introduced to ethics, or indeed to any branch of philosophy. Ewing's book has great merits; it is admirably clear and it makes no attempt to exploit a misconception common among beginners that philosophy is a peculiarly grand and mysterious subject. But

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it will be of use to a student if and only if he has the wit to see that neither the theories examined nor the arguments used against them are as simple as Ewing makes out, the pertinacity to pursue the theories and arguments further and the curiosity to examine the original texts.

P. H. NOWELL-SMITH.

The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, etc. By JOHN AUSTIN. With an introduction by Professor H. L. A. Hart. (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (the first ten of Austin's lectures as Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of London in 1828) was originally published, through the efforts of his wife Sarah, in 1832. In his Preface Austin emphasized that these ten lectures were to be regarded as a detached and preliminary treatise to the main work. Nothing else appeared during the rest of his life, save one political pamphlet, and a couple of articles. In 1834 he gave a shorter course of lectures at Lincoln's Inn, covering very much the same ground as the earlier University of London lectures; but they were not just the same lectures over again, as Professor Hart seems to suggest. Austin intended to work the two courses up into a single, comprehensive treatise on general jurisprudence and ethics, but he did not live to do it. However, he left sufficiently clear indications of his plan for Sarah to be able to consolidate the two courses into the *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, published in 1863.

The other essay contained in the present volume, *On the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence*, also published posthumously, was put together by Sarah Austin from the opening lectures of each of his two main courses, and provides a very brief summary of them, in which Austin lays down what he thinks jurisprudence to be, and why the study of it should be the initial grounding of all lawyers, practical as well as academic.

The works here reprinted, therefore, offer to the modern reader almost all the essentials, and much of the detail, of Austin's account of jurisprudence, within the covers of a single, conveniently small, and very modestly priced book.

As Professor Hart indicates in his short but valuable introduction Austin's lectures present us with two questions. First a general question, whether he was right to maintain that common to all actual and possible legal systems there must be a body of underlying notions and principles, which will be the subject-matter of general jurisprudence—this being the "science of positive law as it *is*," to be contrasted with "the science of legislation, or of positive law as it *ought* to be." If he was right, then general jurisprudence must be an analytical, as contrasted with an historical, study of what is essential to the idea of man in society; and, as Professor Hart suggests, the outcome of such a study could hardly be so very far away from the theories of Natural Law which Austin himself so violently opposed. The second and more particular question will be whether Austin has picked out the right notions to be the basic notions of a general jurisprudence. The answer here could be more confidently negative. Austin's two basic (but not indefinable) concepts, *Command* and *Habit of Obedience*, would not now receive assent, for they make the essential facts about a law, or a body of law, to be simply that it is what is willed or desired by someone, and that that someone shall be a *sovereign* person or corporation. For Austin an independent political society is a group of persons generally in the habit of obedience to a sovereign; and a sovereign is a person or body of persons receiving such obedience, but not in turn in the habit of paying it to

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a further superior. Nowadays we should be more likely to say that the legality of laws is to be determined, not by their having been ordered by a determinate person or group of persons, but by their conformity with what Professor Hart, following Kelsen, calls a constitutional rule. Not that the Austinian view is entirely false. If its two key concepts are supplemented by a third, which might be called something like *Common Purpose*, then the application of his scheme to certain activities of limited appeal and jurisdiction, such as those of organized games, is not altogether inappropriate. Although even here some reference to the constitutional rule may be needed, it plays a less emphatic role than the fact that M.C.C. or the R.F.U. are the governing bodies of their games. But, unfortunately for Austin, the state is not simply M.C.C. writ large.

To have reprinted these works is to have performed a valuable service not only to jurists but also to political philosophers. For, while the influence of Austin during the last hundred years has been continuous, it has been acknowledged for the most part through the agency of his critics. With this new edition now available, the longwindedness of Austin's full lectures can no longer provide a decent excuse for failing to read him.

A. D. WOOLEY.

American Thought: A Critical Sketch. By M. R. Cohen (edited by F. S. Cohen). (The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois. 1954. pp. 360. Price \$5.00.)

It is unfortunate that Morris Raphael Cohen did not live to complete his projected history of American thought. With his rare combination of wide reading and philosophical clear-headedness he would undoubtedly have produced a book of outstanding importance. For too much of the work that others have done in this field (like H. W. Schneider's *History of American Philosophy* or Eric Goldman's *Rendezvous with Destiny*) is rendered infuriating by oversimplified classifications and superficial appraisals. As it is, however, we must be content with the drafts on various relevant topics which Felix S. Cohen edited from his father's posthumous papers before his own untimely death in 1953. And the resultant book is naturally of somewhat uneven merit.

The chapters on the background of the American tradition, on legal thought, and on aesthetics are, I think, the best in the book. The chapter on American ideas of history contains a useful survey of various attitudes and approaches to history which have been adopted in America. But it omits to mention the history of ideas movement, in which Cohen himself took part and A. O. Lovejoy was perhaps the prime mover. The chapter on religious thought has an interesting account of more recent developments but is strikingly deficient for the pre-revolutionary period. Jonathan Edwards, for instance, is mentioned several times in passing, but his theology is nowhere discussed in detail. There is no chapter at all about ethics: Henry George is barely mentioned. The chapter on general philosophy seems the least adequate to its topic. The period covered is from Fiske and Chauncey Wright, at one end, to Lewis and Whitehead, at the other. The New England transcendentalists are thus omitted altogether from this survey, though they are occasionally mentioned in other parts of the book. Contributions to mathematical logic by others than Peirce, Lewis and Sheffer are not mentioned at all, nor are any of the various forms of analytical philosophy, nor the resurrection in America of the movement for the unity of science. Of course, in the circumstances none of these omissions can be blamed either on the author or on the editor. But they do diminish the book's value for those not already familiar with the main developments in its field. The book

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might perhaps have been made more useful as an introductory survey if the editor had indicated the principal gaps that need supplementing from other sources.

The only section where I find the content of Cohen's summaries and criticisms consistently less successful than usual is in his treatment of the philosophers known in America as "neo-realists" and "critical realists." Perhaps he was himself too close to their general point of view to achieve a sufficiently disengaged terminological apparatus for discussing their wrangles about "knowing" and its "objects." What he says about James, Royce, and Dewey is much clearer and more interesting. Indeed, Cohen's writing is for the most part so informed, critical, judicious and lively that for all its incompleteness the book as a whole still deserves a very high place among surveys or histories of reflective thought in the U.S.A.

L. JONATHAN COHEN.

Pragmatism: Philosophy of Imperialism. By HARRY K. WELLS. (London: Lawrence & Wishart, Ltd. 1954. Pp. 221. Price 15s.)

According to Mr. Wells, pragmatism is not only wrong; because it substitutes expediency for truth it is also immoral; because it encourages the propagation of falsehoods useful to a minority class, it is pernicious in its effects; and it was deliberately invented by men who knew that it was false, in order to further the interests of the capitalists, whose hired sophists they were.

Few English philosophers would nowadays accept pragmatism. Still fewer, however, would regard it, considered as a statement about truth, and not as a definition of truth, as any more than a harmless platitude, or, at any rate, a rough approximation to accuracy. After all, true beliefs generally are useful, and if I confuse arsenic with sugar, this error is likely to issue in practical mistakes which may be disastrous both for myself and others. Why, then, should pragmatism be the target for such a stream of abuse as is hurled against it in Mr. Wells's book?

The answer is that Mr. Wells grossly misrepresents pragmatism. Pragmatists hold that a proposition is true if it is useful to X that X should believe it. They do not hold that a proposition is true if it is useful to X that Y should believe it. Hence they would hold the proposition "God exists"—belief in which is such an obstacle in the path of the advancing proletariat—to be true only if it were useful to capitalists that *they themselves* should believe it. They would not hold it to be true on the grounds that it was useful to *capitalists* that *communists* should believe it, any more than they would hold it to be true if it were useful to *communists* that *capitalists* should believe it. It is as obvious as anything can be, and no-one to my knowledge has ever denied it, that it would be extremely useful to *capitalists* that *communists* should believe what is *false*, and extremely useful to *communists* that *capitalists* should do the same. It is in terms of its usefulness to the believer, not in terms of its usefulness to the believer's enemies, that pragmatists define truth; but it is this latter view, which is so stupid that it would not merit refutation had it been held, at which Mr. Wells's fire is directed.

Though few would look upon pragmatism as downright immoral, many regard it as ignoble. This attitude to pragmatism I do not myself share. "*Magna est veritas et praevalet*" is something we should all like to believe. Pragmatists believed it so firmly that they were prepared to define truth in terms of what prevails. Their definition may be erroneous, but let us hope that the confidence on which it was based is not misplaced. Heaven help us all if it is!

JONATHAN HARRISON.

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Moral Rules. By J. D. MABBOTT. (London, Cumberlege, 1955. Extract from Proceedings of the British Academy for 1953, pp. 97-118. Price 3s. 6d.)

This is the annual philosophical lecture endowed by the Henriette Herz Trust. It examines the status in a theory of ethics of those general moral laws whose apparent obligatoriness in relative independence of consequences constitutes a plausible argument for a Kantian or an intuitionist view. The argument is stated generally in terms of an objectivist ethics, but the author holds that it is mainly independent of the issue as regards objectivity, and he gives interesting examples to show how what he says could be stated in terms of other views. He does, however, also think that the development of his argument ultimately strains any non-objectivist theory severely, so that the latter either must be revised and put in a more complex form than any yet attained or be abandoned (p. 117). What sort of revision, if any, could meet the situation he has not suggested, but he makes it clear that the difficulty arises because such views in their normal form can only admit successful means of persuasion and not good ethical reasons.

The argument proceeds by way of criticism of three alternative theories about moral rules—the self-evidence theory, the empiricist theory, and the utilitarian theory. One of the chief contributions of the author is the clearness with which he brings out the complete inadequacy of a purely empirical theory. For ethical propositions to be mere empirical generalizations it would have to be the case that we approved of particular instances of promise-keeping or disapproved of particular acts which inflicted pain independently of any recognition that a promise had been made or that the acts gave pain, and merely noted that they in fact had the common character of promise-keeping or pain-inflicting without feeling directly in any way that that was the reason which made us approve or disapprove of them (pp. 100-1). The case against utilitarianism is also stated very effectively except that no attention is given to a utilitarian who should reply that promise-keeping was good-in-itself and that its *prima facie* rightness depended on its goodness. There remains the intuitionist theory, which, as Mr. Mabbott admits, is much more plausible if it is not claimed that the intuitively known laws command in each case a particular kind of action without exception but only that they are *prima facie* duties. Whether this view is right or not, the main argument which Mr. Mabbott brings against it seems to me to fail. It is to the effect that the rules deemed to be self-evident vary with different civilizations and even with different individuals in the same civilization. Mr. Mabbott admits that in many cases this can be explained by differences as to matters of fact, but he denies (reasonably) that this is so in all. However (1) I do not see that it is necessary to the view to hold that all men agree about the rules. Moral insight may be a developing faculty, indeed one would expect it to be so. (2) The instances selected are unsatisfactory. Certainly the differences between the conscientious objector and his judges or between people who think suicide sometimes right and those who think it is always wrong (p. 99) is not in general reducible to a dispute merely as to matters of fact, but both parties at least would admit that war and suicide are *prima facie* wrong. Even the most hardened militarist would not defend starting a war if there was not some sort of ulterior reason for it. Consequently these belong to the class of disputes which Sir David Ross always regarded as incapable of certain decision, i.e. disputes as to which of two conflicting *prima facie* duties was more binding.

Mr. Mabbott's own theory is that the obligatoriness of the moral laws can be established only by asking what would happen if most people disobeyed them but asking this question with more regard to consequences than did Kant. In other words our author is ultimately a utilitarian in the sense that

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the justification of a law of action is based on the good its general observance does, but not a utilitarian as regards particular actions. It may be right to do more harm than good if we are acting in accord with a good general law. A number of difficult questions remain outstanding. In particular—Why should I refrain from doing good by breaking a law merely because it would do great harm if most people broke it, which there is no prospect of their doing, at any rate as a result of my action? And is it less difficult to be an intuitionist about what is intrinsically good, which Mr. Mabbott must be to establish his rules, than about what is right? His lecture is lucid and stimulating, but we are painfully aware of the limits of space which prevent him from further discussing these questions. It is much to be hoped that he will some time produce a full-scale book on ethics.

A. C. EWING.

Sense without Matter, or Direct Perception. A. A. LUCE. (Nelson. Pp. ix, 165.)

Dr. Luce, who is well known to all philosophers for his life-long devotion to the study of Berkeley and for his valuable contributions to Berkeley scholarship, has published in this little book a lively and spirited attack on "matter" from the Berkeleian point of view. Like his master, Dr. Luce writes in an admirably simple clear style, with the minimum of technicalities, and the book can be recommended as an attractive introduction for the layman to some important aspects of Berkeley's philosophy. In this review I shall confine my remarks to a few selected topics.

(1) *Matter.* As Dr. Luce points out, "matter" is a highly ambiguous word. In one sense it is a common name for such objects of actual or possible sense-perception as trees, stones, drops of water, clouds, etc. In that sense its use implies no theory, and anyone who believes that there are things answering to such names may be said to "believe in the existence of matter." Let us call this "matter in the *empirical* sense." At the opposite extreme "matter" is used to denote the supposed *substratum* in which all the qualities, dispositional properties, and variable states of any bit of "matter," in the empirical sense, are held to *inhere*. In that sense its use implies a certain metaphysical theory, and anyone who finds that theory unintelligible or incredible may be said to "disbelieve in the existence of matter." Let us call this "matter in the *Aristotelian* sense." Dr. Luce, like everyone else, accepts the existence of matter in the empirical sense. He says that he is concerned only to deny the existence of matter in the Aristotelian sense.

Now it is plain that there are intermediate possibilities. Suppose we ask ourselves, e.g., the question: Did Leibniz accept or reject the existence of matter? (i) Certainly he would have agreed that there are objects which we do or could perceive with our senses, and that the names "tree," "stone," "cloud," etc., can properly be applied to certain of them. (ii) Certainly he would have rejected matter in the Aristotelian sense. (iii) But it is also certain that he held that what a person perceives, when he would correctly and truly be said to be "seeing and touching a stone," is profoundly unlike what that person perceives it as being. He perceives it as brown and cold and roughly spherical and hard and massive. But in fact, according to Leibniz, what he perceives has and can have none of these properties. It has other properties, completely different from and incompatible with these, which he does not perceive it as having, viz., the property of being a collection of highly confused minds whose "points of view" all fall within certain narrow limits. We may put the case as follows. "Matter" in the empirical sense has a certain generally

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accepted (if vaguely formulated) *connotation* as well as a generally accepted *denotation*, and so we must distinguish between what I will call the *purely ostensive* and the *connotative* aspects of the empirical sense of "matter." Leibniz accepted the existence of matter in the purely ostensive empirical sense of that word; he rejected its existence, not only in the Aristotelian sense, but also in the connotative empirical sense.

The above distinction is highly relevant to Dr. Luce's position. For an essential part of his doctrine is the positive contention that matter, in the purely ostensive empirical sense, has the properties which we perceive it as having, i.e. that there is matter in the *connotative* empirical sense.

There is another distinction which needs to be drawn, and which Dr. Luce seems often to ignore. We must distinguish between "material substance" in the Aristotelian sense of a *substratum* in which certain qualities and dispositions inhere and certain events occur, and "material substance" in one at least of the senses in which Kant used the term "thing-in-itself." In the latter sense a "material substance" means the supposed *common source* of certain recurrent bundles of actual and possible sensations, such that when one of them occurs in a person's experience he would claim correctly to be perceiving a certain empirical material substance, e.g. the Albert Memorial. It is easy to see that the two notions of *substratum* and of *thing-in-itself* are fundamentally different, even if both should be chimerical. In the first place, a thing-in-itself, in the above sense, would have dispositional properties and variable occurrent states; therefore, if the Aristotelian doctrine of substance were correct, there would be *within it* the distinction of substratum and accidents. Secondly, there would be no logical inconsistency in combining the Aristotelian account of substance with a naïvely realistic account of sense-perception. On that combination of views, when a person perceives with his senses an empirical material substance, he is perceiving a certain *substratum* as having those very qualities which in fact inhere in it, and as undergoing those very changes which in fact are occurring in it, independently of whether he or anyone else should happen to be perceiving them.

Dr. Luce constantly twits matter, in the *Aristotelian* sense, with being something in principle imperceptible. This would be true, I think, of matter in the sense of *thing-in-itself*. But, if the Aristotelian doctrine of substance were combined, as it might logically be, with a realist account of sense-perception, matter in the Aristotelian sense, so far from being in principle imperceptible, would be precisely what a person *is* perceiving whenever he sees or touches or tastes or smells a body.

(2) *Diversity of Visual and Tactual Sense-data.* Dr. Luce, like Berkeley, takes for granted that anything which a person literally *sees* or could see must be numerically diverse from anything which a person literally *touches* or could touch. I do not find this self-evident, and I do not know how it could be proved. Berkeley's own argument for it has always seemed to me weak. It seems to me that it is here that the Berkeleian doctrine plainly comes in conflict with what common sense uncritically takes for granted. I do not regard this as a conclusive objection to the doctrine itself; but it is an objection to the claim that there is no conflict between the Berkeleian and the plain man.

(3) *Causation.* In Chapter V Dr. Luce explains and defends Berkeley's doctrine of causation. According to this, the word "cause" is ambiguous. In one sense it means *efficient* cause, and Dr. Luce describes an efficient cause as that which "makes changes begin to be." In the other sense it means a perceptible event which is a reliable sign of another such event. It is held to be self-evident that nothing can be an efficient cause except a mind exercising volition. God is a persistent efficient cause, and each of us is from time to time

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an efficient cause in a small way. Dr. Luce says that in us "feeling of effort, be it muscular, mental, or mixed, is the index of . . . causal power."

Much has been written on this topic from Hume's time to the present day, and Dr. Luce does not here consider the objections which have been raised or the answers which have been proposed. I will content myself here with the following two remarks. (i) Is it an accurate account of the agency which Berkeleians ascribe to God to say that he "makes changes begin to be"? I should have thought not. (ii) In the case of a finite person who at a certain moment makes a voluntary movement of his body or voluntarily calls up an image, how far is it correct to say that he "makes a change begin to be"? Only, I should have thought, in a secondary sense. What he does, surely, is to make a modification in a process of change which is already going on independently of his volition, e.g. in the electric currents in his brain or in the course of his thoughts.

(4) *Matter and Materialism.* Dr. Luce constantly asserts that the denial of matter in the Aristotelian sense would be the death blow of materialism, and he plainly attaches considerable importance to this implication of his doctrine. I take materialism to be the view that a person's mind and his mental processes are completely and one-sidedly dependent on his brain and nervous system and on physical processes in these. Now of course the empirical facts which seem *prima facie* to support this view are a datum common to all philosophers, which each school of philosophy must interpret in accordance with its own general principles. It seems to me that the mere rejection of matter in the Aristotelian sense would not carry one far in the direction of denying the alleged implication of these facts. The parts of Berkeley's system which would seem to be directly relevant to this end are the following. (i) The doctrine that the only possible efficient causes are minds exercising volition, and that causation in the sense of *de facto* regular sequence presupposes efficient causality at the back of nature as a whole. (ii) The doctrine that anything which is such that it could conceivably be sensed can actually exist when and only when someone is actually sensing it, and the inference that the greater part of nature (including the minute structure and the inner processes of the bodies of finite persons) exists only in so far as it is continually sensed by a non-human mind of superhuman wisdom and power. It is a long step from denying the existence of matter in the Aristotelian sense to establishing these characteristic positive doctrines and seeing exactly what would follow from them. It is perhaps inevitable that in this little book, written mainly for non-expert readers, Dr. Luce has not addressed himself as fully to this task as one could have wished.

C. D. BROAD.

The Contemplative Activity. By P. HAEZRAHI. (George Allen and Unwin. Pp. 139. Price 12s. 6d.)

These eight lectures are an interesting and ingenious attempt to rehabilitate the Kantian aesthetic. How far they achieve an adequate analysis of our most moving aesthetic experiences everybody must judge for himself.

The style, with several straggling sentences, anacolutha and long parentheses, may have been quite acceptable in good delivery but to a reader is often obstructive.

The thesis is that the pure aesthetic experience is quite devoid of sensuous charm, intellectual concepts—including recognition of resemblance—and of

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any emotion except that of delight in the experience. Such experiences may be stimulated by nature, for instance by the spirals of a falling leaf, or by non-representative art. Consequently Dr. Haerzrahi, like Kant, has to maintain that poetry and most art rely on "dependent" beauty, being infected by the adherence of non-aesthetic elements, though "taste on the whole profits by this harmony of the perceptive faculties with reason." Reynolds thought that "The great end . . . is to make an impression on the imagination and the feeling. The imitation of nature frequently does this. Sometimes it fails and something else succeeds." Our author writes "The fox in the contemplated landscape could say 'I am a splash of brownish-red colour.' " And presumably the Sistine Ezekiel could make an analogous boast.

There seem to be two difficulties here not dealt with by either Kant or Dr. Haerzrahi. The first is that every set of sense-impressions which we recognize as a pattern ought to be beautiful. But for me this is wishful thinking. The second is that the artistic imitation or adaptation of natural patterns, say a landscape or sunset, might be at least as purely beautiful as the original. A third objection—that the theory does not cover some of our eminently aesthetic experiences such as those of tragedy or "the starry heavens"—Kant tried to meet by recourse to his two forms of Sublimity, which, far from being mere patterns, satisfy us just by their "formlessness." Here Dr. Haerzrahi goes further. Though most works of art and some natural objects involve emotion for their full appreciation, these are only aesthetic so far as they are "formed" or "mastered" by "elegant" pattern. This conforms the theory closely to Wordsworth's "Emotion recollected in *tranquillity*" or Croce's "*Contemplative expression* of emotion in a sensuous *form*." The author's own discussion of the antithesis between form and matter seems less satisfactory than that of A. C. Bradley on "Substance" and "Subject" in his essay on *Poetry for Poetry's Sake*.

Dr. Haerzrahi claims that, once admitting the essentially aesthetic element in art to be pattern, then "the responses to works of art can be graded in order of merit" and "the reasons for so grading them represent objectively valid standards," so that "a poem can be proved good." But I cannot see that this claim is fulfilled. The statement that "an aesthetic experience cannot be mistaken or true" seems inconsistent with the other that "we are interested in the question of *which* objects *ought* to arouse such experience" and also perhaps with a third that wider considerations reduce the margin of error to which the formal aesthetic judgment is prone. The attempt at such proofs rests on question-begging terms such as "adequate," "appropriate," "sufficient," "justified."

On p. 107 the printer has substituted for "Trajan" "Trojan."

E. F. CARRITT.

Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science, 1100-1700. By A. C. CROMBIE. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1953. Pp. ix + 369. Price 35s. net.)

This book, which appears appropriately at the 700th anniversary of the death of Robert Grosseteste, is nevertheless much more than an account of his scientific work and ideas. It relates also in some detail a great deal of the scientific history of the later Middle Ages, with particular reference to the study of optics, and the story is finally brought up to the time of Galileo, Descartes and Newton. In addition to giving an account of the facts, it attempts

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an interpretation, its general thesis being "not only that many of the problems which modern analysis seeks to solve are precisely the problems tackled in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but also that many of the answers given at that remote time were precisely those which have been rediscovered only recently after long neglect." The author goes even further, and claims that in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries "a systematic theory of experimental science was understood and practised by enough philosophers for their work to produce the methodological revolution to which modern science owes its origin." He allows that advances were made in the seventeenth century, but holds that these were rather of the nature of details. There was a change from qualitative to quantitative procedures, and apparatus increased in range and precision. "Yet all these were advances in existing practices. The outstanding original contribution of the seventeenth century was to combine experiment with the perfection of a new kind of mathematics and with a new freedom in solving physical problems by mathematical theories, of which the most striking are those of modern dynamics." Grosseteste is hailed as the first to acquire "a clear understanding of the principles of modern experimental science."

It may be said without hesitation that the book is a most valuable and masterly study of its subject. It is the product of wide reading and deep thought, and the presentation is orderly, elegant and interesting. It abounds in valuable references and contains an exhaustive bibliography. No one who has any interest at all in the scientific thought of the Middle Ages can refuse a tribute of admiration and gratitude to Dr. Crombie for making so much material available in so compact a form.

His success in maintaining his thesis, however, is more controversial. His method is, by quotation and exegesis, to show that the conceptions of what is unfortunately called "scientific method" held by Galileo and Newton, which are, in the main, still tenable, are to be found in these earlier writers, and to deduce that what is essential in modern science originated with them. But against this there is one fatal objection. Grosseteste worked in the thirteenth century, and his procedures were followed and developed continuously until the seventeenth, as Crombie shows; but it was not until the seventeenth century that any appreciable progress in scientific knowledge began to be made, and then it went forward with an almost incredible leap and has accelerated its pace ever since. Why did not this happen earlier? If the essence of the matter was known in the thirteenth, why did it wait 400 years to take effect?

The inference is inescapable that something new and vital entered into scientific thought and practice with Galileo. If we want to understand modern science we must discover what that was, and Crombie's method fails because it rests on the assumption that Galileo knew and stated fully what he was doing. This assumption is untenable. It would be strange indeed if, after three centuries of experience of the new philosophy, showing advances beyond anything that could have been conceived when the process started, we were not in a position to understand the character of its origin with a depth and clarity impossible to those who began it. From our present point of view we can see that the impetus given to scientific enquiry in the seventeenth century owed its existence to three factors, each (except the first) depending on the one that preceded it, and each—at any rate in the form in which it was then introduced—absent from the thought and practice of earlier times.

The first and most essential of these factors was the study of the characteristics of the general properties of bodies, irrespective of the particular bodies that manifested them, in contrast to the investigation of the causes of particular

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phenomena. The subject of Galileo's study was motion, whether shown by a body in the sky, a stone falling on the Earth, a ship travelling on the sea, a pendulum swinging, or what not. Similarly, later scientists studied heat and not particular hot bodies, electrification and not particular electrified bodies, and so on. In the scholastic philosophy a body in one place moved in one way, and a body in another place moved in another way, a light body moved differently from a heavy body, a body mainly of earth moved differently from a body mainly of air, and so on. It was until the place, the weight, the chemical nature were ignored, and motion studied simply as motion, that any real scientific progress was possible, because there are discoverable laws of motion, of heat, of optics, but no laws of stones, of flames, of rainbows. The study of the particular material object or phenomenon—even if you could learn its cause, which was rare—carried you no further; you had to start *ab initio* with the next object or phenomenon. But a law such as Galileo's and Newton's laws of motion was applicable at one sweep throughout the universe.

Secondly, a general field of study having been isolated, an experiment was made in which the simplest possible example of a phenomenon in that field was chosen to reveal the general underlying regularities. That is the significance of Galileo's experiments with an inclined plane, on the basis of which Newton was able to find a general law applicable to motions of very different kinds in the heavens and on the Earth. Again there is nothing corresponding to this in the Middle Ages. A few experiments of a kind were made, but not experiments in the sense of arranging conditions so that the general phenomenon selected for study appeared in its simplest form. Clearly there could not be, for no general phenomenon was selected for study. Experiments with light passing through globes of water were made to copy the particular phenomenon of the rainbow, not to understand general laws of optics which could be extended to all optical phenomena. For that they were quite unsuited. The modern experimental method, which is essentially that of creating artificial conditions under which the basic characteristics of a general phenomenon can exhibit themselves as free as possible from complicating circumstances, began in the seventeenth century. This statement is not invalidated if an example of a particular experiment is discovered which can be so regarded but was not.

Thirdly, the experiment was so devised as to yield *measures* of the phenomenon studied, and the result was expressed as a relation between measurements. Mathematics was thus brought into the service of science. This was associated with the philosophical belief that the book of Nature is written in the mathematical language (though this is not a necessary association), and this Crombie allows, notwithstanding isolated examples of measurement in earlier times, to have been an innovation of the seventeenth century. But measurement would have lost its chief meaning if it had not been preceded by the selection of the right subject for study and the production of examples of that subject in which the measurements made could be found to stand in a simple mathematical relation to one another. You can measure the flight of a bird as well as the rate of rolling of a sphere down a slope, though the practical difficulties are of course greater, but the result will tell you nothing beyond the behaviour of that particular bird on that particular occasion. The mathematical aspect of science becomes significant only after the more fundamental aspects are understood, though its importance then can hardly be exaggerated. The "outstanding original contribution" of the seventeenth century is outstanding only because it is raised up by the other original contributions on which it rests, which were equally original and far more general since there is much in modern science that is not metrical or even mathematical.

It is impossible, therefore, to concede the claims which Crombie makes for

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his heroes. Indeed, his own account makes this clear, for he is at no pains to misrepresent their work. According to Nifo, one of the two sixteenth-century writers with whom, he tells us, the series of pre-Galilean modern scientists culminated, "the object of natural science was to discover the cause of a given observed effect," whereas Galileo put aside "any suggestion that he was going 'to investigate the cause of the acceleration of natural motion,'" and "insisted that he intended simply 'to investigate and demonstrate some of the properties of accelerated motion, whatever the cause of this acceleration may be.'" Thus even Galileo's own apprehension of what he was doing differentiates him fundamentally from his forerunners.

On the other hand, however, it must be admitted that the ridicule which has often been poured upon the pre-Galilean workers is unjustified. They wrestled seriously and well with the problems that faced them, and if those problems were unfortunately selected, they were those which they inherited from their Greek mentors. Their failure to make more headway than they did after centuries of effort was doubtless one of the factors that unconsciously induced their successors to try a more excellent way. The success of the seventeenth-century scientists may well have been impossible without experience of the long unavailing labours of Grosseteste and his followers, and we may accord all honour to their spade-work without supposing that they planted the seed as well. Dr. Crombie's admirable book enables us to do this, for the work of those whom he discusses is presented quite independently of his interpretation of it.

HERBERT DINGLE.

Sense Perception and Matter. By MARTIN LEAN. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. 1953. Pages ix, 217. Price 21s.)

This claims to be a critical analysis of Professor Broad's theory of perception. Mr. Lean sums up his judgment of Broad's discussion in a quotation from Sir Walter Scott, which, as applied to Broad, is in very bad taste, and I hope Mr. Lean is by now ashamed of it.¹

Mr. Lean confines himself in the main to Ch. IV of *The Mind and its Place in Nature*, entitled "Sense Perception and Matter." He refers occasionally to Broad's *Scientific Thought*, but not to any of Broad's later writings on perception. He subjects the chapter to a minute and detailed examination, and in doing so he seems to me to throw a good deal of darkness on what Broad is actually saying.

Broad, for example, notes that in what he calls a perceptual situation (in which a person is perceiving something during a period of time which may be quite short) two elements are always present: (a) what is sensuously manifested at the time and (b) the conviction that what is sensuously manifested is "not isolated and self-subsistent, not completely revealed in all its qualities, but that it is spatio-temporally a part of a larger whole of a certain kind, viz. a certain physical object, and that this whole has other qualities beside those which are sensuously manifested in the perceptual situation."² He calls (a) "the objective constituent of the perceptual situation" and (b) "the external reference of the situation."

He then goes on to rule out certain possible views about how (b) is related to

¹ He "coins new phrases

And vends them forth as knaves vend gilded counters,
Which wise men scorn, and fools accept in payment." (Lean, p. 207.)

² *The Mind and its Place in Nature*, p. 151.

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(a), insisting that it is not psychologically an inference from (a), and that it could not be logically justified by inference from (a). If we try to explain it as a logical inference we shall at best arrive only at a hypothesis that there are physical objects, and not at the actual conviction we do have about them. This seems to me what he is saying on p. 152. He makes it more explicit later on, when he says our conviction is not reached by inference, even though it can be defended by inference on later reflexion (208); and he drives home his point by describing the notion of a physical object as a Category, defined by Postulates (217).

Mr. Lean interprets this as saying the very thing Broad is denying. According to him, Broad treats "the relationship between perception and physical objects, as a whole, as though it were like the relationship between the scientist's observations and the hypothetical causes he infers" (Lean, 88) and as "maintaining that the notion of persistent physical objects is merely a hypothesis to explain the correlations between our perceptual experiences" (96). He even quotes Broad's account of the notion as a "Category . . . defined by Postulates," in confirmation of his interpretation: all of which seems to me a complete misunderstanding of Broad.

In his footnote on p. 110, he confuses Broad's "perceptual situation" with his "objective constituent of a perceptual situation," and this seems to explain some of his misunderstandings.

He is very careless in his references to Broad. On p. 102, e.g., he says, "Broad wants to say that the situation called 'seeing a lamp' amounts merely to having a visual experience. . . . Further attempts at visual inspection yield only more of the same type of perceptual experiences. Thus, one can at best have only a succession of perceptual experiences, the objective constituents of which cannot be properly called a lamp." It is only a hypothesis that these reveal a physical object.

Broad's own statement I have referred to shows that he doesn't "want to say" anything of the sort. On p. 103 Mr. Lean has turned it into "he wants to say that we are merely having successions of perceptual experiences," and then goes on to ask, "But what is the relevance of the word 'merely'?" Two sentences later, it becomes "If we omit the word 'merely,' on the other hand, his statement is a truism." Whose statement? one wants to know. Broad's? The whole thing is an invention of Mr. Lean.

He does this kind of thing far too often. On p. 185 he admits that he can find no clear statement in Broad's writings concerning the temporal period during which one can properly be said to be "seeing the same sensum."¹ But he thinks it should follow from what Broad says that our sense experiences must be different from moment to moment, and that hence we cannot ever see the same sensum from moment to moment (though on p. 187 he quotes a passage in which Broad says that "the numerical diversity of two objective constituents is . . . no bar to complete identity of their actual or apparent qualities"—where Broad is speaking of two perceptual situations which are contiguous in time).

By p. 190 Mr. Lean's conjecture has become "Dr. Broad's view that . . . the objective constituents of our own perceptual situations are 'momentary, fleeting particulars'" and by pp. 191-2 he has gone even further. Discussing the question whether there could be any theoretical significance in saying that a sensum had qualities we failed to notice (as Broad suggested), and other questions which Mr. Lean thinks are bound up with this, he says, "But of course Dr. Broad insists that he does not *know* these things, since all that we ever perceive directly are 'transitory particulars'."

¹ Though there is a good deal of discussion of the point in *Scientific Thought* especially Chapters X and XIII.

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In the same context there is another example of this kind of transition. In his *Scientific Thought* (p. 246) Broad was dealing with an objection (which, by the way, he called a "baseless prejudice") to the effect that "we are not aware of sensa and their properties, as a rule, unless we specially look for them" [e.g. that when we are looking at a penny, we don't notice that our sensum is elliptical]. He had two replies to this, one, a special reply, to the effect that it is only when our sensum is very nearly circular that we may not notice that it is elliptical. The other was a more general reply, to the effect that the objection rests on a misunderstanding of the view about perception which the sensum theory holds.

Mr. Lean refers to the passage, so far as Broad's special reply is concerned, on p. 183; but by p. 189 he tells us that Broad 'is obliged, as we have seen, to come to terms with the fact that we do not 'as a rule'—in truth, in the vast majority of cases—perceive such discrepancies" [i.e. between the sensum and the character we attribute to the object]—thus attributing to Broad just the point ('as a rule') Broad was concerned to deny, and also (190) giving the point an importance for Broad's theory which Broad explicitly refused to it.

I decided that I couldn't trust Mr. Lean in these matters of interpretation. And even on the assumption that what Mr. Lean was really trying to do was to show that on his premisses Broad ought logically to be in the position Mr. Lean was attributing to him, I didn't think the attempt was successful. In consequence I thought Mr. Lean's critical attacks were directed against the wrong target.

Mr. Lean's own account of perception is given only bit by bit in the course of his discussion, and I may have misunderstood him. It rests on the theory that our common sense modes of expression refer only to observable situations, and cannot mean more than is sensibly revealed in such situations (19). He takes as example the experience "I see a tree," which he says is "intended to convey only the kind of commonplace observable situation in terms of which we were taught its use or meaning" (19-20). It could not possibly refer to anything not observable (22). Similarly, if we speak in ordinary language of an object remaining the same over a long period, this must be interpreted "in the ordinary sense; and this is the sense in which even a philosopher could identify his hat in the cloakroom and would lodge a complaint with the management if it were not there when he returned, or if it had been exchanged for another" (26-27).

The question is, how much Mr. Lean is saying. He defends the view that objects are themselves coloured, and that they have the colour they have, regardless of whether or not we happen to be looking at them, on the grounds that whenever we look at (say) a red object, we see it red, and that colour photographs taken of objects when no one is looking at them show just the colours we see when we do look at the objects. And he adds: "Obviously in all such cases there is some persistent physical characteristic in the object itself which is responsible for its consistently giving rise to the same colour experience. It is this *permanent disposition* which we have in mind when we say that colour is a physical property of objects themselves, and not *merely* a quality of sensations" (127). Now unless he can show that this permanent disposition is literally colour, this argument does not do what he must do if he is to justify his assertion that things are coloured when no one is looking at them.

He says (181) that scientists "cannot correctly say that physical objects are never red or hot—if these words are to be understood in their literal ordinary senses. . . . It would be very strange indeed if merely by giving a casual analysis of the process by which we perceive the sensible qualitative characteristics of objects, the scientist could cause the characteristics to disappear!"

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But this does not give what he needs either. There is a characteristic gesture on p. 61, where he says, "We believe (*know!*) that physical objects are coloured . . . regardless of whether or not we happen to be looking at them"; and I think his ultimate justification is to be found in his repeated statement that our perceptual knowledge is empirical, and that the language in which we express it cannot be wrong in principle. The expressions we use "mean nothing more nor less than the kind of experienceable situations to which they were devised to refer" (35). How else, he asks, could one determine what characteristics a penny actually had save by careful inspection? "What other meaning can be given to the words: 'the characteristics which the penny actually has?'" (134).

Now if "the book is still red when no one is looking at it" were taken in a non-literal sense to mean nothing more than that the book appears red whenever someone is looking at it, that colour photographs of it taken in the absence of observers appear red when someone looks at them, and so on, then Mr. Lean could maintain his account of meaning and still speak of objects keeping their sensory qualities when unobserved.

But if you want to go further than this and say that objects when "observable but not observed" have in a literal sense the qualities that they have when observed, I do not see that you can justify this on the ground that the correct usage of such an expression is determined within the context of social communication. For it doesn't, when taken literally, refer to anything experienceable. You can't observe anything when it is not being observed.

It seems to me that Mr. Lean actually asserts both things; and that the "literal" sense is contrary to his theory of language.

In so far as he says anything precise, Mr. Lean's account of what is "experienceable" does not differ from Broad's. He counters Broad's description of an act of sensing by saying that when, e.g., he sees a chair, he can't distinguish any such thing as that described by Broad as a visual *sensum*. He agrees "to be sure" that "when I see a chair of that colour and shape, it is true that I am seeing a brown patch of colour of such and such a shape, etc. But I cannot agree that the sense in which I see this is a different sense from that in which I see the chair (or at least the immediately visible part of the chair)" (53). The parenthesis here seems to give his whole case away. According to it the sense in which I am seeing a brown patch is no different from the sense in which I see the immediately visible part of the chair. Broad could not wish for more: except an account from Mr. Lean, in terms of visual experience, of the difference made by adding "of the chair."

What is curious to me is that Mr. Lean thinks Broad is depriving us of the chair, while he himself is giving us it. My own impression is that if either of them falls short, it is Mr. Lean, with his theory of language holding us to what is completely observable, rather than Broad, who does take seriously the question what justification, if any, can be given for statements, taken literally, characterizing physical objects when they are not actually being observed.

L. J. RUSSELL.

Truth and Freedom. By LOUIS DE RAEYMAEKER and other Professors of the University of Louvain. (Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Editions E. Nauwelaerts, Louvain and Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Pp. vii + 133. Price 25s.)

The best way of indicating the nature of this book will be to quote from the front cover. It "was written at the invitation of the present President of the United States of America, Dwight D. Eisenhower. In 1947, in his capacity as President of Columbia University, he requested the University of Louvain, as

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well as others throughout the world, to take part in the bicentennial of Columbia's founding by explaining "the ideal of full freedom of scholarly enquiry and expression, the right of mankind to knowledge and to the free use thereof." In answer to his invitation, seven eminent professors of one of Europe's most renowned universities consider the freedom of scientific research and expression and its relationship to truth, first in general according to the tradition of their venerable University, and then in particular from the viewpoints of philosophy, psychology, history, sociology, physical science and literature."

Louvain is, of course, a Catholic university. It is, therefore, natural that the main question discussed, directly or indirectly, in all these essays is whether the Catholic scholar is placed under any sort of restricting condition in his specialist studies by the nature of his religious beliefs. The answer in every case is that he is not. The arguments put forward in the various essays are all very much the same and run something like this. Truth is (a) indivisible, but (b) to be found on a variety of levels, which cannot conflict with each other for the simple reason that the levels are different. The Catholic thus has a double assurance that no true discovery can ever conflict with his faith. If, as sometimes happens, the levels get run together and there appears to be a conflict, then either the apparently scientific truth cannot be so solid after all or, perhaps, the theological doctrines have not yet been interpreted as they should be. Which it is, only time can tell. Certainly, the scientist, or historian, must be very careful as to the public use he makes of any result that may seem to be at variance with religion as at present understood. But this is by no means to say that he, as scientist, should not freely continue with his work in whatever way is considered to be scientifically best. And if any Catholics have ever said otherwise, they have shown themselves more zealous than wise. (One partial exception might have to be made were a reigning Pope to make any pronouncement at variance with this view; but, Professor Aubert seems to imply in his essay on "The Freedom of the Catholic Historian," the exception need last no longer than the reign of such a Pope (p. 84).)

One may or may not disagree with this general position and with the doctrine of different levels in particular, but it would be hard to quarrel with sentiments so reasonable as these. On the other hand, their enunciation, while undeniably fitting for occasions such as bicentennial celebrations, does not easily make for essays of remark or interest. One feels that the only appropriate reaction is to welcome the prevailing attitude and to refrain from disputing the details. To this there is, however, one notable exception, the essay on "Truth and Freedom. A Philosophical Study," by Professor Dondeyne. Professor Dondeyne is concerned to develop two main themes. One is that already outlined above and common to all the writers, though expressed by him with particular clarity and force. ("If the case of Galileo ended with the victory of the new science, it was also of enormous benefit for Faith and theology, for it obliged theologians to rethink their synthesis, and in the process Faith gained much in purity and grandeur" (p. 46).) The other is that truth and freedom are complementary values which depend intimately on each other. One side of his argument may be sketched as follows without, I hope, too great a distortion.

The term "freedom" has two aspects, the negative one of absence of restraint and the "positive element of a certain ideal of autonomy, self-control or self-possession in the exercise of one's activity." While both aspects go together, the second is of particular importance in "moral and religious life." Thus, to act freely is to know what one is doing and why; (the question

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is left open as to how one should here analyse the word "know," but there seems no reason why a dispositional analysis should not do). It is to give a meaning to one's life. "But our actions acquire a meaning to the extent that they embody values . . . therefore it may be said that free-will behaviour ultimately is a deliberate and efficacious value-judgment embodied in a concrete action. Deliberation or motivation, decision and execution . . . are not so much distinct events . . . as constituent aspects of one and the same action in the process of maturation. . . . To judge that a value is worth while is to place oneself at the service of this value . . . by that very fact to give a meaning to one's life and take charge of it" (p. 32). At the same time, the term "reason" has "in the main two fundamental meanings." The first is the rationalistic or deductive sense; the second what Professor Dondeyne calls the existential sense, according to which "reason means that general exigency existing in us, taken together with its corresponding power, to give a foundation to, and a justification for, our affirmations and behaviour. It is this exigency which . . . is the basis of our freedom and personality" (p. 47). Thus, the notion of free action is bound up with that of reason and knowledge of the truth, by virtue of the relationships which both notions have with that of a value-judgment.

Of course, this sketch does not adequately represent the whole argument, which itself, naturally enough, is stated rather than worked out. Of course, too, the philosophical tradition in which the essay is written is very different from that which is dominant in England today. But it is not for that reason any the less stimulating, whether or not one believes that the only or prime function of philosophy is the investigation of actual and possible conceptual relationships. Indeed, it may well be from this standpoint that many of Professor Dondeyne's remarks will be found to be most suggestive.

If the word "suggestive" implies a promise, however, it also implies a limit. Suggestions need time and space for further exploration and neither are unrestricted here. It remains, therefore, to be recorded that while the book is excellently, even extravagantly, produced, the standards of proof-reading and translation (from the French) are extremely uneven. The mistakes include some borderline cases where one is uncertain to which of the possible failures they should be attributed. The following seems the most interesting example (p. 114): "As much as Sartre excels in the description of the sensible universe, so much he is utterly without feelers for the spiritual world." The levels of experience are indeed open to confusion in unexpected ways.

ALAN MONTEFIORE.

Condorcet. Sketch for an historical picture of the progress of the human mind.

Translated by June Barraclough, with an introduction by Stuart Hampshire. (Weidenfeld and Nicholson. 1955. Pp. xvi + 202. 12s. 6d.)

There are two points that must be recorded straightaway. First, this is, all in all, a very good translation, accurate but free; (though something seems to have gone wrong with the opening sentence of Stage Six). Second, Hampshire's two-part introduction, first to the author and then to the work, is as admirable as it is brief.

This text is the third published in the series "The Library of Ideas", the aim of which, according to the back cover, "is to present to a public, which includes the general reader and the university student, a number of significant

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works in the history of Western thought and ideas that, for all their importance, are not at present easily obtainable." It is, no doubt, an excellent and useful thing that such works should be made available; although for whom exactly it may be excellent and in just what ways it may be useful is clearly a question open to considerable discussion. (See, for example, Wilfrid Harrison on "Texts in Political Theory" in a recent issue of *Political Studies*.) It may also be taken for granted fairly enough that there are a variety of good academic reasons why the student, *qua* student, should be grateful for the appearance in translation of this particular work. But what about the "general reader"? What might one reply to him if he should ask whether it is still worth his while to read this last hurried work of Condorcet?

It dates, of course, of that there is no doubt; it dates, one may say, in three main ways. The one I should put first is the naïveté of so much of the history which plays after all a very large part in the whole. It is true, as Hampshire points out, that in a sense Condorcet's view of what history should be was strikingly modern in its breadth and that he was among the very first to realize how all social phenomena are fundamentally interrelated. It is also true that it would be ridiculous to criticize a sketch for being too thin. Nevertheless, if it is history that the general reader wishes to read—as opposed to the materials of history—there are other and more modern places to go. Secondly, and paradoxically, it dates in some of its most brilliant anticipations of the future, but in precisely the fact that for Condorcet they *are* anticipations rather than statements of what would now be generally accepted. Thirdly, and notoriously, there is his eighteenth century optimism. As Professor Toynbee has said, "An equally generous minded and sanguine observer of human affairs who was writing an equivalent of Condorcet's *Sketch* in 1955 would probably estimate both Man's goodness and Man's rationality a good deal lower than Condorcet's estimate in 1793-94." But this is a point that it is perhaps too easy to overstress and that is why I put it third. For one thing, doubt will keep on breaking in. Condorcet recognizes perfectly well that progress in the past has been anything but uninterrupted either in its march or its spread and there may yet be many zigzags in store; nor does he suppose that all men are without exception and inevitably made morally better by the acquisition of further knowledge. It is even possible to overemphasize his belief in the intrinsic rationality of man—in spite of his touching conviction that the possibility of mass communication cannot bring but mass enlightenment—for he is well aware, too, of the great powers of prejudice. Of course, he was fundamentally an optimist and a rationalist; and of course this is a faith that is far more difficult today. Even so, it may have its modern versions. There is, for example, a Marxist one that seems to be widely held, differing in many ways from that of Condorcet, but still of the same family; and there are certainly others.

But the very fact that it is so firmly dated is one of the reasons why the *Sketch* has still much to offer. Views which, however, important, are today becoming inescapably platitudinous, whether they be on the benefits of social insurance or on the joint role of mathematics and experiment in the natural sciences, recover a fresh impact in the writings of an eighteenth-century thinker. Not, of course, that the fact of their having been delivered so long ago is sufficient to account for this impact. The work of an original and vigorous mind remains vigorous and original long after its originality has become everybody else's commonplace. If Condorcet is often by modern standards naïve, he is equally often pungent and shrewd. But this is not all, not even perhaps the most important. One needs to know something of the circumstances under which it was written—the constant danger of discovery

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and death at the hands of the revolution for which its author had worked so hopefully and hard—to appreciate the full nobility of this work. If it is right, as surely it is, to say that Condorcet's optimism and rationalism were for him a faith, it must not be thought that it was one untested by bitter and ungrateful personal experience. To it the *Sketch* is an impressive memorial.

ALAN MONTEFIORE.

God and Polarity. A Synthesis of Philosophies. By WILMON HENRY SHELDON.
(Yale University Press. Pp. 712. Price \$8.00. English price 63s.)

A vast amount of scholarly labour has gone to the production of this very elaborate and handsomely printed volume. The reader who perseveres will find in it many points of interest and information not easily available elsewhere. But it must also be said at once that the enterprise as a whole does not seem to be successful or very well conceived. The author is much concerned about the agelong disagreements of philosophers, and as our situation today is "critical as never before in recorded history," he thinks it time to issue "a trumpet call to philosophy to mend its ways"; it "must integrate itself or die," and by this we are to understand apparently that philosophers must give up their besetting sin of trying to refute one another and of being more concerned with such refutations than with the attainment of truth. We must abandon the parochialism of supposing that we are right and others wrong; and this is again to be understood, not in the sense that we must cultivate modesty and tolerance, realizing that we *may* be wrong and others right, but in the much more startling sense that we must make no claim to truth which is exclusive of other claims. It is the exclusiveness of philosophical views that is most to be deplored; for we have only to "dig beneath the surface" to realize that they are all equally sound. Oriental practices have much to teach us here. "The Westerner loves to refute, he is an individualist, a free enterpriser competing with others even while he is a member of a philosopher's group. Not so in the East. There the note of a balance not to be upset, of a final truth that needs no progress, is pervasive" (p. 180). In pursuance of his aim to rid philosophy of its disputatiousness, Professor Sheldon undertakes an extensive survey of main types of philosophy, idealism, materialism, scholasticism and so forth, attempting to show that they have all stressed some important truth but have lapsed from grace by taking this as an exclusive principle by which to understand the world. The truths of various philosophies are complementary aspects of a polarity that extends throughout the whole universe, from the relation of right hand and left hand to the relation of man and God. If we ask how this is to be established without refuting the more restricted theories that compete with it, the answer is that it is established, not by logical proof (although that, like everything else, has its place) but by experiment, and it is by "experience" or "experiment" that Eastern thinkers in the main have attained the harmony which they can bequeathe to the West. The main feature of the "experiment" is to set ourselves to improve conditions in the world and to ask whether or not there is a consensus of opinion among those thinkers who have been inspired by the same ideal about the finality of the sort of omnibus philosophy, rooted in the belief in the supremacy of value, which the author recommends himself. There are circumstances where "the majority vote" does not count for much, but it must count, and apparently be decisive, when "the majority is made up of men of high intelligence, seeking earnestly the good of their fellows" (p. 354).

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Since these are the terms in which the author conceives his task, it is not likely that there will be found anywhere very precise arguments which will be of interest to philosophers. The surveys of various philosophies, especially oriental systems, have worth, and one cannot but be impressed by the industry which has enabled the author to describe the positions of some other philosophers almost entirely by weaving together quotations from their work for the length of many pages (not perhaps the best way of expounding them). There is also much good sense in the rejections (refutations?) of facile solutions of the problem of evil, notwithstanding the suggestion, which not many of Professor Sheldon's readers will take very seriously I hope, that the innocent bird engulfed by a snake may for all we can *prove* to the contrary, be expiating sins committed in a previous existence. As the author has, in my opinion, something worth while to bring forth from his obviously vast knowledge of Eastern thought for the enrichment of Western philosophy, especially where religious matters are concerned, it seems a very grave pity that he should have made himself in fact so ineffective, in the substance of his book, by the suicidal policy (for a philosopher) of disdaining argument on principle. In the circumstances little is left to the reviewer but the expression of the profoundest regret and the hope that misunderstandings of the nature of philosophy will not induce others to take so gloomy a view of the disagreements of those who practise it.

H. D. LEWIS.

JOHN LOCKE: *Essays on the Law of Nature*. Latin Text, with translation, Introduction and notes, together with transcripts of Locke's shorthand in his Journal for 1676. Edited by W. VON LEYDEN. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1954, 35s. net.)

In this volume the editor has made available three early writings of Locke from manuscripts in the Lovelace Collection now in the Bodleian Library: firstly, a series of essays in Latin on the law of nature; secondly, a half-humorous speech closely related to these essays, and composed by Locke for the ceremony at which he resigned the office of Censor at Christ Church in 1664; and thirdly some transcripts of shorthand entries from Locke's journal in the year 1676.

As regards the content of the essays, the existence of a natural law is briefly demonstrated, and two principal questions are then considered in turn: by what faculties do men come to know this law? and why and to what extent is it binding upon them? The answer suggested to the former question is that the senses, aided by the understanding, should suffice to inform men of the law of nature, but that many of them fail to make a right employment of their faculties. It is clear from Locke's correspondence that his thoughts had been directed to this subject about the time of the Restoration; and the essays may represent lectures given by him at Christ Church during his tenure of the office of Censor. Mr. von Leyden has printed from two MSS. the Latin text of the essays, with an English translation and a summary of contents; and in his extensive Introduction he has dealt with all the principal questions which a reader or researcher is likely to ask. He begins by furnishing some general information about the papers in the Lovelace Collection; he considers the sources of Locke's view of natural law, and the channels by which ancient or mediaeval ideas reached him; he asks why Locke failed to publish the *Essays* in spite of requests from some of his friends; and he points out that the discussion of natural law is constantly in the background in the later writings, the *Essay on*

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the Human Understanding and the *Second Treatise on Civil Government*. Further, some criticism of Locke's view of natural law is offered from the point of view of contemporary logic.

The success of the editor in dealing with his complicated task, and in bringing the most significant results clearly to the front, compensates to some extent for the second-rate quality of the essays themselves, and for their fumbling Latin style. Two points which emerge from the Introduction seem to me to be of special interest. Firstly, a development is traced, not merely in these essays but in Locke's writings as a whole, from a purely voluntaristic conception of the natural law, whereby it is viewed as a commandment of the divine lawgiver, towards a view of the rationalist or Platonic type. Locke becomes more sensitive to the need to show that the law is inherently rational, though, inasmuch as it is the divine will which makes it formally obligatory, a voluntaristic element remains. Locke is found to have been much influenced by Nathanael Culverwel, *An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature* (1652). Secondly, Locke could neither abandon, nor develop with any precision, the view which he had formed that a demonstrative science of morals is possible. His intention was, presumably, to show that the law of nature provides the foundation of such reasoning. But his study of the formation of moral ideas led him along a different path. In a paper on *Ethick in General* he is found declaring that "good and bad, being relative terms, do not denote anything in the nature of the thing, but only the relation it bears to another, in its aptness and tendency to produce in it pleasure or pain." There resulted much vacillation in his thought, and a void space in the *Essay* was the consequence. This is well described in a passage too long to quote here (Introduction pp. 77-78).

Though Mr. von Leyden's adjective "hedonistic" appears to me too strong to describe the factor in Locke's later ethics which comes to light here, it is plainly present, and further evidence of it might perhaps have been found in the *Thoughts on Education*; parents, in early life, are in the position of lawgivers, and they are urged to direct children by their smiles or by their angry and frowning countenance.

The reviewer can perhaps best justify his existence by calling attention to some mistakes in his translation, such are not surprising in a first edition.

P. 110 par. 2: the reading *praestare* is supported by p. 116 line 5 and p. 282, last sentence of Note A, P. 116-7: the word *unguem* has obviously dropped out before *latum*, or *unquam* may be a mistake for *unguem*. For "nothing, no matter how great," read "nothing deviates even by an inch." P. 126-7: As on p. 125, Locke's *fando enim audimus* must be intended to represent the English "hearsay." The meaning is surely: "I come next to tradition, which I distinguish from sense not because traditions do not enter the mind by sense—for it is through hearsay that they are received—but because the ears hear the sound only, and it is belief which embraces the fact." P. 51, line 8: By *conceptus animi uti et corporis* I think he means not "every concept about the mind as well as about the body" but "conception in the mental, no less than in the physical sense." P. 153 line 18: the apodosis begins at *qui se produceret*. P. 165 line 4 foll.: Here and in the corresponding passage in the summary, p. 100, the word "concerning" is not required and leads to distortion of the argument. Locke is distinguishing three kinds of *consensus naturalis*: agreement in customs or actions, agreement in opinions, and agreement in basic general principles. To speak of agreement concerning opinions and morals suggests that he means all three kinds of agreement to be reflective. Further, whereas the Latin text on p. 164 line 6 is *alii-alii*, what is translated is *aliis-aliis*. The translation required is this: "Secondly, in those opinions to which men give assent in varying degrees, some firmly and constantly, others feebly and unsteadily. Thirdly,

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agreement in first principles, which are of such a character as to elicit ready assent from any man of sound mind, etc." P. 177 2nd par. line 14: Here "consent concerning some opinion" should be emended for the reason just given: and on the rest of this page the translation seems to misrepresent the argument, the view stated in the footnote being mistaken. The question under review is whether universal consensus of opinion, even if known to be a fact, could prove that the practice agreed upon was a natural law. Locke argues that it could still be no more than an indication of such a law. "For I can never know for certain whether *this* [i.e. any given opinion] is the opinion of every individual. That would be a matter of belief, not of knowledge. For (1) if I discover this opinion in my own mind before ascertaining the fact of such consensus, then the knowledge of the consensus will not prove to me what I knew already from natural principles; and (2) if I cannot be sure that it really is the opinion of my own mind until I have first ascertained that there is such a consensus among men, then I can also reasonably doubt whether it is the opinion of others; since it is impossible to suggest a reason why something should be accorded by nature to all other men which I feel to be wanting in myself."

P. 193 line 6: for "anywhere" read "in some places" (*alicubi*). P. 197: *aut omnino laeta non sit, aut iterum abrogata*. For *laeta* read *lata* or *data*, and translate: "either the law has never been given . . . or it has been repealed." P. 241: *sine aliqua malignitatis suspitione* is, I think, a reference to the evil eye. Same page: for *sic volentibus satis*, which is nonsense, read *sic volentibus fatis*. P. 242 line 3: Surely the reference to the executioner's axe is superfluous? Locke, looking forward to the demise which will release him from his troubles, says that he has acted (as Censor) according to the laws of nature and the statutes of Christ Church, but that he now approaches the altar as a willing victim and offers to *the knife* a throat which has been saved from so many perils: "for I hope that my offences have not been grave enough to deserve the halter," etc.

The Latin style of Locke, in the valedictory speech, reeks of Seneca. This surely might be borne in mind when considering the sources of his views on natural law, and more especially the target at which he is aiming in his criticism of innate ideas? Here he might have read: (*Epist.* 117) *multum dare solemus praesumptioni omnium hominum et apud nos veritatis argumentum est aliquid omnibus videri: tanquam deos esse inter alia hoc colligimus, quod omnibus insita de dis opinio est, nec ulla gens usquam est adeo extra leges moresque projecta, ut non aliquos deos credat.*

D. J. ALLAN.

Philosophy and Analysis. A selection of articles published in *Analysis* between 1933-40 and 1947-53. Edited, with an introduction, by Margaret Macdonald. (Basil Blackwell. 1955. Pp. 296. Price 30s.)

A sixth anthology of analytic and linguistic philosophy! After Professor Flew's two series of "Logic and Language"; after the two bulkier "anthologies" that have appeared in America; and after Mr. Elton's more recent slighter volume, comes yet a sixth. The general reader of philosophy may feel hesitant: should his natural desire to keep abreast of the times induce him to embark upon this latest volume? This doubt is likely to be sharpened when he realizes that all (save one) of the articles reproduced in this volume appeared originally in *Analysis*, a small philosophical journal whose get-up has always been attractive but whose contents—many of them in pre-war years contributed by exiled Continental philosophers of ultra-empiricist or

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ultra-formalist leanings—have usually been rather technical and not the easier for being brief. No, the general reader of philosophy may conclude, this volume is not for him. And undoubtedly it has been designed primarily for university students of philosophy, undergraduate and postgraduate, who can find in it important articles which are otherwise virtually unobtainable. Nevertheless, it contains more for the general reader of philosophy than might at first appear; and it is with his interests in mind that I suggest that Miss Macdonald's book may prove instructive, not just as a source book, but as a kind of composite picture of "what has happened to British philosophy" during the last twenty years.

A great deal has happened to it in the period. Some of us may have been baffled by this development, but no one, I think, who has given the matter careful consideration, can deny that there have been real gains: gains in respect of instruments and methods, gains in respect of standards of care and exactness, gains in force and range of expression, and gains in respect of the atmosphere—"scientific" in the best sense of that word—in which philosophical discussion is generally conducted today.

Now it seems to me that *Analysis* has epitomized the movement to which these gains are due better than any other journal of its period; and Miss Macdonald's volume, by giving us a sample of the best work that *Analysis* has published, helps us to see what that movement has been and is. Even to the relative outsider the phenomenon is of the greatest interest; and if only as a "documentary" of its period, Miss Macdonald's book deserves the attention of every serious student of philosophy.

In her excellent introduction Miss Macdonald recalls the original aim with which *Analysis* was launched, viz., to publish short articles on relatively isolable philosophical problems, to the solution of which different philosophers might successively contribute from their different viewpoints. She wisely refrains from attempting an exact account of the "analyticity" of her authors, but she writes illuminatingly on two of the main influences upon the analytic movement, viz., Earl Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein. By contrast, what she writes of Professor Moore's influence—which she rightly regards as the most important of the three and as still growing—falls short. (The difficulty which admirers and disciples of Moore find in explaining their debt to him seems to me one of the enigmas of contemporary philosophy.) Possibly the most profitable way of reading the articles which she has collected is to distinguish in them the five or six main ways in which Moore's writings and teachings have profoundly affected contemporary analysts.

Miss Macdonald has grouped her material into ten chapters, the most successful of which well illustrate the kind of progressive attack upon some chosen problem which has been the most notable feature of *Analysis*. Chapters VI, VII and X will probably be the most interesting to general readers of philosophy. In the first of these Professors Toulmin and Flew apply Professor Ryle's well-known interpretation of statements about motives to Freud's clinical descriptions on the one hand and his general theorizings about mental action on the other. Both philosophers show insight into Freud's thought; but both unfortunately accept Professor Ryle's analysis quite uncritically, despite the exceptions and objections which have been raised to it—almost as though it were an "established philosophical truth." Nevertheless, there is enough of value in Ryle's interpretation to make their enterprise worthwhile; and it is good to hear (from Miss Macdonald) that experts in the psychological field have found their discussions useful. Mr. Peters's rejoinder in defence of Freud's "mechanistic" theories of mental action is a rather less forceful performance. Chapter VII entitled "Events, Time and Tense," con-

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sists in three attempts by different authors to answer a problem that is very clearly posed by Professor Duncan-Jones, viz., if references to the *past* are in all cases references to something that happened before *now*, must such sentences as "Brutis killed Caesar in B.C. 44" mean something different on each occasion that they are asserted? The discussion is clear, workmanlike and even exciting. But it is curious that none of the contributors considers the possibility that the concern which some historians have shown about their own activity of dating events and about the kind of evidence this activity requires, might throw some light on the problem. In Chapter X Mr. Paul and Miss Macdonald give excellent examples of analytical methods derived from Wittgenstein and Moore applied to two important Marxist doctrines, Lenin's Theory of Perception and Engels' assertion that the world can only be understood as a system not of *things* but of *processes*. Both authors sweep the Marxists' floor in dual metaphorical sense, clearly, methodically, yet devastatingly. Yet there is something tell-tale in the way in which Miss Macdonald lets slip the epithet "boring" to express her reaction to any metaphysical enterprise of the kind upon which Engels (admittedly here, as always, a thoroughly second-rate thinker) was engaged.

Miss Macdonald's grouping of topics in other chapters is somewhat more artificial and I will, therefore, simply single out what seem to me the most valuable of the remaining articles: Two masterly exorcisings of Russell's "heterologicality" paradox by Mr. Nathaniel Lawrence and Professor Ryle; two remarkably pungent and capable articles on "Likeness of Meaning" by Professor Nelson Goodman; a very convincing short article "Two Senses of Probability" by Mr. Urmson, and a careful rejoinder by Mr. Whately; Professor Max Black's blessed elucidation of that piece of elephantine logical sophistication, Tarski's "Semantic Theory of Truth," and an important development of F. P. Ramsey's "No-theory of Truth" by Mr. P. F. Strawson. One of the most interesting themes that recurs in a number of chapters is that of the relation of a sentence's social and practical *context* to its *content*: on this subject Mr. A. M. McIver supplied, in articles dated 1936 and 1938, a number of ideas which recent discussions have shown to be very fruitful.

I have noticed only two small misprints which could usefully be removed in any later edition. On page 2, footnote 7, a number needs to be supplied to complete the last sentence. On page 180, at the end of paragraph 1, the index "1" needs to be removed.

W. B. GALLIE.

A Dictionary of Linguistics. By M. A. PEI and F. GAYNOR. (Philosophical Library, New York, 1954. Pp. viii + 238. Price \$6.00.)

This little dictionary gives concise definitions of terms used in the two branches of Linguistics, that is in *General* (or *Descriptive*) *Linguistics* (which deals with the Nature of Language and with ways of describing Language and languages) and in *Historical* (or *Comparative*) *Philology* (which deals with the histories of individual languages and language-families). Much of the vocabulary of Linguistics is esoteric and this book will primarily be of use—and of very real use—to non-philologists and elementary students of Linguistics (also, for reference, to many other classes of persons). Recently, devotees of Structural Linguistics—that doctrine which has, in America, achieved a dominance comparable to that of late held by Marrian due to Linguistics in Russia—have introduced a welter of new terms into the American literature of the subject, terms not generally used outside it, and this dictionary naturally abounds in these (cf., for instance, "*significian*": A student or prac-

tioner of signifiés (q.v.)" (p. 197), and "*progressive tense*: A verbal form, usually periphrastic, expressing that the action is, was or will be in progress at the time indicated" (p. 176)—thus, no doubt, a concept somewhat similar to that more usually indicated by means of the words *imperfective* or *durative*). The *Dictionary* does contain a large number of entries but it is by no means complete. Two serious omissions seemed to me to be ἀπ.λεγ. = ἀπαξ λεγόμενον and *Stufenwechsel*, perhaps the commonest technical term of Finno-Ugrian Philology—the latter omission is rather surprising for, in the *Dictionary*, care has been taken to suggest standard names for the Finno-Ugrian languages (as is necessary, for they are but little written about in English)—not, alas, the names suggested as standard by the present reviewer, *Leeds Studies in English and Kindred Languages*, Vol. III (1934) pp. 57-9, and *Transactions of the Philological Society*, 1941, p. 1 (thus cf. *Olonetzian*, p. 154 instead of his suggested *Aunus* which still seems to him in every way superior).

ALAN S. C. ROSS.

Studies in Zen. By D. T. SUZUKI, D.Litt. (Rider; 1955. 12s. 6d.)

Studies in Zen is a collection of seven originally separate articles, the first of which was written in 1906, and the last in 1953; there is, inevitably, a certain degree of repetition, but, on the whole, the essays combine to give a fairly broad picture of Professor Suzuki's interpretations of Zen.

The book begins with a history of the school of Zen—sectarian history being a subject very near to the heart of the majority of Japanese Buddhist scholars. But we soon pass beyond this aspect of the approach, and do not return to it. Zen was admirably suited to the Chinese temperament, and to the existing, and potential rival, systems of thought. It had its breath of Taoism, and it appealed to the love of formalism and ritual on which Confucius had built: it was, in fact, so elastic, as to be adaptable to almost any environment. The stress on intuition, and the neglect of the intellect was and is ideally fitted to the thinking processes of both Chinese and Japanese: it is by no means rare to find what seems to be an intuitive feel for what one suspects is the correct answer to some problem, followed by (to satisfy the demands of western reasoning) a series of logical proofs which lead to anywhere but the same answer.

Zen is "a special transmission outside the scriptures, not depending on the letter, but pointing directly to the Mind." Zen masters have not demanded of their pupils extensive studies of the sutras, and Professor Suzuki maintains that the attainment of the desired end is by an act of will, plus intuition, which moves over an intellectual impasse. It is at this point that he begins to run into difficulties. The Zen experience is "beyond the ken of intellectual painting, or dialectical delineation," he admits,—yet these are his only means of explaining it to us. The paradox, or the mere repeat of the pupil's question in the reply of the master, which is part of the peculiar technique of the Zen master, must then remain unintelligible to one who has not experienced the enlightenment which comes of the act of intuition and will combined—and this Professor Suzuki cannot induce in his reader. The most that he can do is to aver, from the inside, that "when looked at from the inside, . . . there looms up the big character Zen, which is the key to all the mysteries." One feels some sympathy with Hu Shih, when he complains (in an article to which one of the seven essays is a somewhat unconvincing reply), that according to Suzuki Zen is illogical, irrational and therefore beyond our intellectual under-

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standing. The best he can do is to tell the world that Zen is Zen and altogether beyond our logical comprehension.

The editing of the essays has been undertaken by Mr. Christmas Humphreys and the London Buddhist Society: as they extend over a period of almost fifty years, it must have posed many problems. The printing of both Chinese and Japanese versions of technical terms is useful; but there are many cases where a Chinese is referred to by the Japanese reading of his name. There is a constant misunderstanding of the function of the hyphen in a Chinese proper name—Dr. Hu Shih, for example, appears as Hu-Shih, the equivalent of Humphreys-Christmas. It might also have been possible to indicate the long vowel in Japanese—and most publishing houses seem equal to the task—by means of a bar placed above the relevant vowel; thus, mondō, or bushidō. The word katsu or kwatsu (p. 45) appears elsewhere as kwatz (p. 144), or Katz (p. 184), and neither of the latter instances is listed in the index. And if the reader is keen enough to consult the Index, he will be faced with contradictions the like of the following (which is not an isolated instance); p. 184—Tokusan (Teh-shan, 790–865), and Index—Tokusan (Te-shan) (779–865). This sample of errors I have treated at some length, for they will cause as much bewilderment to the novice, as they must do exasperation to the expert.

G. BOWNAS.

Books also received.

- Journal of the Society of Psychical Research*, September 1955. Pp. 53. 3s.
- RALPH B. WINN (Ed.). *American Philosophy*. Philosophical Library, New York. 1955. Pp. (xviii) & 318. \$6.00.
- A. A. ROBACK (Ed.). *Present-day Psychology*. Philosophical Library, New York. 1955. Pp. (xiv) & 995. \$12.00.
- SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA. *A History of Indian Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press. 1955. Pp. (xiv) & 204. 25s.
- JEAN BODIN, tr. and selected by M. J. TOOLEY. *Six Books of the Commonwealth*. Basil Blackwell. 1955. Pp. (xlvii) & 212. 15s.
- Tr. and selected by H. S. REISS. *Political Thought of the German Romantics*. Basil Blackwell. 1955. Pp. (vii) & 211. 15s.
- JAMES BROWN. *Subject and Object in Modern Theology*. S.C.M. Press. 1955. Pp. 214. 18s.
- ANTONY FLEW and ALASDAIR MACINTYRE (Eds.). *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*. S.C.M. Press. 1955. Pp. (xii) & 274. 21s.
- REGINALD O. KAPP. *Facts and Faith*. Riddell Memorial Lecture. Oxford University Press. 1955. Pp. 63. 5s.
- DAVID HUME. *Writings on Economics*. Ed. Eugene Rotwein. Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd. 1955. Pp. (cxi) & 224. 30s.
- CHARLES A. HART (Ed.). *Knowledge and Expression*. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. Twenty-Ninth Annual Meeting. The Catholic University of America. 1955. Pp. 313. \$3.50.
- ETIENNE GILSON. *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*. Sheed & Ward. 1955. Pp. (xvii) & 829. 42s.
- FERNAND VAN STEENBERGHEN. *The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century*. Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd. 1955. Pp. (ix) & 115. 15s.
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- MEYER N. BRUSKOVSKY. *Cosmic Design*. Vantage Press, New York. 1955. Pp. 129. \$2.00.

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- JOHN BONFORTE. *The Philosophy of Epictetus*. Philosophical Library, New York, 1955. Pp. (xiv) & 146. \$3.00.
- PHILIP BLAIR RICE. *On the Knowledge of Good and Evil*. Random House, New York, 1955. Pp. 300. \$4.50.
- Translated, Introduction and Commentary by R. HACKFORTH. *Plato's Phaedo*. Cambridge University Press, 1955. Pp. (vii) & 200. 21s.
- DORA MARSDEN. *The Philosophy of Time*. Holywell Press, Oxford, 1955. Pp. 34. 5s.
- JUSTUS BUCHLER. *Nature and Judgment*. Columbia University Press (London: Oxford University Press), 1955. Pp. (viii) & 210. 30s.
- CLARENCE IRVING LEWIS. *The Ground and Nature of the Right*. Columbia University Press (London: Oxford University Press), 1955. Pp. (vi) & 97. 20s.
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INSTITUTE NOTES

RECEPTION TO LORD SAMUEL

The Reception in honour of the President's 85th birthday given by the Institute on November 22nd last at the Royal Society of Arts was a happy occasion. In a short speech Mr. Hooper outlined the history and aims of the Institute, Sir David Ross paid tribute to Lord Samuel in proposing his health and the President replied in a characteristic speech of charm and wit. The cake was cut, the toast drunk and Lord Samuel received the congratulations of friends and distinguished guests.

"PHILOSOPHY AND THE LIFE OF THE NATION"

The text of Lord Samuel's speech given to an appreciative audience at The Assembly Hall, Institute of Education, on February 7th, will be published in the July number of the JOURNAL. Separate copies of the lecture will shortly be obtainable from the Institute, price 1/- post free.

OBJECTS OF THE INSTITUTE

The Royal Institute of Philosophy exists to bring leading exponents of various branches of Philosophy into direct contact with the general public, with the purpose of satisfying a need felt by many men and women in every walk of life for greater clearness and comprehensiveness of vision in human affairs.

With this broad educational purpose in view, the Institute—

- (1) Provides at suitable times in the day and evening courses of lectures by leading exponents in the more important subjects coming within the scope of Philosophy. All branches of Philosophy are represented—Ethics and Social Philosophy, the Philosophy of Law and of the Sciences, of the Fine Arts and of Religion, as well as Logic and Metaphysics and Psychology.
- (2) Issues a quarterly philosophical journal (free to members).
- (3) Proposes to form a philosophical library.
- (4) Gives guidance and assistance to individuals in their philosophical reading.
- (5) Encourages research in Philosophy.

There are Local Centres of the Institute at Bangor, Cardiff, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Durham, and Sheffield.

Students of philosophy are reminded that they may become Associates of the Institute at a reduced fee of 8s. 6d. per annum, provided they are full-time students studying for a degree or diploma at a university or university college and are not engaged in a gainful occupation. Present or past Members of the Institute are not eligible to become Associates.

Further information and forms of application for membership may be had on application to the Director of Studies at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C.1.

NOTICE

In commemoration of the Freud Centenary, the British Psycho-Analytical Society has arranged a Series of Six Lectures on "Psycho-Analysis and Contemporary Thought" to be given at Friends House, Euston Road, N.W.1. Tickets at 4s., or one guinea for the series, may be obtained at the door or in advance from the Administrative Secretary, British Psycho-Analytical Society, 63 New Cavendish Street, W.1. Lectures commence at 8.30 p.m.

1956

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| Friday, April 13th | Marion Milner, B.Sc.: "Psycho-Analysis and Art." |
| Tuesday, April 17th | Donald W. Winnicott, M.A., F.R.C.P.: "Psycho-Analysis and the Sense of Guilt." |
| Tuesday, April 24th | Roger Money-Kyrle, M.A., Ph.D.: "Psycho-Analysis and Philosophy." |
| Friday, April 27th | Elliott Jaques, M.D., Ph.D.: "Psycho-Analysis and Social Problems in Industry." |
| Tuesday, May 1st | John Bowlby, M.A., M.D.: "Psycho-Analysis and Child Care." |
| Tuesday, May 8th | Ilse Hellman, Ph.D.: "Psycho-Analysis and the Teacher." |

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